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SUMMARY
The objective of this dissertation is to study covert communications over classical and
quantum channels. In contrast to the well-studied notion of secrecy, in which one attempts
to protect the content of information, covertness (or low probability of detection) requires
that the communication remains undetectable from an unwanted party, called the warden.
This goal is achieved by using coding schemes that mimic the output statistics of the chan-
nel when there is no communication. A fundamental result states that the optimal number
of transmitted bits scales as the square root of the number of channel uses when covert-
ness is achieved. Many standard information-theoretic tools, therefore, fail in this zero-rate
regime and one has to resort to the finite-length analysis of a protocol. In the first half of this
dissertation, we establish results pertaining to the fundamental limits of covert communica-
tion over classical channels. In particular, we refine asymptotics of covert communications
under three different metrics to measure covertness: relative entropy and variational dis-
tance between the probability distributions induced without and with communication, as
well as the optimal probability of missed detection at a fixed probability of false alarm; we
characterize the optimal throughput of covert communication over a non-coherent wireless
channel; we study the effect of warden’s knowledge of the code in covert communication.
In the second half of this dissertation, we investigate the fundamental limits of covert secret
key generation, in which two parties attempt to generate a secret key by using a classical or
quantum channel and a public authenticated channel. We develop a scheme when the war-
den can arbitrarily change the state of a classical channel; we provide achievability results
for covert secret key expansion over classical-quantum channels; we propose a scheme that
could achieve positive throughput for covert secret key generation over a bosonic channel.
Finally, in the last chapter, we study quantum steganography, in which the objective is to





The concept of information plays a canonical role at the heart of several sciences and tech-
nologies. Analogous to Issac Newton who provided precise meanings well-suited for math-
ematical theories for the terms colloquially used in everyday conversations such as force,
mass, etc., Claude Shannon developed the theory of information [1] in his 1948 paper A
mathematical theory of communication [2]. He defined information as a sequence of sym-
bols generated according to a random process and, in his words, considered the problem of
“reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another
point.” One year later, Shannon published another paper to investigate the naturally re-
lated problem of information secrecy in his established framework of information theory.
His formulation assumed no limit on the adversary’s computational power but considered
a statistical model for the message and the adversary’s observations.
While information security concerns including, but not limited to, confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and authenticity of information and the methods by which they are alleviated can be
traced back to ancient times, the development and dominance of computers with extremely
high computational power and wireless networks in the last century has fundamentally
altered the way we should think about these problems. Additionally, the surge of machine-
to-machine wireless communications as part of the development of the IoT has escalated
the privacy concerns and the risk of having sensitive data leaked. Although the celebrated
RSA encryption/decryption algorithm is a successful solution in contemporary communi-
cation systems and has numerous desirable features, it also possesses unsatisfactory as-
pects, such as relying on limits on the computational power of the adversary. The perhaps
complementary paradigm of information-theoretic security mentioned above could solve
this issue. In this chapter, we describe two security problems that could be investigated
1
from an information-theoretic point of view, covert communication and secret key genera-
tion. We then review the quantum information theory formalism and discuss its relation to
the secret key generation problem.
1.1 Covert Communication
1.1.1 Problem Formulation
While most information-theoretic security works to date have revolved around the issues
of confidentiality and authentication [3, 4, 5], the growing concern around mass communi-
cation surveillance programs has reignited interest in investigating the covertness of com-
munications, also known as LPD. In LPD problems, the objective is to hide the presence
of communication and not necessarily to prevent information leakage about the messages
transmitted. Following the analysis of LPD with space-time codes [6], recent works have
investigated the information-theoretic limits of covert communications over noisy chan-
nel [7, 8]. In particular, building upon concepts from steganography [9], the study in [7]
shows the existence of a “square-root law” for covert communication, which essentially
states that no more than O(
√
n) bits can be communicated covertly over n channel uses of
a memoryless channel.
We now review the formal model for point-to-point covert communication. As illus-
trated in Fig. 1.1, a legitimate transmitter (Alice) communicates with a legitimate receiver
(Bob) over a memory-less channel (X ,WY |X ,Y) in the presence of a warden (Willie) who
observes the communication through another memory-less channel (X ,WZ|X ,Z). There
is no loss of generality in ignoring the joint channel WY Z|X , as we shall see that results
only depend on the marginal channels WY |X and WZ|X . We use shorthands Px , WY |X=x,
P x , Px1⊗· · ·⊗Pxn , Qx , WZ|X=x, and Qx , Qx1⊗· · ·⊗Qxn . All parties are synchro-
nized and the communication is supposed to happen over n channel uses. An “idle” symbol
0 ∈ X corresponds to the expected input to the channel if no communication takes place,
i.e., Willie’s observation of the channel over n channel uses is distributed according to Q0
2
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Figure 1.2: Performance of warden’s tests
when there is no communication. The objective is for Alice to communicate a uniformly
distributed message W ∈M to Bob with a small probability of error while ensuring a low
probability of detection from Willie. The communication may be assisted by a uniformly
distributed shared secret key S ∈ K. To this end, Alice encodes (W,S) through an encoder
f : M× K → X n and Bob decodes W through a decoder φ : K × Yn → M. We as-
sume that the encoder and the decoder are known to all parties. Willie, on the other hand,
uses its observations to detect the communication. Formally, the warden applies a possibly
stochastic test t : Zn → [0, 1] to the output z of his channel and declares the existence of a
communication with probability t(z). Upon denoting the distribution of Willie’s observa-
tions that is induced by the encoder f by Q̂ , 1|M||K|
∑
m∈M,k∈KQ
f(m,k), the false alarm
3
probability and the missed detection probability of the test t are
α(t) , EQ0(t(Z)) and β(t; f) , 1− EQ̂(t(Z)), (1.1)
respectively. Given an encoder f , we can illustrate Willie’s performance by plotting the re-
gion D , {(α(t), 1− β(t; f)) : t : Zn → [0, 1]} in a two-dimensional plane (see Fig. 1.2).
Considering “blind” tests, which do not take the observations from the channel into account
and are defined as t(z) , p for all z and for some p ∈ [0, 1], the set
B , {(α, 1− β) : α > 0, β > 0, α + β > 1}, (1.2)
which is the region below the red line in Fig. 1.2, is always included inD. This observation
suggests the following informal criterion for covertness.
To ensure that Willie’s observations through his channel do not help him detect the com-
munication, the encoder f should be chosen such that D ≈ B.
There is no single way of formalizing the above criterion as there exists several tests,
and for each test t, there are two associated probabilities of error α(t) and β(t; f). One com-
monly used quantity to measure covertness in the literature is the relative entropy between




, for the following two reasons. First, by Pinsker’s inequality,
we have











is small, the performance is close to
a blind test for any test t. In addition, one could take advantage of the relations of the
relative entropy to other entropic quantities that appear in an information-theoretic analysis.
We adopt this covertness measure throughout this chapter and we shall investigate other
measures in the next chapters.
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Remark 1. The covert communication problem resembles steganography problem [10] in
many aspects. In both problems, Willie’s goal is to detect the existence of the communi-
cation, and similar scaling of the optimal number of bits has been established for both
problems, known as the “square root law” [11]. However, the main difference between
the two models is that the specific realization of the noise of the channel is unknown to all
parties in covert communication, while the transmitter often exactly knows the cover text
in steganography.
1.1.2 The Fundamental Limits of Covert Communication: Square-Root-Law
We state here the main result for covert communication, known as square-root-law, which
characterizes the asymptotically optimal number of bits that could be reliably and covertly
transmitted. This result serves as the counter-part to the traditional Shannon channel coding
theorem for covert communication.
Theorem 1. Let Px  P0 and Qx  Q0 for all x ∈ X and WZ|X ◦ P 6= Q0 for all
P ∈ P(X ) with P (0) 6= 1. Let Cn be a sequence of codes such that
1. Cn transmits a message of size Mn over n channel uses;





6 δ where Q̂n is the distribution of Willie’s observations
induced by Cn.
The optimal scaling of logMn is Θ(
√
















The main implication of Theorem 1 is that if we normalize the number of transmitted
bits by the number of channel uses, we asymptotically obtain zero. Instead, we normalize
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the number of bits by the square root of the number of the channel uses to obtain a “covert
throughput.” The maximum achievable throughput is given in (1.4).
Sketch of Achievability Proof of Theorem 1
We sketch the achievability proof in three steps. The main ideas are based on [12, 13].
A generic protocol Analogous to many information-theoretic achievability proofs, we
use a random codebook whose codewords are generated independently according to an iid
distribution P ⊗nn over X n. We shall specify later the distribution Pn, which depends on n,
unlike standard random coding. We also suppose that the random codebook is instantiated
from common randomness shared between Alice and Bob and unknown to the warden1 to
induce the distribution W ⊗nZ|X ◦P ⊗nn at Willie’s end. We address the de-randomization of the
protocol in the last step of the proof. LetMn be the message set and {Xm ∈ X n}m∈Mn
be the random codebook. Alice transmits Xm when the message value is m. Note that
the standard typical set decoding fails to achieve positive covert throughput because there
exists a positive but arbitrary small rate penalty in that analysis, which asymptotically dom-
inates the O( 1√
n
) rate of covert communication. We resort to a finite-length bound on the
















and choose Pn and |Mn| so that the above quantity vanishes.
Covert Process We now discuss how the distribution Pn should be chosen. First note that
if Pn does not depend n, D
(







itively, by increasing the number of samples the warden can improve its test). Therefore,
we have to ensure that by increasing n, WZ|X ◦Pn gets closer to Q0. Let P̃ be a distribution
1This is a non-uniform shared key, inconsistent with our assumption in Section 1.1.1. We shall, however
“uniformize” the shared key in the last step of the proof.
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2 P̃ (x) x 6= 0.
(1.6)







W ⊗nY |X ◦ P ⊗nn (Y)







Therefore, choosing logMn = nI(Pn,WY |X) − n
1
4 log n the probability of error vanishes




















W ⊗nZ|X ◦ P ⊗nn ‖Q⊗n0
)
= δ. (1.9)
We thus achieve the desired throughput and covertness.
De-randomization The amount of common randomness required in the protocol is much
larger than the size of the transmitted message. This could be mitigated by a technique
known as channel resolvability [14]. Let C1, · · · , CL be L independent instantiation of the
random codebook, which are sampled before the transmission and are known to Willie.
Alice and Bob share a uniformly distributed secret key of size L according to which they
choose one of the codes C1, · · · , CL. Conditioned on using the codebook C`, let ε(`) and
Q̂(`) be the probability of error at Bob and the induced output distribution at Willie, respec-






















`=1 Q̂(`) would be close to their mean with high
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Sketch of Converse Proof of Theorem 1
To establish a converse for covert communication, we first use Fano’s inequality to bound
the number of bits in terms of I(P n,WY |X) where P n is the average input distribution in-
duced by the code. We then invoke the covertness constraint to restrict the average induced
input distribution. Let {Cn}n>1 be a sequence of codes such that the probability of error at




6 δn. Let W,S,X,Y,Z be the random variables
corresponding to the message, the key, the input sequence, Bob’s output, and Willie’s out-
put, respectively when Cn is used. Following the calculations in [13, Eq. (82)-(87)], we
have
logMn 6
































1−Pn(0) x 6= 0
0 x = 0
(1.16)
We now exploit the covertness constraint to upper-bound 1− P n(0). By [12, 13],
D
(






Using the Taylor expansion of D
(
WZ|X ◦ P n‖Q0
)
in 1−P n(0), we have [12, Eq. (36)]
D
(





χ2(WZ|X ◦ P̃n, Q0) +O((1− P n(0))3) (1.18)
Combining (1.15), (1.17), and (1.18) yields the converse.
1.1.3 Beyond Point-to-Point Covert Communication
There have been several studies in recent years attempting to generalize the model dis-
cussed so far in various directions and scrutinize the assumptions therein. We review here
a subset of such studies.
1. Since communication systems typically include more than a single receiver and trans-
mitter, studying covertness in a multi-user network is of interest. The covert capacity
region of MACs and broadcast channels has been studied in [15] and [16, 17, 18],
respectively. Perhaps surprisingly, the covertness constraint helps us simplify the ca-
pacity region in multi-user problems, as the sum-rate constraint is inactive for MACs
[15], and time-division is optimal for a class of broadcast channels [17]. The routing
of information in a wireless network with multiple relay nodes and multiple wardens
has been also considered in [19].
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Figure 1.3: Model of secret key generation
scaling of the number of bits that could be transmitted covertly. In particular, the
authors of [20] have shown that achieving a positive rate is possible if the warden has
an inaccurate estimate of the channel noise.
3. The construction of efficient codes achieving positive covert throughput was studied
in [21, 22]. The main challenge in the code construction is that no linear code would
achieve the covert capacity [21, Lemma 1]. In [22], “a concatenated-style” code was
proposed, while the coding scheme of [21] is based on PPM and MLC.
4. The authors of [23] have extended covert communication to classical-quantum chan-
nels. In [24], the authors considered quantum key distribution with a covertness
constraint.
5. Covert communication when the warden does not know the exact transmission win-
dow has been studied in [25, 26], in which the scaling of the optimal number of bits
changes to O(min(n,
√
nT )), where T is the window size.
1.2 Secret Key Generation
To accomplish many cryptographic tasks, the legitimate parties (Alice and Bob) require
common randomness unknown to unwanted parties (traditionally named Eve for eaves-
dropper), which we call a secret key. Legitimate parties can distill the secret key from
correlated “partially” secure (in the sense that is formalized later) observations. To this
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end, Alice and Bob should know the joint statistics of Eve with their observations and be
connected by a bi-directional noiseless unlimited capacity channel whose output could be
observed by Eve (see Fig. 1.3). Let X ∈ X n, Y ∈ Yn, and Z ∈ Zn denote the obser-
vations of Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively, distributed according to P ⊗nXY Z . A secret key
generation protocol operates as described next.
1. Alice and Bob interactively communicate over the public channel for r-rounds as
follows. In the ith round, Alice first transmits CAi , a function of X, her local random-
ness, and previous communication over the public channel; Bob then transmits CBi ,
a function of Y, his local randomness, and previous communication over the public
channel.
2. After the rth round, Alice and Bob use all their available information to distill keys
KA and KB, respectively.
Let C denote all public communications and PKAKBCZ denote the joint distribution of





∥∥PKAZC − P unifKA ⊗ PZC
∥∥
1
to be small. The first constraint ensures that the keys generated
at Alice’s and Bob’s end are the same with high probability and the second constraint
ensures that Eve has negligible knowledge about the generated key and the key is uniformly
distributed.
Let us fix a probability distribution PXY Z and a positive real number R. We say that
the rate R is achievable if there exists a sequence of protocols {Pn} such that Pn generates





∥∥PKAZC − P unifKA ⊗ PZC
∥∥
1
vanish in the limit of large n. In general, the maximum achiev-
able rate for an arbitrary distribution PXY Z is unknown, although many achievability and
converse results have been established. The following theorem provides an achievability
result.
Theorem 2. The rate max(0, I(X;Y )−min(I(X;Z), I(Y ;Z))) is achievable.
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Sketch of proof. It is enough to show that I(X;Y )−I(Y ;Z) is achievable when I(X;Y ) >
I(Y ;Z). We recall two coding techniques, information reconciliation and privacy amplifi-
cation, essential to establish the achievability result.
Information Reconciliation Suppose Alice and Bob want to communicate over the pub-
lic channel in order to agree on the same (possibly non-secure) piece of information. In
particular, we prove in the following lemma how Bob can send a function of Y over the
public channel so that Alice can decode Y with the help of X.
Lemma 1 (Source coding with side information). Let (X,Y) be distributed according to
P ⊗nXY . Let R > H(Y |X) and F : Yn → J1, 2nRK be a random encoder that independently
and uniformly at random maps y to an element of J1, 2nRK. There exists a decoder φ :
X n × J1, 2nRK→ Yn (depending on F ) such that
lim
n→∞
EF (P(φ(X, F (Y)) 6= Y|F )) = 0. (1.19)
Sketch of proof. We adopt the standard notation of [27] for typical sets. Let φ be the typical
set decoder, i.e., φ(x, c) = y if y is the unique element of Yn such that (x,y) ∈ T εn (X, Y )
and F (c) = y. Let (x,y) be fixed. An error occurs if (x,y) is not typical or there exists
an element ỹ ∈ T εn (Y |x) with F (y) = F (ỹ). The first probability goes to zero. To
bound the second probability consider, note that |T εn (Y |x)| ≈ 2nH(Y |X) and for each ỹ,
P(F (ỹ) = F (y)) = 2−nR. Therefore, by the union bound the second probability goes to
zero too. See [28] for a detailed proof.
Privacy Amplification The objective here is to reduce Eve’s information at the expense
of decreasing the size of the initially shared information between Alice and Bob. The
following lemma states that, if we randomly “bin” Y, Eve obtains negligible information
about the bin provided that the number of bins is not too large.
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Lemma 2 ([29]). Let (Y,Z) be distributed according to P ⊗nY Z . Let R < H(Y |Z) and
F : Yn → J1, 2nRK be a random encoder that independently and uniformly at random









We are now ready to prove the theorem. Let F : Yn → J1, 2nR1K × J1, 2nR2K be
a random encoder where each output is chosen independently at random and R1 and R2
satisfy R1 + R2 < H(Y |Z) and R2 > H(Y |X). We can always choose such R1 and R2
with R1 arbitrary close to I(X;Y ) − I(Y ;Z). Defining (C,K) = F (Y), Bob transmits
C over the channel, Alice decodes Y from C and X. Alice then reconstructs K from her
estimate of Y. By Lemma 1, Alice decodes the message with high probability and by
Lemma 2, PC,K,Z is close to P unifC,K ⊗ P ⊗nZ .
Remark 2. The function F in both Lemma 1 and 2 could be chosen uniformly from a
family of two-universal functions [30] from Yn to J1, 2nRK. This could reduce the sample
space of F significantly. Furthermore, although one can argue that there exists a specific
instantiation f of F with good performance, Bob could always randomly sample F and
transmit it over the public channel.
1.3 Quantum Information Theory
1.3.1 Preliminaries
In quantum information theory, one revisits the Shannon theory of information by consid-
ering the quantum nature of information-processing devices. We review here the formalism
of quantum mechanics (see e.g., [31, 32] for a complete introduction).
Associated with each system A, there exists a Hilbert spaceHA; the state of the system
is described by a positive unit-trace linear operator ρA : HA → HA. Such operator is called
a density operator andD(HA) denotes the set of all density operators acting onHA. A state
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is pure if it is of the form |φ〉〈φ|A for some unit vector |φ〉A. We often use φA to denote
|φ〉〈φ|A. Let 1A denote the identity operator acting on HA. A measurement is a set M =
{Mi}i∈I such thatMi  0 for all i ∈ I and
∑
i∈IMi = 1A. The output of the measurement
M on a system in the state ρA would be tr (ρAMi). The Hilbert space corresponding to the
composition of the systems A and B isHA⊗HB. If the joint system is in the state ρAB, the
sub-systems A and B are in the states ρA = trB (ρAB) and ρB = trA (ρAB), respectively.
For a state ρA, we denote the von Neumann entropy byH(ρA) , H(A)ρ = −tr (ρA log ρA).
For a joint state ρAB, von Neumann conditional entropy and mutual information are de-
fined as H(A|B)ρ , H(AB)ρ − H(B)ρ and I(A;B)ρ , H(A)ρ − H(A|B)ρ, respectively.
For two states ρ and σ for the same system, we define three distances: the quantum rel-
ative entropy D(ρ‖σ) , tr (ρ(log ρ− log σ)) (if support (σ) * support (ρ), we define
D(ρ‖σ) = ∞), the trace distance ‖σ − ρ‖1 , tr
(√
(σ − ρ)†(σ − ρ)
)
, and the fidelity




. A quantum process with input systemA and output systemB can be
formally described by a completely-positive trace-preserving mapN : D(HA)→ D(HB).
The identity channel mapping each state in D(HA) to itself shall be denoted by idA. We
recall here some important facts that will be frequently used in the last three chapters.
Data Processing Inequality Let ρ and σ be in D(HA) and N : D(HA) → D(HB). We
have
D(ρ‖σ) > D(N (ρ)‖N (σ)) (1.21)
‖ρ− σ‖1 > ‖N (ρ)−N (σ)‖1 (1.22)
F (ρ, σ) 6 F (N (ρ),N (σ)) (1.23)
Spectral Decomposition All density operators are of the form
∑
i λi|ei〉〈ei| where λi >
0,
∑
i λi = 1, and {|ei〉} is an orthonormal basis for the underlying Hilbert space.
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Purification For any state ρA ∈ D(HA), there exists another system, called reference,
and a pure state |φ〉RA ∈ HA ⊗HR such that ρA = trR (φRA).
Schmit Decomposition Let |φ〉AB be a state in HA ⊗ HB. There exists orthonormal
family of vectors {|ei〉}i∈I ⊂ HA and {|fi〉}i∈I ⊂ HB and positive real numbers {λi}i∈I
with
∑




λi|ei〉 ⊗ |fi〉. One important consequence of
this results is that H(φ)A = H(φ)B for any pure state |φ〉AB.
Uhlmann’s Theorem Let σ and ρ be two density operators acting on the same space. Let
|φ〉AR and |ψ〉AR be purifications of ρ and σ, respective. We have [33]
F (ρ, σ) = max
U :unitary on R
|〈ψ|(1A ⊗ U)|φ〉|2. (1.24)
1.3.2 Quantum Key Distribution
We now discuss an application of quantum information theory, called quantum key distri-
bution. Note that in the secret key generation problem introduced in Section 1.2, a crucial
assumption is the knowledge of the statistics of the eavesdropper’s observation. The quan-
tum mechanics laws allow Alice and Bob to circumvent this assumption and to upper-bound
Eve’s information using only the statistics of their data. In particular, let Alice, Bob and
Eve share a tripartite state ρABE . We claim that
I(A;E)ρ 6 H(A)ρ + H(A|B)ρ . (1.25)
To see this, we take a purification |φ〉ABER of ρABE and note that
I(A;E)ρ 6 I(A;ER)φ = H(A)φ + H(ER)φ −H(AER)φ = H(A)ρ + H(A|B)ρ .
(1.26)
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Since privacy amplification works even when Eve’s observations are quantum [30], Alice
and Bob can ensure the security of the generated key by knowing only the statistics of their
observations. Note that to achieve a positive rate we need I(A;B)ρ−H(A)ρ +H(A|B)ρ >
0, which simplifies as H(A|B)ρ < 0. This inequality holds if and only if ρAB is entangled.
Based on this idea, numerous protocols have been introduced (see the survey [34]) for
quantum key distribution, overcoming many theoretical and experimental challenges.
1.4 Outline of the Dissertation and Related Publications
In the first three chapters of this dissertation, we consider the fundamental limits of covert
communication. In the following three chapters, we investigate the problem of secret key
generation over classical or quantum channels with covertness constraint. In the last chap-
ter, we study a related problem to covert communication, called quantum steganography.
In Chapter 2, we consider the finite block-length performance for covert communica-
tion under three covertness metrics: relative entropy, total variation, and minimum missed
detection at a fixed probability of false alarm. We find the optimal first-order asymptotics
for binary-input DMC for all three metrics. We also characterize the optimal second-order
asymptotics when the covertness is measured by the relative entropy and provide lower-
and upper-bounds on the second-order when the covertness is measured through total vari-
ation, and minimum missed detection at a fixed probability of false alarm. The results of
this chapter are based on the following publications.
• M. Tahmasbi and M. R. Bloch, “First and Second Order Asymptotics in Covert
Communication,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 65, no. 4, pp.
2190–2212, Apr. 2019.
• M. Tahmasbi and M. R. Bloch, “Second-Order Asymptotics of Covert Communica-
tions over Noisy Channels,” in Proc. of IEEE International Symposium on Informa-
tion Theory, Barcelona, Spain, Jul. 2016, pp. 2224–2228.
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In Chapter 3, we consider the problem of covert communication over non-coherent
fast Rayleigh-fading wireless channel. This problem is motivated by the fact the covert
capacity of AWGN channels is achieved by vanishing amplitude distributions, which makes
the detection of the phase difficult at the receiver. We characterize the covert capacity as
the solution to an optimization problem and show that the optimal distribution is discrete
with a finite number of mass points and establish an amplitude constraint on the position
of mass points. The results of this chapter are based on the following manuscript.
• M. Tahmasbi, A. Savard, and M. R. Bloch, “Covert Capacity of Non-Coherent Rayleigh-
Fading Channels.” submitted to IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, Oct.
2018.
In Chapter 4, we analyze how the knowledge of the warden about the code affects
the ability of the legitimate users to communicate covertly. We first show that when the
code is unknown, the square root law still holds. In addition, we consider the scenario in
which the warden does not know the code but has previous samples of its channel when
the code was used. We prove asymptotically tight lower- and upper-bounds on the number
samples required to “learn” the code. The results of this chapter are based on the following
manuscript.
• M. Tahmasbi and M. R. Bloch, “Covert communication when the code is unknown
at the warden,” accepted to Allerton Conference, August 2019.
In Chapter 5, we propose a formal model for secret and covert key generation using
public communication and n instances of a noisy channel. We develop achievability and
converse bounds for a passive warden. We then extend the achievability results for an active
warden who can arbitrarily change the state of the channel. The results of this chapter are
based on the following publications.
• M. Tahmasbi and M. R. Bloch, “Covert secret key generation,” in Proc. of IEEE
Conference on Communications and Network Security, Workshop on Physical-Layer
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Methods for Wireless Security, Las Vegas, NV, Oct. 2017, pp. 540–544.
• M. Tahmasbi and M. R. Bloch, “Covert Secret Key Generation With an Active
Warden,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 15, pp.
1026–1039, 2020.
In Chapter 6, we extend the results of Chapter 5 for a cq channels. This requires a
quantum channel resolvability result and a careful analysis of the error exponents. The
results of this chapter are based on the following publication.
• M. Tahmasbi and M. R. Bloch, “Framework for covert and secret key expansion over
classical-quantum channels,” Physical Review A, vol. 99, no. 5, p. 052329, May
2019.
In Chapter 7, we develop a protocol for quantum key distribution running over bosonic
channels satisfying a covertness constraint. Our protocol achieves the square root law with
(very) low throughput. While our results are slightly disappointing in that the range of
useful parameters is limited, they open the way to experimental demonstrations of covert
QKD. The results of this chapter are based on the following manuscript.
• M. Tahmasbi and M. R. Bloch, “Towards undetectable quantum key distribution over
bosonic channels,” submitted to Journal on Selected Areas in Information Theory.
Finally, in Chapter 8, we establish results for quantum steganography, in which the warden
has an inaccurate knowledge of the channel and the legitimate parties leverage this lack
of knowledge to perform a quantum information processing task without disturbing the
output statistics of the channel expected by the warden. We formalize the problem for
four combinations of quantum information processioning tasks, for which we establish
achievability results. The results of this chapter are based on the following references.
• M. Tahmasbi and M. Bloch, “Steganography Protocols for Quantum Channels,” in
Proc. of IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, Paris, France, Jul.
2019, pp. 2179–2183
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• M. Tahmasbi, M. R. Bloch, “Steganography Protocols for Quantum Channels,” sub-
mitted to Journal of Mathematical Physics.
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APPENDIX
1.A One-Shot Coding Results
As discussed in Section 1.1.2, we frequently resort to one-shot coding results in achievabil-
ity proofs of covert communication. We gather here the most useful results for the reader’s
convenience.
1.A.1 Classical Channel Coding
As depicted in Fig. 1.A.1, let (X ,WY |X ,Y) be a classical DMC, W be a message uni-
formly distributed over M, and f : M → X n be an encoder. The decoder forms the
maximum likelihood estimate of W as Ŵ , arg maxm∈MW ⊗nY |X(Y|f(m)). We then have
the following result in this setup.
Lemma 3 ([35]). Let PX be a probability distribution over X n and F : M → X n be a
random encoder whose codewords are iid according to a distribution PX. Let 0 < ε′ < ε <
1 and
log |M| 6 Dε−ε′s
(
PX ⊗W ⊗nY |X‖PX ⊗ (W ⊗nY |X ◦ PX)
)
+ log ε′, (1.27)
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Figure 1.A.1: Random coding for reliable communication
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We now replace (X ,WY |X ,Y) by a cq-channel x 7→ ρxB. Note that the decoder should
be a quantum measurement {Γm}m∈M while the encoder is still a classical function f :
M→ X n.
Lemma 4. ([36, Theorem 1]) Let PX, F :M→ X n, ε, ε′ be as in Lemma 3. Let
logM 6 Dε−ε′H (ρXB‖ρX ⊗ ρB) + log ε′, (1.28)
where ρXB ,
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB, ρxB , ρx1B ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρxnB , and
DηH(ρ‖σ) , − log inf
Q:06Q61,tr(Qρ)>1−η
tr (Qσ) . (1.29)













> 1− ε. (1.30)
1.A.2 Classical and Quantum Channel Resolvability
Let (X ,WZ|X ,Y) be a classical DMC andQx be defined as in Section 1.1.1. The following
result holds, which is known as channel resolvability.
Lemma 5. Let PX be a probability distribution over X n and F : M→ X n be a random
encoder whose codewords are independently sampled from PX. Let M, δ, δ′, λ be such
that
log |M| > D1−δ+δ′s
(
































QF (m) −W ⊗nZ|X ◦ PX
∥∥∥∥∥
1







Proof. (1.31) follows from [13, Lemma 2] and (1.33) follows from McDiarmid’s inequality
(see Theorem 5 in Appendix 1.B).
Let us replace (X ,WZ|X ,Z) by a cq-channel x 7→ ρxW . We have the following result.
Lemma 6. ( [37, Lemma 9.2]) Let PX and F be as in Lemma 3. Let ρxW , ρ
x1




























1.A.3 Privacy Amplification with Quantum Side Information
We first recall the definition of a two-universal family of hash functions.
Definition 1. Let X and Z be two finite non-empty sets. A non-empty family of functions





1{f(x) = f(x′)} 6 1|Z| . (1.35)
Moreover, F is called regular if for all f ∈ F and all z ∈ Z , we have |f−1(z)| = |X ||Z| ,
where f−1(z) , {x ∈ X : f(x) = z}.
The next two results are well-known properties of two-universal hash functions.
Proposition 1. Let X and Z be two non-empty finite sets such that |X | is divisible by |Z|.
There exists a two-universal regular family of functions from X to Z .
22
Proof. All functions f with f−1(z) = |Z||X | form a two-universal family of hash functions.
Lemma 7. ([30]) Let ρXA be a cq-state onHX ⊗HA with respect to an orthonormal basis






















We gather here four results from concentration of measure theory, which could be applied
to the one-shot results in Appendix 1.A when the channel is memory-less. A reader could
refer to standard texts on high dimensional probabilities for details and proofs (e.g., [38]).
Theorem 3 (Hoeffding’s Inequality). Let X1, · · · , Xn be independent random variables















Theorem 4 (Bernstein Inequality). LetX1, · · · , Xn be independent random variables such



















Theorem 5 (McDiarmid’s Inequality). Let X1, · · · , Xn be independent random variables
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belonging to a set X and g : X n → R be a function satisfying
sup
x1,··· ,xn,x′i
|g(x1, · · · , xi, · · · , xn)− g(x1, · · · , x′i, · · · , xn)| 6 ci, ∀i ∈ J1, nK. (1.39)
We have for all t > 0,





Theorem 6 (Berry-Esseen Theorem). Let X1, · · · , Xn be independent random variables
such that for k ∈ J1, nK we have E(Xk) = µk, σ2k = Var(Xk), and tk = E(|Xk − µk|3). If




k and T =
∑n














FUNDAMENTAL LIMITS OF COVERT COMMUNICATION: SECOND-ORDER
ASYMPTOTICS
2.1 Summary
We study the first- and second-order asymptotics of covert communication over binary-
input DMCs for three different covertness metrics and under the maximum probability of
error constraint. When covertness is measured in terms of the relative entropy between
the channel output distributions induced with and without communication, we characterize
the exact first- and second-order asymptotics of the number of bits that can be reliably
transmitted with a maximum probability of error less than ε and a relative entropy less than
δ. When covertness is measured in terms of the variational distance between the channel
output distributions or in terms of the probability of missed detection for a fixed probability
of false alarm, we establish the exact first-order asymptotics and bound the second-order
asymptotics. PPM achieves the optimal first-order asymptotics for all three metrics, as
well as the optimal second-order asymptotics for relative entropy. The main conceptual
contribution of this paper is to clarify how the choice of a covertness metric impacts the
information-theoretic limits of covert communications. The main technical contribution
underlying our results is a detailed expurgation argument to show the existence of a code
satisfying the reliability and covertness criteria. The content of this chapter is based on [39,
40].
2.2 Introduction
The square-root law of covert communication has been refined in several follow-up works [41];
in particular, the information-theoretic limits are now known for classical discrete and
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Gaussian memoryless channels [13, 12], classical-quantum channels [42, 23], and multiple-
access channels [43], when covertness is measured in terms of the relative entropy between
the channel output distributions induced with and without communication. Note that the
choice of relative entropy as a metric for covertness is guided in part by the natural connec-
tion between relative entropy and information-theoretic metrics, such as entropy and mu-
tual information, which have been largely explored in the context of information-theoretic
security [44].
The contribution of the present paper is twofold. First, as an attempt to develop oper-
ational characterizations of covertness, we study the information-theoretic limits of covert
communication for alternative metrics, including variational distance, and the probability
of missed detection. Second, motivated by the likely time-limited nature of covert com-
munications, we make a first step towards a finite-length analysis and extend the first-order
analysis of information-theoretic limits to second-order asymptotics. The specific results
developed in the present paper focus on binary-input pDMC to yield simple closed-form
expressions and are the following.
• We characterize the exact second-order asymptotics of the maximum number of reli-
able and covert bits that can be transmitted with maximum probability of error ε and
relative entropy δ between channel output distributions with and without communi-
cation (Theorem 7); this corrects an unfortunate error in the conference version [45],
in which we claimed erroneous second-order asymptotics for arbitrary codes with an
average probability of error ε.
• We characterize the exact first-order and bound the second-order asymptotics of the
maximum number of reliable and covert bits that can be transmitted with maximum
probability of error ε and variational distance δ between channel output distributions
with and without communication (Theorem 8).
• Finally, we characterize the exact first-order and bound the second-order asymptotics
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of the maximum number of reliable and covert bits that can be transmitted with max-
imum probability of error ε and probability of missed detection 1− α− δ when α is
the adversary’s probability of false alarm (Theorem 9).
All our achievability results are established using PPM, which optimality was previously
only established for the first-order asymptotics with relative entropy [46]. The operational
relevance of codes used in conjunction with PPM, which may be viewed as a highly struc-
tured subset of constant-composition codes, is justified by recent work towards practical
code design [21], in which PPM plays a crucial role. We also emphasize from the outset
that the focus on the maximal probability of error is essential to our analysis. As discussed
in Remark 3 and Appendix 2.A, there is no strong converse for average probability of error
without additional constraint; hence, considering the maximum probability of error as the
reliability metric is reasonable for second-order analysis.
The second-order asymptotics obtained with a relative entropy metric for covertness
are what could have been expected by extrapolating the results of channel coding in the
finite length regime [35] to the first-order asymptotics of covert communication [13, 12];
however, the proof requires specific techniques beyond those used to study the first-order
asymptotics of covert communications and second-order asymptotics of classical commu-
nication. First, as already mentioned, the achievability proof relies on PPM codes [46]
instead of iid random codes. Second, unlike the analysis of the second-order asymptotics
of reliable and secure communications [35, 47], we have to deal here with parameters cap-
turing reliability and covertness, with the latter appearing in the first-order asymptotics;
more specifically, the optimal coding scheme identified in [13] exploits a code with a bin
structure, in which each bin forms a reliability code for the legitimate channel indexed by
the secret key while the overall code forms a resolvability code for the adversary’s channel.
To prove the existence of a code with the desired characteristics, we expurgate a random
code after resorting to concentration of measure inequalities, such as McDiarmid’s inequal-
ity, and carefully analyzing the probability of error. We point out that our current results
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Figure 2.3.1: Model of covert communications over noisy channels
only identify the second-order asymptotics for the number of transmitted message bits and
do not characterize the second-order asymptotics for the number of key bits.
2.3 Problem Formulation
We consider the point-to-point covert communication setup described in Section 1.1.1 and
depicted in Fig. 2.3.1. Alice (the legitimate transmitter) is connected to Bob (the legitimate
receiver) and Willie (the warden) through the channels (X ,WY |X ,Y) and (X ,WZ|X ,Z),
respectively. We recall that the transmission of 0 ∈ X indicates no communication and we
denote Px , WY |X=x and Qx , WZ|X=x for all x ∈ X , as well as P x , Px1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Pxn
and Qx , Qx1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Qxn for all x ∈ X n. Alice wishes to transmit a message uniformly
distributed in a set M to Bob with the help of a secret shared key uniformly distributed
over K. Let Z denote Willie’s observations in n channel uses. The distribution of Z is
Q0 where 0 denotes the all-zero sequence in X n. We also denote by Q̂ the distribution
of Z when there exists communication. Motivated by the discussion in Section 1.1.1, we
measure the covertness as a “distance,” denoted by d(·, ·), between the distribution of Z
with and without communication, i.e., d(Q̂, Q0). Here is the formal definition of the covert
communication code.
Definition 2. A code C with message setM, key set K, and block-length n consists of an
encoder f :M×K → X n and a decoder φ : K×Yn →M. It is called an (M,K, ε, δ)davg
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code if





P f(m,k)({y : φ(k,y) = m}) > 1− ε. (2.2)
Let M∗(ε, δ)davg , sup
{
M : ∃(M,K, ε, δ)davg code
}
.
We similarly define an (M,K, ε, δ)dmax code and M
∗(ε, δ)dmax by replacing (2.2) by
max
m∈M,k∈K
P f(m,k)({y : φ(k,y) = m}) > 1− ε. (2.3)
In particular, we study three distances, namely, the relative entropy d(P,Q) = D(P‖Q),
vartional distance d(P,Q) = 1
2
‖P −Q‖1, and the minimum probability of missed detec-
tion at a fixed false alarm probability d(P,Q) = 1− α− βα(Q,P ).
Remark 3. Most of the previous studies of covert communication [12, 13] considered the
average probability of error; we study here both the average and the maximum probabil-
ity of error. The latter constraint captures a pragmatic requirement and is critical to our
second-order converse argument. As shown in Appendix A, analyzing the average proba-
bility of error is a different and (we believe) substantially more difficult endeavor for the
non-vanishing probability of error since there is no strong converse for the reliability pa-
rameter. This intriguing behavior appears because one can slightly increase the average
probability of error without any effect on covertness by simply adding all-zero codewords
to the codebook. This, of course, leads to what one would consider as “bad codes,” which
we avoid by focusing on the maximal probability of error.
Remark 4. The three covertness metrics discussed earlier have slightly different opera-
tional meanings. When enforcing that the probability of missed detection satisfy βα(Q0, Q̂) >
1 − α − δ for a fixed probability of false alarm α, one implicitly assumes that the adver-
sary optimizes its detector at a specific point of the ROC curve with known probability
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of false alarm. In contrast, when enforcing 1
2
‖Q̂−Q0‖1 6 δ, since α + βα(Q0, Q̂) >
1 − 1
2
‖Q̂−Q0‖1 for any probability of false alarm α, one essentially wishes to enforce
covertness irrespective of the exact operating point on the adversary’s ROC curve. Finally,
since 1
2
‖Q̂−Q0‖21 6 12D(Q̂‖Q0) by Pinsker’s inequality, the constraint D(Q̂‖Q0) 6 δ is
more stringent than when using variational distance, but only provides a loose proxy for
constraining the ROC curve since Pinsker’s inequality is not tight.1 The relations between


























where D denotes the relative entropy, V denotes varitional distance and βα denotes the
distance 1− βα(P,Q)− α.
2.4 Main Results
To simplify our results, we restrict the channels to binary-input channels, i.e., X = {0, 1}.
We also assume that Q1  Q0, P1  P0 and Q1 6= Q0. These assumptions are necessary
for our results to hold. In fact, without Q1  Q0, covert communication is impossible as
some input symbols detect the use of the non-innocent symbol with probability one. At the
other extreme, if Q1 = Q0 then no detector can distinguish the use of innocent and non-
innocent symbols so that the problem reduces to classical communication. Finally, without
P1  P0, Alice and Bob have an unfair advantage that allows them to exchange ω(
√
n) bits
covertly [13, Theorem 7]. Our main results in Theorem 7, Theorem 8, and Theorem 9 char-
acterize the maximum number of reliable and covert bits under the above assumptions. In
1See also the discussion in [13, Appendix A].
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all cases, the first and second terms behave as Θ (n
1
2 ) and Θ (n
1
4 ), respectively, as expected;
nevertheless, the constant behind Θ(·) is metric-specific.











4 +O(log n). (2.6)
This optimal number of message bits is obtained with a first-order optimal number of key
bits


















Theorem 8. Let d(P,Q) = 1
2






and ω , 2Γ√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
. We have






4 +O(log n), (2.9)
and


















4 +O(log n). (2.10)
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This number of message bits is obtained with a number of key bits





















Theorem 9. Let d(P,Q) = 1 − α − βα(Q,P ) and ε ∈]0, 1[, α ∈]0, 1[, and δ ∈]0, 1 − α[
be fixed. Let Λ , Q−1(1− α− δ), Υ , Q−1(α), and ω , Λ+Υ√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
. We have






4 +O(log n), (2.13)
and





















n 14 +O(log n). (2.14)
This number of message bits is obtained with a number of key bits





















We point out that the second order asymptotics in Theorem 8 and Theorem 9 are loose
because the parameters Γ, Λ, and Υ may be very small; in particular, because of the in-
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equalities (2.4), Theorem 7 is sometimes a tighter lower bound for small values of n. We
conjecture that the upper-bounds in (2.9) and (2.13) can be achieved, although we could
not establish it with our current proof techniques.
We illustrate the results of the three theorems with a simple numerical example. We
consider the situation in which (X ,WY |X ,Y) and (X ,WZ|X ,Z) are BSCs with cross-over
probability pm = 0.11 and pw = 0.45, respectively, and ε = 10−3, δ = 10−2, and α = 0.2.
Since the convergence to the asymptotic limit is slow (on the order of Θ(n−
1
4 )), we use a
log scale for the blocklength. As shown in Fig. 2.4.1, the choice of the covertness metric
results in different number of bits, which of course raises the question of which number to
settle on.



































Lower bound M∗V (n, ε,
√
δ/2)
Upper bound M∗V (n, ε,
√
δ/2)
Lower bound M∗β(n, ε,
√
δ/2, α)
Upper bound M∗β(n, ε,
√
δ/2, α)
Figure 2.4.1: Second-order approximation of maximum number of covert and reliable bits
as a function of blocklength. Both DMCs are BSCs with cross-over probability pm = 0.11
and pw = 0.45, respectively, and ε = 10−3, δ = 10−2, and α = 0.2. The dotted horizontal
lines indicate the optimal first-order asymptotics.
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2.5 Results for a General Distance
2.5.1 Information Specturm Divergence
Our achievability and converse results will be stated in terms of information spectrum di-
vergence [48] defined as follows.
Definition 3. Let µ and ν be two probability measures over the same space such that
ν  µ. We define














denote the Radon-Nykonym derivative.
We now review some useful properties.









2. For any third probability measure ω, we have
Dεs (µ⊗ ω‖ν ⊗ ω) = Dεs (µ‖ν) . (2.19)
































4. By Theorem 3 in Chapter 1, we have
D1−εs (µ











5. We now restrict ourselves to discrete probabilities for simplicity. For any PMF PX
and for all channels WY |X and VY |X , we have [48]
Dεs
(











To establish achievability results, we need a “continuity” condition on the metric d for the
following reason. For a random codebook whose codewords are generated independently
from a distribution PX, one can expect that if the size of the codebook is large enough the
induced distribution by the codebook is closed to W ⊗nZ|X ◦ PX. We can also choose PX
such that d(W ⊗nZ|X ◦ PX, Q0) is small. The continuity then allows us to bound the distance
between the induced distribution by the codebook and Q0.
Definition 4. Let L : R→ R be a function that maps positive numbers to positive numbers.
We say that a distance d is L-continuous at a distribution Q if
∀P1, P2 : |d(P1, Q)− d(P2, Q)| 6 L(‖P1 − P2‖1) (2.24)
The following theorem provides an achievability result for maximum probability of
error.
Theorem 10. Let d be L-continuous at Q0. Let PX be a probability distribution over X n.
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LetM and K be two sets and ε, δ′, ε′, δ′′, η, p, λ be real numbers such that














log |M|+ log |K| > D1−δ′+δ′′s
(











There exists an (η |M| , |K| , ε, L(δ′ + λ+ 1− η) + d(W ⊗nZ|X ◦ PX, Q0))dmax code.
Proof. See Appendix 2.B.
We provide here a high-level sketch of the proof. Following [13], the coding scheme
in the achievability proof consists of |M| × |K| randomly generated codewords xsw with
s ∈ K and w ∈M. The code is designed such that the following two properties hold:
(P1) the entire codebook {xsw}(s,w)∈K×M forms a resolvability code for the channel (X ,
WZ|X ,Z) approximating W ⊗nZ|X ◦ PX;
(P2) for every s ∈ K, with probability at least p (with respect to the random coding), there
exists a subset M̃ ⊂ M with
∣∣∣M̃
∣∣∣ > η |M| and sub-codebook {xsw}w∈M̃ forms a
reliability code for the channel (X ,WY |X ,Y) with a maximum probability of error ε.
One cannot ensure (P1) and (P2) by a standard expurgation argument, since one should
expurgate a small number of codewords to ensure that the induced output probability of the
expurgated codebook does not change much. We address this issue by a careful analysis of
the probability of error of a random codebook.
Remark 5. The extra term χ2
(
W ⊗nY |X ◦ PX‖P 0
)
+ 1 in (2.25), which does not appear in
[35, Theorem 18], is the penalty of using P 0 instead of the “true” probability distribution
of Y in our decoding rule. This sub-optimal bound yields the same first- and second-
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order asymptotics for covert communications, although it could certainly be improved for
a finite-length analysis; this choice, however, simplifies our calculations.
PPM Distribution
We now study the specific “PPM distribution,” which was used in [46] for covert communi-
cation; we subsequently use this distribution to generate random codes and combine them
with Theorem 10.
Definition 5 ((n, `)-PPM covert distribution). Given X = {0, 1} and n > ` > 1, we define





n : ∀i ∈ J1, `K :
im∑
j=(i−1)m+1







We then set P n,`X,PPM as the uniform distribution on B. We further define P n,`Y,PPM , W ⊗nY |X ◦







The PPM distribution P n,`X,PPM may be viewed as a way to generate structured constant
composition codewords; specifically, every codeword generated according to P n,`X,PPM con-
tains exactly ` 1-symbols, each located in a window of sizem, the quotient of the Euclidean
division of n by `. The structure of the PPM covert distribution plays a pivotal role in




have the same weight (unlike iid
distribution), which is essential to bound infx∈support(PX) Dε−ε
′
s (P
x‖QY) in (2.25); 2) the
structure P n,`X,PPM =
(
Pm,1X,PPM
)⊗` ⊗ P ⊗r0 simplifies the calculation of d(P n,`Z,PPM, Q0).
We devote the remainder of this section to the development of properties of PPM dis-
tribution, which are geared towards the use of Theorem 10.
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where (a) follows from (2.19) and (b) follows from (2.20). Since we have wt(x) = ` for




, we have (2.29).
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To prove (2.30), we define m , bn/`c. We then have
χ2(P
n,`


























































































where (a) follows from (2.23), (b) follows from (2.19), and (c) follows from (2.22).
We now bound d(P n,`Z,PPM, Q
0) for the three metrics.
































































Proof. See Appendix 2.C.
2.5.3 Converse
We now develop a generic converse for a distance d. The following result states that the
number of covert and reliable bits that one can transmit may be characterized by establish-
ing an upper bound on the weight of codewords. Such upper bounds are metric-specific,
and we develop them in Section 2.6.
Definition 6. For any distance d and real numbers w > 0 and δ > 0, let




PPX(wt(X) 6 w). (2.47)
Theorem 11. Suppose that there exists constants ω and C depending only on Q1, Q0 and
δ such that for all n large enough and γ small enough λd((ω − Cγ)n
1
2 , δ) > γ . We then
have















Proof. See Appendix 2.D.
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2.6 Covert Communication with Specific Covertness Metrics
We now leverage the general results established in Section 2.5 and specialize them to study
three covertness metrics: relative entropy (Subsection 2.6.1), variational distance (Subsec-
tion 2.6.2), and probability of missed detection (Subsection 2.6.3). As alluded to earlier, all
that needs to be done is: (i) establish that the metric under consideration is a quasi metric,
as defined at the beginning of Section 2.5; (ii) verify that the conditions of Theorem 10 and
Theorem 12 are satisfied.
2.6.1 Covertness in Relative Entropy
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 7.
Lemma 10. Suppose Z is finite and let PZ and QZ be two PMFs over Zn such that
1
2











































































Figure 2.6.1: The parameters in the proof of Theorem 7
where (a) follows from Fannes’s inequality.
Achievability of Theorem 7. Let ε, δ, and ω be as in Theorem 7. To use Theorem 10, we
choose parameters `n, P nX, ε
′




n, λn as in Table 2.6.1 where t will be determined
later. We then chooseMn and Kn such that
log |Mn| = inf
x∈support(PnX)












































4 +O(log n) +O(1) (2.58)
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and






































We also have pn > exp (−2|Mn|λ2n) as pn is constant and exp (−2|Mn|λ2n) tends to zero.




6 δ − 1√
n
. This is possible because of














δ′n + λn + 1− ηn

 (2.62)
6 δ − 1√
n









δ′n + λn + 1− ηn

 (2.63)















which is less than δ for large enough n. Therefore, Theorem 10 yields the existence of an
(ηn|Mn|, |Kn| , ε, δ)dmax where






4 +O(log n) +O(1) (2.65)
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with the required key size







Converse of Theorem 7. The converse follows from Theorem 11 and the following lemma.





Proof. Let PX be a distribution over X n such that D
(
W ⊗nZ|X ◦ PX‖Q0
)
6 δ. By [13,




where PX , 1n
∑
i=1 PXi . Moreover,















































2.6.2 Covertness with Variational Distance
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 8.
Achievability of Theorem 8. Let ε, δ, Γ and ω be as specified in Theorem 8. Similar to the
analysis for relative entropy, we use Theorem 10 with P nX , P
n,`n






6 δ − 1√
n


















The term Γ is what we would expect by inspection of (2.45) to obtain a variational distance







of a Taylor series of the Q function around Γ. Formally, we choose
√




















which will be sufficient to ensure (2.72). For a cubic equation of the form x3− px+ q = 0,









































































































































































where (a) and (b) follow since, for x close to zero, arccos(x) = π
2





























+O (1) , (2.79)









































































in (2.72) to guarantee that (2.83) is less than δ − 1√
n
. The rest of the proof
is exactly the same as the proof of Theorem 7 with the same parameter as in Table 2.6.1
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except for `n. 2
Converse for Theorem 8. The converse follows from Theorem 11 and the following two
lemmas.
Lemma 12. Assume that n is large enough and w is such that w/n and w2/n3/2 are small
enough. We have
βα(Q






















Proof. See Appendix 2.E.
We next establish a lower bound on λd(w, δ).















we have λd(w, δ) > γ.
Proof. Let PX be a PMF over X n such that 12
∥∥∥W ⊗nZ|X ◦ PX −Q0
∥∥∥ 6 δ. We want to show




X + (1− p)P
(2)
X (2.86)
such that P (1)X and P
(2)










∣∣∣ 6 ‖PZ −QZ‖1. This bound is tighter than what
we establish for the relative entropy in Lemma 10. We can therefore use the same continuity argument for



























∥∥∥W ⊗nZ|X ◦ P (2)X −Q0
∥∥∥
1
> 1− α− βα(Q0,W ⊗nZ|X ◦ P (2)X ) (2.90)
> 1− α− βα(Q0,
{







> 1− α− βα(Q0, {Qx : wt(x) > w}) (2.92)
(a)













where (a) follows form Lemma 12 and w = O(
√










substituting the bound in (2.93) in (2.89), we obtain that




























































> 2(1− p) (δ + 2γ)− 2p (2.97)
> 2(δ + 2γ)− 4p, (2.98)
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where (a) follows from the definition of w, and (b) holds upon a proper choice of C. Thus,
we have p > γ as desired.
2.6.3 Covertness with Probability of Missed Detection at Fixed Significance Level
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 9, in which d(P,Q) = 1−α−βα(Q,P ) for α ∈]0, 1[.
Lemma 14. For two distributions PZ and QZ over Zn, we have




Proof. Let T ⊂ Zn be such that Q0(T ) 6 α and PZ(T c) = βα(Q0, PZ) = 1 − α −
d(PZ, Q
0). We then have
d(QZ, Q
0) = 1− α− βα(Q0, QZ) (2.100)
> 1− α−QZ(T c) (2.101)




Achievability of Theorem 9. Fix ε ∈]0, 1[, δ ∈]0, 1 − α[, and n; we just show how we can
choose `n such that βα(Q0P
n,`n
Z,PPM) > 1− α− δ + 1√n and the rest of the proof is similar to
the proof for variational distance. Let Λ , Q−1(1 − α − δ) and Υ , Q−1(α); we wish to
































2 x + O(x2) for
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We form the cubic equation
x3 −
(























































































































































































































































































+O(x2) for x close to zero.
The proof of the converse of Theorem 9 requires the following steps similar to those of
covertness with variational distance. We lower-bound λd(w, δ) and then use Theorem 11.














we have λd(w, δ) > γ.
Proof. It follows from the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 13.
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2.7 Conclusion
We have developed an approach to study covert communication when covertness is mea-
sured with several distances. It is legitimate to ask which metric would make the most
sense from an operational perspective. While relative entropy is amenable to a fairly ex-
tensive information-theoretic analysis, as illustrated by our complete characterization of
second-order asymptotics in Theorem 7, variational distance, and probability of false alarm
are probably more adequate since they directly relate to the operation of an adversary at-
tempting to detect the communication. Since measuring covertness in terms of variational
distance does not impose any constraint on where the adversary operates on its ROC curve,
we believe that variational distance is perhaps the most operationally relevant covertness
metric.
Our results have been restricted to binary-input DMCs to obtain simple closed-form
expressions but extensions to arbitrary finite input alphabets may be obtained following the
approach of [12]; however several research questions remain open. We have not character-
ized the exact second-order asymptotics of covert communication with variational distance
and probability of missed detection metrics; we conjecture, however, that the upper-bounds
are achievable. We have also not characterized the second-order asymptotics for the num-
ber of key bits required; a close inspection of our current proof technique shows that we
explicitly rely on a law of large numbers to analyze the number of key bits, which one
would have to circumvent.
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APPENDIX
2.A The Effect of Average Probability of Error on First Order Asymptotics
Assume that the optimal second order asymptotics are of the form





for some function f that is strictly increasing in δ and does not depend on ε, which is what
we would hope to establish based on our results maximum probability of error. Now for
1 > ε > 0 and δ > 0, pick ε
1−ε > α > 0 and set ε
′ = (1 + α)ε − α, and δ′ = (1 + α)δ.
Since δ′ > δ and because of (2.116), we expect for all blocklengths large enough that
logM∗(ε′, δ′) > logM∗(ε, δ).
Consider now a code with M∗(ε′, δ′) codewords, and let Q̂′
n
be the distribution induced
at the eavesdropper’s output when randomizing uniformly over all codewords. Let S be a
set (with repetition) of N , αM∗(ε′, δ′) all-zero codewords. We construct a new code by
adding the set S to the previous code. The resulting code has average probability of error
Pavg = P
(
Ŵ 6= W |W ∈ S
)
P(W ∈ S) + P
(

















It also induces a new distribution Q̂n at the eavesdropper’s output when randomizing uni-






















We therefore obtain a new code with probability of error less than ε and relative entropy
less than δ, but with a number of codewords M∗(ε′, δ′) + N that exceeds M∗(ε, δ). This
contradiction shows that (2.116) does not hold, so that either f(δ) is non-increasing or δ
or depends on ε. In both cases, this suggests a result significantly more complex than what
we were trying to establish. Note that this does not contradict existing results on covert
capacity [12, 13] because these works have all been in the regime limn→∞ ε = 0. Finally,
from this example, we conclude that no strong converse exists when measuring reliability
with an average probability of error and even the first-order asymptotics depend on a non-
vanishing average probability of error. Hence, one could expect a much more challenging
analysis of second-order asymptotics under the average probability of error constraint.
2.B Proof of Theorem 10
We first prove a channel coding result. Let f :M→ X n be an encoder. We define for the
optimal decoder P erravg(f) and P
err
max(f) as the average and maximum probability of error,
respectively.
Lemma 16. Let PX be a probability distribution over X n and F :M→ X n be a random
encoder whose codewords are sample independently according to PX. Let M, ε ∈]0, 1[,
and ε′ ∈]0, ε[ be such that
log |M| 6 Dε−ε′s
(

















Additional, letM, ε, ε′, η, p be such that

















∃ M̃ ⊂M : |M̃| > η |M| , P errmax(F |M̃) 6 ε
)
> p. (2.120)
Proof. Note that (2.118) is a minor modification of [13] Using the bound in [13, Lemma

















Y |X ◦ PX‖P 0) + 1)
(2.121)
6 ε− ε′ +
|M| (χ2(W ⊗nY |X ◦ PX‖P 0) + 1)
Dε−ε′s
(
PX ⊗W ⊗nY |X‖PX ⊗ P 0
) (2.122)
6 ε. (2.123)
The proof of (2.120) is more subtle. For a fixed encoder f , let us consider the following
sub-optimal decoding rule. Upon observing a sequence y ∈ Yn, the receiver estimate the





If there is no or there exists multiple such m̂, the decoder declares an error. When the
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Let ε(1)m and ε
(2)
m be the probabilities of E (1)m and E (2)m , respectively, conditioned to the trans-
mission of f(m). Note that ε(1)m and ε
(2)
m are random variables for the random encoder F .












6 ε− ε′, (2.128)

















Y |X ◦ PX‖P 0) + 1) (2.129)
(a)
6 (1− λ1)(1− λ2)ε′, (2.130)
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where (a) follows from the definition of |M| and γ. Note next that
PF
(





∃ M̃ ⊂M : |M̃| > η |M| ,max
m∈M̃







































where (a) follows from (2.128), (b) and (c) follow from Markov’s inequality, and (d) fol-
lows from (2.130).
By Lemma 16 and (2.25), with probability at least p (with respect to the random cod-
ing), for each k ∈ K, there exists a subset M̃k ofM of size at least η |M| such that when
the value of the key is k and the message is restricted to the set M̃ the maximum probabil-
ity of error (of optimal decoder) is less than ε. By permuting the messages, we can assume
without loss of generality that M̃k = M̃ for all k ∈ K. Since the performance of the sub-
codes corresponding to each value of the key is independent, with probability at least p|K|
(with respect to the random coding), there exists a message set M̃ of size at least η |M| and
an encoder F̃ : M̃×K → X n such that the maximum probability under optimal decoding
rule is at most ε. Therefore, by (1.33) and (2.27), there exists an encoder f̃ : M̃×K → X n
such that the maximum probability of error under optimal decoding is less than ε, and its
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Qf(m,k) −W ⊗nZ|X ◦ PX
∥∥∥∥∥
1







































+ d(W ⊗nZ|X ◦ PX, Q0)
(2.140)
6 L(δ + λ+ 1− η) + d(W ⊗nZ|X ◦ PX, Q0), (2.141)
where (a) follows since d is L-continuous at Q0, and (b) follows from the trainable in-
equality.
2.C Proof of Lemma 9
We first prove a technical lemma.
Lemma 17. Suppose Z , (Z1, · · · , Zm) is distributed according to Q⊗m0 . Define A(z) ,
Q1(z)−Q0(z)
Q0(z)
and let B , 1
m
∑m
i=1A(Zi). Also define B with distribution P(B = b) ,
P(B = b|B 6= −1) and C , log(1 + B). There exists a constant 0 6 τ < 1 depending
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only on the channel such that





































































Suppose Z̃ , (Z̃1, · · · , Z̃m) is distributed according to Pm,1Z,PPM. Define B̃ , 1m
∑m
i=1 A(Z̃i),






B̃ = b|B̃ 6= −1
)



































































































Proof. We first show that the moments of B and B are close. Define κ , maxz:Q0(z)>0∣∣∣Q1(z)−Q0(z)Q0(z)
∣∣∣ and τ , PQ0(A(Z) = −1), which is strictly less than one because Q1  Q0,
and therefore, suppQ1 ∩ suppQ0 6= ∅. Notice that 12‖PB − PB‖1 = τm, |B| 6 κ and









κq‖PB − PB‖1 (2.157)
= κqτm. (2.158)
Therefore, it is sufficient to find E(Bi) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Note that
EQ0(A(Z)) = 0 (2.159)
EQ1(A(Z)) = χ2(Q1‖Q0) (2.160)



















































































































, and therefore, we have

























4(1−a)4 6 ln(1 + x); thus,




























































where (a) follows since minz:Q0(z)>0,Q1(z)>0A(z) > −1. Furthermore, for the variance of
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where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality.
We now calculate the moments with respect to PPM distribution. First note that if we
define P iZ(z) , Q1(zi)
∏





P iZ; therefore, for any
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. One can check that this property holds for all moments of B̃ and C̃. There-






























































































































































)∣∣∣ = O(τm) as was done earlier for B and B. Using
then the same bounds for log(1 + x) as before and the above calculations, we obtain the
desired bounds for the moments of C̃.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 9. By [46, Lemma 1], we have for n large enough
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To prove (2.45), note that for any two distributions P andQ, one can write 1
2
‖P −Q‖1 =
PP (P (X) > Q(X)) − PQ(P (X) > Q(X)). Therefore, if Z = (Z1, · · · , Zn) and Z̃ =
































However, note that P n,⊗`Z,PPM = (P
m,1
Z,PPM)
` ⊗ Q⊗r0 , and for any z = (z1, · · · , zn) with zi =






































































for A(z) , Q1(z)−Q0(z)
Q0(z)










































Furthermore, we consider two iid sequences B1, · · · , B` and B̃1, · · · , B̃` with distribution







B̃i = b|B̃i 6= −1
)
. (2.209)
Note that with τ , P(A(Z1) = −1) < 1, we have P(Bi = −1) = τm. By defining
Ci , log(1 + Bi) and C̃i , log(1 + B̃i), we will deal with random variables that take
finite values with probability one. We now replace C̃i by C̃i, and since C̃1, · · · C̃` are iid,







































































































































































and therefore, we have (2.45).
To lower-bound βα(Q0, P
n,`
Z,PPM), we use the Neyman-Pearson lemma, which states that







for some γ, then we have
βα(Q



































































































































2.D Proof of Theorem 11
We first prove finite-length converse results.
Theorem 12. Let w be a positive integer. For any (M,K, ε, δ)davg and real numbers p, q







1− p(1− λd(w, δ))
(2.224)















Proof. Let C = (f, φ) be a code with message setM and key set K inducing input distri-
bution PX over X n. Let us define εm,k , PP f(m,k)(φ(k,Y) 6= m) for m ∈ M and k ∈ K.





εm,k 6 ε, d(W
⊗n
Z|X ◦ PX, Q0) 6 δ. (2.226)
Upon defining S , {(m, k) : wt(f(m, k)) 6 w}, we have |S| /(|M| |K|) = PPX(S) >
λd(w, δ). Additionally, by Markov’s inequality, there exists k0 ∈ K such that





εm,k0 6 qε (2.228)
We therefore have for M̃ , {m ∈M : (m, k0) ∈ S},
∣∣∣M̃







1− p(1− λd(w, δ))
. (2.230)
Let P̃X denote the uniform distribution over f(M̃× {k0}). Applying Fano’s inequalty, we
obtain that






























which is the desired bound.
Now suppose that C is (|M| , |K| , ε, δ)dmax. As before, we define S, for which we have
|S| > λd(w, δ) |M| |K|. There exists k1 ∈ K such that |S ∩M× {k1}| > |S| / |K| >
λd(w, δ) |M|. Thus,


























where (a) follows form [35, Theorem 31] and (b) follows from [48, Lemma 2.4]
Consider a sequence of (Mn, Kn, ε, δ)dmax codes and let γn , n
− 1
2 . Using Theorem 12
for wn = (ω − Cγn)n
1
2 and ηn = n−
1



























































4 +O(log n), (2.245)
69
where (a) follows from (2.19), and (b) follows from (2.21).
We now consider a sequence of (Mn, Kn, εn, δn)davg with limn→∞ εn = 0 and lim supn→∞
δn = δ. Let {γn}n>1 be such that limn→∞ γn = 0 and set wn = (ω−Cγn)n
1
2 . Let {pn}n>1









Setting qn = ε
− 1
2























> 0. One can check that γn tends to zero as
n→∞, log 1












2.E Proof of Lemma 12
Let A(z) , Q1(z)−Q0(z)
Q0(z)
and









Let T , {z ∈ Zn : ∑ni=1A(zi) > τ} for τ determined later. By Theorem 6 in Chapter 1,
we have


















PQx(T c) 6 1−Q
(
τ − nµ0 − wt(x)(µ1 − µ0)√
nσ20 + wt(x)(σ21 − σ20)
)
+
6 (nt0 + wt(x)(t1 − t0))








nσ20 + wt(x)(σ21 − σ20)
)
+
6 (nt0 + wt(x)(t1 − t0))





where (a) and (b) follows since µ0 = 0. This yields that
βα(Q



































































(σ21 − σ20)− µ1 (2nσ20 + w′(σ21 − σ20))





The nominator in (2.256) is negative for large n because the first term is O(
√
n) and the













































































FUNDAMENTAL LIMITS OF COVERT COMMUNICATIONS: WIRELESS
NON-COHERENT CHANNEL
3.1 Summary
The covert capacity is characterized for a non-coherent fast Rayleigh-fading wireless chan-
nel, in which a legitimate user wishes to communicate reliably with a legitimate receiver
while escaping detection from a warden. It is shown that the covert capacity is achieved
with an amplitude-constrained input distribution that consists of a finite number of mass
points including one at zero and numerically tractable bounds are provided. It is also con-
jectured that distributions with two mass points in fixed locations are optimal. The content
of this chapter is based on [49].
3.2 Introduction
For DMCs, the covert-capacity achieving input distribution takes the form of sparse sig-
nalling corresponding to those symbols that might arouse suspicion if transmitted, are used
a fraction 1/
√
n of the time if n is the block length. Perhaps surprisingly, sparse sig-
nalling does not achieve the covert-capacity of AWGN channels, as the optimal coding
scheme exploits instead Gaussian or BPSK [12] signaling with an average power vanish-
ing as O (1/n). In other words, encoding information in the phase of modulation symbols
together with a diffuse power is crucial for optimality. Gaussian signaling has therefore
been used to further study covertness over Gaussian and wireless channels, as in [20, 50]
to show the benefits of uninformed jammers, in [51] to analyze the role of randomized
timing, in [52] to study the effect of randomized power allocation, and in [53] to analyze
covert relaying strategies. We note that all aforementioned works exploit random Gaus-
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sian codebooks, which simplifies the covertness analysis by reducing the optimal attack
to a radiometer. In contrast, we analyze covertness with non-random codebooks using the
conceptual approach laid out in [13].
While Gaussian codebooks provides valuable insight into the properties of coding schemes
for covert communications over AWGN channels, operating in the vanishing-power regime
as suggested by the results might prove challenging. In particular, not only may phase-lock
loops fail to properly track the phase of the transmitted signals but symbols with low am-
plitude may also be severely affected by phase noise, resulting in a significant degradation
of the transmission reliability. These effects are also likely to be amplified by the presence
of fading in wireless links. The objective of the present paper is to develop insight into this
problem by characterizing the covert capacity of non-coherent fast Rayleigh-fading chan-
nels (Theorem 13 in Section 3.4), in which the phase is uniformly distributed over [0; 2π[;
although no channel state information is available to the transmitter and receivers, some
symbol-level synchronization is assumed.
Our analysis of the covert capacity for non-coherent channels builds upon the ideas
initially developed in [54, 55] for amplitude constrained channels and extended to [56] for
memoryless non-coherent Rayleigh fading channels under an average power constraint. In
particular we show that an optimal covert capacity achieving input distribution is discrete,
with one mass point located at zero and subject to an amplitude constraint. While the
discrete nature of the distribution may not be a surprise, the fact that the location of the
mass points is bounded results from the specific nature of the covertness constraint. We also
conjecture that two mass points in fixed locations is actually optimal, which is supported
by numerical results although we do not have a formal proof. Overall, our results suggest
that, in the presence of phase uncertainty, sparse signaling might be an efficient modulation
scheme for covert communication.
Our proof technique follows for the most part the high-level approach outlined in [54,
55, 56]; however, the covert communication constraint makes the analysis more intricate
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as the optimal capacity-achieving input distribution turns out depend on the block length.
In particular, the converse arguments for single-letterization lead to a parameter-dependent
constrained optimization problem, in which the parameter should be taken to zero as the
blocklength goes to infinity (see the statement of Theorem 13 and (3.18) in Section 3.5).
This requires us to analyze the fine dependence of the objective function and the Lagrange
multipliers as a function of a parameter using ideas from sensitivity analysis [57].
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.3, we review the notation
in use in this chapter and in Section 3.4, we introduce the precise model for covert com-
munication over non-coherent Rayleigh-fading channels and discuss our characterization
of the covert capacity. In Section 3.5, we develop the converse proof of our main result.
3.3 Notation and Conventions
In this chapter, we use continuous probability spaces, which requires its own notation.
Let (S,F) be a measurable space. When S is a subset of R, we always consider the σ-
algebra induced by Borel sets, which converts S to a measurable space. Let f : S → R
be measurable and µ be a measure over S ⊂ R. We call f integrable if
∫
S |f |dµ < ∞.
We then denote the Lebesgue’s integral by
∫
S f(x)dµ. If S =]a, b] and µ is the Lebesgue’s








f . If µ is a probability measure,
X : S → R is a random variable, and A is an event, we use Pµ(A) and Eµ(X) to denote
µ(A) and
∫
S X(s)dµ, respectively. When the probability measure µ is discrete, it can be
characterized with a PMF P : S → [0, 1] satisfying µ(A) = ∑s∈A P (s). When the




f(s)ds. We do not distinguish between a probability measure and its
PMF or PDF (if they exist). The product of two measures µ and µ′ is defined in the standard
way and is denoted by µ ⊗ µ′. We define the relative entropy between two probability







is the Radon-Nikodym derivative.





− 1. We define I(X;Y ) ,
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D(µXY ‖µX ⊗ µY ) where µXY , µX and µY denote the probability measures associated to
(X, Y ), X , and Y , respectively.
Let X and Y be two subsets of R. A channel wY |X from X to Y is a mapping x 7→ µx
where µx is a probability measure on Y . If µx is always continuous, we write wY |X(y|x) to
denote the PDF of µx. If µ is a probability measure on X and wY |X : x 7→ µ′x is a channel
from X to Y , we define a joint probability measure wY |X ⊗ µ on X × Y as
(µ⊗ wY |X)(E) ,
∫
µ′x(Ex)dµ, (3.1)
where Ex , {(x̃, ỹ) ∈ E : x̃ = x}. We also define the marginal probability measure
induced on Y by wY |X ◦ µ. If X and Y denote the joint random variables associated to the
measure µ⊗wW |X , we allow ourselves to denote their mutual information by I(µ,wY |X) ,
I(X;Y ).
3.4 System Model
We consider the fast Rayleigh-fading wireless channel illustrated in Fig. 3.4.1, in which at
every time instant, the input-output relationships are given by
Y = HmX +Nm and Z = HwX +Nw, (3.2)
where X is the channel input, Y is the received signal at the legitimate receiver, and Z
is the received signal at the warden attempting to detect the transmission. The fading co-
efficients Hm and Hw are independent complex circular Gaussian random variables with
zero-mean and variances θ2m and θ
2
w, respectively. The noises Nm and Nw are also indepen-
dent zero-mean complex circular random variables with variance σ2m and σ
2
w, respectively.
Furthermore, we assume that the channels are stationary and memoryless. The fading co-
efficients are unknown to all parties, who only have access to their statistical distributions.
Since the phase of the fading parameters is uniform, information can only be encoded into
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the magnitude of X; additionally, |Y |2 and |Z|2 become sufficient statistics for detection.
Hence, as shown in [56], upon re-labeling |X|2 by X and the outputs |Y |2 and |Z|2 by Y
and Z, the non-coherent channel is effectively a new memoryless channel with input and



























By properly normalizing Y and Z, we can assume that σw = σm = 1, and by normalizing
X , we can further assume that θw = 1. Thus, we can parameterize the channel by a single
parameter1 θm, for which the transition probabilities are


















Although the input and output sets of the channels are all equal to [0,∞[, we distinguish
them with the labels X , Y , and Z for the input set, the output of main channel, and the
output of the warden’s channel, respectively.
Figure 3.4.1: Covert wireless channel
We next formally describe the covert communication problem in the wireless setting;
as depicted in Fig. 3.4.1, the transmitter aims to communicate a message W ∈ J1,MnK
1Note that θm in (3.4) is different from θm in (3.6).
76
by encoding it into a sequence X = (X1, · · · , Xn) of n symbols using a publicly known
coding scheme. Upon observing the corresponding noisy sequence Y = (Y1, · · · , Yn), the
receiver forms an estimate Ŵ of W . The encoding and decoding may also use a pre-shared
secret key S with an arbitrary distribution over a measurable space.2 The objective of the
warden is to detect the presence of a transmission based on its noisy observation Z =
(Z1, · · · , Zn). The requirements for reliable and covert communication may be formalized
as follows. We let q̂Z denote the output distribution induced by the coding scheme and
q⊗n0 the product output distribution expected in the absence of communication when the
channel input is set to x = 0. The performance of an (Mn, n) code transmitting one of Mn
message over n channel uses is then measured in terms of the average probability of error
P(Ŵ 6= W ) and in terms of the relative entropy D(q̂Z‖q⊗n0 ).34 Let δ > 0. We say that a
covert throughput R is δ-achievable if there exist (Mn, n) codes of increasing block length
n such that
logMn = ω(log n), lim
n→∞
P(Ŵ 6= W ) = 0, (3.7)
lim sup
n→∞





The covert capacity, Cno-CSI(δ), is defined as the supremum of all δ-achievable covert
throughputs. Note that we do not specify δ in our terminology of achievable through-
put, since it turns out that the normalization of logMn in (3.7) removes the dependence on
δ.
2We show in our achievability proof that a key uniformly distributed over a discrete set with size O(Mn)
is sufficient to achieve the covert capacity.
3The constraint D(q̂Z‖q⊗n0 ) 6 δ ensures that, regardless of the test performed by the adversary, the sum
of the probability of missed detection and false alarm is lower-bounded by 1 −
√
δ. Please refer to [13,
Appendix A] for a detailed discussion of the operational meaning of an upper-bound on the relative entropy.
4 The choice of this specific relative entropy to measure covertness is driven in part by the ease of analysis
using channel resolvability techniques. One could of course consider alternative metrics, such as variational
distance or a relative entropy with a reversed order of arguments, as discussed in [13, 39]. While the op-
erational meaning of these other metrics remains the same, the analysis and the exact dependence on the
constraint δ is metric-specific.
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Theorem 13. Let Ω̃>0 be the set of discrete probability measures over ]0, 1[ with a finite























Theorem 13 provides useful insight into the problem of covert communication over
non-coherent channels in several regards. First, a straightforward calculation shows that





. The expression in
(3.9) is therefore a counterpart of [13, Corollary 3] and [12, Eq. (28)]. Second, Theorem 13
shows that we may restrict the signaling schemes for covert communications to finite and
amplitude bounded constellations; while the finite nature of the constellation was somewhat
expected from the non-coherent nature of the channel, the bound on the amplitude of the
points is perhaps more surprising as it was not imposed a priori. We numerically evaluate
and plot in Fig. 3.4.2 (3.9) when the number of mass points in µ is fixed using a brute-
force search. Based on our numerical results, we conjecture that two mass points and OOK
signaling is optimal for covert communication.
We omitted the achievability proof, which could be done by pursuing the same approach
as in [13, 12]. Please refer to [49] for the complete proof.
3.5 Converse Proof of Theorem 13
Before delving into the detailed proofs, we first provide the sketch of the various steps of
the converse proof.
78


























Number of mass points = 1
Number of mass points = 2
Number of mass points = 3
Figure 3.4.2: Numerical evaluation of bounds on covert capacity.
1. We first follow the reasoning of the converse proof of [13] to show that if R is a
δ-achievable rate, then there exists a sequence of probability measures {µn}n> over




6 δ/n for n and







2. We show that the probability measure µn can be further restricted to be discrete
with a finite number of mass points and a mass point at zero. This is achieved by




and adapting some techniques developed in [56].
3. We prove that we can still upper-bound a covert throughput even if we constraint the
amplitude of µn as max(support (µn)) 6 1 + ζ for any ζ > 0.
4. Let {µn}nn > 1 be a sequence of probability measures such that µn has a finite
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3.5.1 Step One: a General Converse for Covert Communication
We consider a sequence of code {Cn}n>1 where each code Cn can transmit logMn bits with
probability of error εn and relative entropy at most δn, and we have limn→∞ εn = 0 and
lim supn→∞ δn 6 δ. If (X,Y,Z) denotes the input and the output of the channels when Cn
is used and p̂XYZ denotes the joint distribution, a standard application of Fano’s inequality
yields
logMn6
I(X; Y) + Hb (εn)
1− εn
6
I(X; Y) + 1
1− εn
, (3.14)
where Hb (x) , −x log(x) − (1 − x) log(1 − x). One can then upper-bound the mutual




I(Xi;Yi) 6 nI(X̃n; Ỹn), (3.15)





and pX̃nỸn(x, y) , pX̃n(x)px(y). Note that limn→∞ nI(X̃n; Ỹn) = ∞ since we assumed
that logMn = ω(log n). Following [59, 12], one can also lower-bound the relative entropy
as
δn > D(p̂Z‖q⊗n0 ) >
n∑
i=1
D(p̂Zi‖q0) > nD(pZ̃n||q0), (3.16)
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where the sequence of distributions {pX̃nỸnZ̃n}n>0 is subject to the constraint D(pZ̃n‖q0) 6
δn
n
. This completes the first step of the converse proof.
3.5.2 Step Two: Discreteness of the Optimal Distribution









∞. The next lemma shows that there exists a unique maximizer to the above problem.





6 ν and I(µ∗ν , wY |X) = A(ν).
Proof. See Appendix 3.E.
We next characterize the unconstrained form of the optimization in (3.18).













and µ∗ν is the unique maximizer of the above optimization.
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2. Define
















For all µ ∈ Ω, we have
A(ν) > Eµ(w(X,µ∗ν , ν)). (3.21)
3. Given µ1 ∈ Ω, we have for all µ ∈ Ω,
A(ν) > Eµ(w(X,µ1, ν)). (3.22)
if and only if
w(x, µ1, ν) 6 A(ν) ∀x ∈ X , (3.23)
w(x, µ1, ν) = A(ν) ∀x ∈ support (µ1). (3.24)
4. We have limν→0+ γ(ν) =∞ and limν→0+ γ(ν)ν = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 3.E.
Lemma 19. There exists ν0 > 0 such that for all 0 < ν 6 ν0, support (µ∗ν) is discrete with
a finite number of points in any bounded interval.
Proof. Fix some ν > 0, and define r(y) , (wY |X ◦µ∗ν)(y) and f(z) , (wZ|X ◦µ∗ν)(z). We
assume that there exists an interval with an infinite number of points in support (µ∗ν) and
obtain a contradiction for ν small enough in four steps.
Step 1: We first use the argument in [56] to show that the KKT condition in (3.24)
holds for all x > 0. By the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, there exists a convergent se-
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quence {xi}i>1 in support (µ∗ν). Moreover, by (3.24), for any x ∈ support (µ∗ν), we have
φν(x) , w(x, µ
∗













dz − A(ν) + γ(ν)ν = 0.
(3.26)
We now show that φν(x) is analytic in x over the domain D , {x : R(x) > 0}. Note that
∫∞
0
px(y) log px(y)dy = − log(1 + θmx) − 1 and
∫∞
0
qx(z) log q0(z)dz = −1 − x, which




























































|px(y) log r(y)|dy is uniformly bounded on any compact subset of D, and
Theorem 17 yields that
∫∞
0




qx(z) log f(z)dx is also analytic over D and therefore φν is analytic. Since φν(x)
is an analytic function overD, and φν(x) = 0 over a set with a limit point inD, the identity




px(y) log px(y)dy = − log(1+θmx)−1 and
∫∞
0
qx(z) log q0(z)dz = −1−x,
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we can re-write




px(y) log r(y)dy − γ(ν)
∫ ∞
0
qx(z) log f(z)dz. (3.32)
To obtain a contradiction, we cannot use the Laplace transform approach of [56] because
there are two integrals in (3.32), which is therefore the sum of two Laplace transforms with
different arguments. Hence, we continue the proof with another approach.
Step 2: In this step, we shall find the supremum of the support of µ∗ν in terms of
γ(ν). We first consider any non-zero point x̃ ∈ support (µ∗ν) and any ∆ ∈]0; x̃[. Since
x̃ ∈ support (µ∗ν), there exists δ > 0 with µ∗ν (]x̃−∆, x̃+ ∆[) = δ. Thus, for any y, by

















∣∣∣∣X ∈]x̃−∆, x̃+ ∆[
)
µ∗ν(]x̃−∆, x̃+ ∆[) (3.34)
>
δ




and similarly, lower-bound f(z) by
f(z) >
δ




Substituting these bounds in (3.32), we obtain



















= − log(θ2mx+ 1)− 1− γ(ν)(1 + x)− A(ν) + γ(ν)ν
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− log δ








1 + x̃+ ∆













where κ is a constant not depending on x. Since (3.39) holds for all x, by taking the limit
x→∞, we should have
γ(ν)
x̃−∆













which implies that x∗ , sup(support (µ∗ν)) < ∞. Furthermore, upon finiteness of x∗, we
have r(y) 6 e
− y
1+θ2mx
∗ , and f(z) 6 e−
z
1+x∗ . Replacing these upper-bounds in (3.32), we
obtain








































∗ > 0. (3.45)
85
By definition of the support of a distribution, it should be closed, and therefore, x∗ ∈









∗ = 0. (3.46)
Step 3: Using the equality for x∗ in (3.46), we derive an upper-bound on A(ν)
depending on γ(ν) and ν. By definition of µ∗ν , it holds that


































































∗ (2√ν + ν
)
, (3.56)
where (a) follows from log(1 +x) > x−x2/2 for x > 0, and (b) follows from Lemma 28.




























Step 4: We complete the proof by obtaining a contradiction. Lemma 33 part 4
implies that there exists ν0 > 0 and C > 0 such that A(ν) > C
√
ν for all 0 < ν 6 ν0.




θ4m(1 + |1− θ4m|)
)
in
addition to A(ν) > C
√
ν for all 0 < ν 6 ν0. Since by decreasing ν0, the statement would
be weaker, we can always assume that ν0 < 1. Thus,
C
√
































Lemma 20. There exists ν0 > 0 such that for any ν0 > ν > 0, the support of µ∗ν has a
finite number of points.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Assume that the support of µ∗ν has infinitely many
points {xi}∞i=1 in increasing order with probabilities {αi}∞i=1. Since we proved that in any
bounded interval, we can only have a finite number of points, limi→∞ xi = ∞. Note that
for any j > 1, we have






(wZ|X ◦ µ∗ν) (z) > αjqxj (z) . (3.65)
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dz − A(ν) + γ(ν)ν
(3.67)














− A(ν) + γ(ν)ν (3.68)









where κ is a constant not depending on x. Furthermore, the KKT condition in (3.24)








Because xj can be large enough, we have−γ(ν) > 0. This cannot be true for small ν since
limν→0+ γ(ν) =∞ by Theorem 14.
Lemma 21. There exists ν0 > 0 such that for all ν0 > ν > 0, µ∗ν has a mass point at 0.
The proof of Lemma 21 will require the following technical result which is a modifica-
tion of [56, Lemma 1].
Lemma 22. Let f(z) be a PDF with mean m and g(z) be a strictly monotonically increas-
ing function, then
∫
(z −m)f(z)g(z)dz > 0.
Proof. (z−m)(g(z)−g(m)) is always positive as either the product of two negative terms





(z −m)g(m)f(z)dz = 0.
Proof of Lemma 21. Let ν0 be as in Lemma 20 so that µ∗ν has finite number of mass points
for all 0 < ν 6 ν0. For the sake of a contradiction, assume that µ∗ν is a discrete probability
measure over X with k mass points 0 < x1 < · · · < xk with corresponding probabil-
ities α1, · · · , αk. In [56], it is proved that reducing x1 increases the mutual information









































1+x1 (z + x1 + 1) (2z + Eµ(X) + 1) . (3.73)
The right hand side of (3.73), is bounded with an integrable function of z independent of













































Since 1 > 1
x1+1




+ 1 is strictly monotonically increasing
in z. Using Lemma 22,
∂D(wZ|X◦µ‖q0)
∂x1





6 ν still holds and I(µ,wY |X) is increased. This contradicts with the
definition of µ∗ν , and therefore, there exists a mass point at zero.
3.5.3 Step Three: an Amplitude Constraint
For a probability measure µ on X and a > 0, we define Ca[µ] as a new probability measure





µ(]−∞, x[) x < a,
1 x > a.
(3.77)
Intuitively, µ̃ is obtained by moving all probability of ]a,∞[ in µ to a mass point at a.








) 6 lim infn→∞
I(Ca[µ∗νn ], wY |X)√
D
(
wZ|X ◦ Ca[µ∗νn ]‖q0
) . (3.78)
To prove this result, we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 23. If µ is a discrete probability measure on X with finite number of mass points
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I(Ca[µ], wY |X) > I(µ,wY |X)− θ2mmax(support (µ))µ(]a,∞[). (3.80)

















Hence, by moving all mass points located in ]a,∞[ to a to obtain Ca[µ], we decrease the rel-
ative entropy. Applying the same argument to the channelwY |X , we have D
(





wY |X ◦ µ‖p0
)































































θ2mxi − log(1 + θ2mxi)
)
(3.87)
6 θ2mmax(support (µ))µ(]a,∞[). (3.88)
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Lemma 24. For all a > 0, there exist ν0 > 0, x̃ ∈ X , and ξ > 0 such that for all





Proof. Fix ν > 0 small enough and suppose that µ , µ∗ν has mass points x1 < · · · < xk
with corresponding probabilities α1, · · · , αk. Let r(y) , (wY |X◦µ)(z) and f(z) , (wZ|X◦












in the KKT condition (3.24) for the point x = xk, we obtain
















Since limν→0+ γ(ν)ν = 0, for small ν, −1 − A(ν) + γ(ν)ν 6 0, and therefore, (3.90)
implies that
0 6 −γ(ν)(1 + xk)
a
1 + a
+ γ(ν) log(1 + xk) +
1 + θ2mxk
1 + θ2ma
− (1 + γ(ν)) log(µ(]a,∞[)).
(3.91)
Furthermore, if xk is large enough, we have log(1+xk) 6
(1+xk)a
4(1+a)
, and if ν is small enough
and xk is large enough, by Theorem 14 part 4, we have
1+θ2mxk
1+θ2ma
6 γ(ν)(1 + xk) a4(1+a) .




















Since limν→0+ γ(ν) = ∞, there exists ν0 > 0 such that infν∈]0,ν0] γ(ν)1+γ(ν) > 12 . Hence, for
ξ , a
4(1+a)
and all 0 < ν < ν0, we have µ(]a,∞[) 6 2−ξxk .
We are now ready to establish the upper bound in (3.10) of Theorem 15.




). By Lemma 20, if n is large enough
µ∗νn is a discrete probability measure with finite number of mass points, and so is Ca[µ
∗
νn ].
By Lemma 23, we have D
(







I(Ca[µ∗νn ], wY |X)√
D
(
wZ|X ◦ Ca[µ∗νn ]‖q0
) >
































which is less than 2−
1
2















, let µ̃ be a probability distribution on X with
















where (a) follows from the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 23, and (b) follows


























νn), we have (3.95).
3.5.4 Step Four: Obtaining the Bound in Theorem 13
We first prove a lemma that relates the constraint on the relative entropy to χ2 divergence.
Let Ω̃>0 be the set of discrete probability measures over [0, 1[ with finite number of mass
points.
Lemma 25. Let ε > 0 be small enough and {νn}n> be a sequence of real numbers such
that limn→∞ νn = 0 and 2
√
νn + νn 6 0.5 for all n. There exists a sequence of probability

















µ′n , C1+ζ [µn] (3.101)
µ′′n , Can [µ
′
n], (3.102)





a and an , min(1 − ζ, a′n). Let {νn}n> be a sequence of
real numbers such that limn→∞ νn = 0 and 2
√













n . We next use the following lemma
to upper-bound χ2(wZ|X ◦ µ′′n‖q0).
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6 ν and max (support (µ)) 6 a < 1.
If 2
√
ν + ν < 1/2 and for some M > 0, we have (wZ|X ◦ µ)(M)/q0(M) > e, then
1
2





















1+a)dz + 2(Eµ(X))3. (3.103)
Proof. See Appendix 3.D.
We first establish a lower-bound on (wZ|X ◦ µ′′n(z))/q0(z) to use Lemma 26. Since
an 6 a′n, we have






























, we have (wZ|X ◦ µ′′n)(Mn)/q0(Mn) > e.
Therefore, Lemma 26 implies that
1
2
































































































and (b) follows since by Lemma 28, we have Eµ′′n(X) 6 2
√

































For the first limit, we consider two cases.












































































































































































goes to infinity as n






)dz = 0. The third limit in (3.111) follows since








We now consider I(µ′′n, wY |X) and show that it is close to I(µn, wY |X) = A(νn).
If an = 1− ζ , then by a modification of Lemma 23
I(µ′′n, wZ|X) > I(µ
′
n, wZ|X)− 2ζµ′n(]1− ζ,∞[) (3.121)
= I(µ′n, wZ|X)− 2ζµn(]1− ζ,∞[) (3.122)
> I(µ′n, wZ|X)− 2ζ
Eµn(X)
1− ζ (3.123)
> I(µ′n, wZ|X)− 6ζ
√
νn
1− ζ . (3.124)
If an = a′n, by Lemma 23
I(µ′′n, wZ|X) > I(µ
′
n, wZ|X)− 2(1 + ζ)µ′n(]a′n,∞[) (3.125)





































where (a) follows from the argument of Theorem 15. Taking λn = µ′′n ∈ Ω̃>0, by (3.128)
and (3.120), we have (3.99) for ε = 6ζ
1−ζ .
















In other words, µ̃ is the probability measure µ conditioned to the event ]0, 1[. We have














where (a) follows since θ2mx− log(1 + θ2mx) = 0 for x = 0. Moreover,


































Therefore, we obtain the upper-bound in (3.10).
3.6 Conclusion
For covert communications over non-coherent wireless channels, we showed that discrete
constellations with an amplitude constraint are optimal. This differs from the results for
coherent Gaussian channels in which using the phase is required to achieve the covert
capacity. Supported by numerical results, we also conjectured that the optimal number of
points is two and that their positions are fixed.
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APPENDIX
3.A Leibniz Integral Rule
For a reader’s convenience, we recall Leibniz integral rule here as it is used extensively
throughout the paper.
Theorem 16. Let O be an open subset of R and Ω be a measure space. Suppose f :
O × Ω→ R satisfies the following conditions
1. f(x,w) is a Lebesgue-integrable function of ω for each x ∈ O
2. For almost all ω ∈ Ω, the derivative ∂f
∂x
exists for all x ∈ O




∣∣ 6 θ(ω) for all x ∈ O
and almost every ω ∈ Ω.









3.B An Analyticity Criterion
Theorem 17. Let g : D×R→ C be a function such thatD is a simple connected subset of
C, g(·, y) is analytic for all y ∈ R, and supz∈C
∫
R |g(z, y)|dy <∞ for all compact C ⊂ D.
The function f : z 7→
∫
R g(z, y)dy is analytic over the domain D.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward application of Fubini’s theorem and Morera’s theo-
100


















where (a) follows from Fubini’s theorem and our assumption on g, and (b) follows since
g(·, z) is analytic and from Cauchy’s integral theorem. Therefore, f satisfies the condition
of Morera’s theorem and is analytic.
3.C Auxiliary Results
We gather here essential technical tools to prove the achievability and converse results. To
begin with, we bound the PDF of the output distributions of the channels wY |X and wZ|X
for an arbitrary input distribution µ.
Proposition 2. For any probability measure µ on X with Eµ(X) <∞ and all y ∈ Y , z ∈
Z , we have
−θ2mEµ(X)− y 6 log((wY |X ◦ µ)(y)) 6 0, (3.139)
−Eµ(X)− z 6 log((wZ|X ◦ µ)(z)) 6 0, (3.140)
EwY |X◦µ(Y ) = 1 + θ
2
mEµ(X), (3.141)
EwZ|X◦µ(Z) = 1 + Eµ(X). (3.142)
Proof. We only prove (3.139) and (3.141), from which (3.140) and (3.142) follow by






1+θ2mx 6 1, and
log
(
(wY |X ◦ µ)(y)
)
= log (Eµ(pX(y))) (3.143)
(a)

























= −θ2mEµ(X)− y, (3.148)
where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality, (b) follows from log(1 + x) 6 x for x > −1,
and (c) follows from Pµ(X > 0) = 1. To obtain (3.141), note that
EwY |X◦µ(Y ) =
∫ ∞
0






















(1 + θ2mx)dµ (3.152)
= 1 + θ2mEµ(X), (3.153)
where (a) follows from Fubini’s theorem and the fact that for all x, y, ypx(y) > 0.




exists and is finite,
then Eµ(X) <∞.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Consider a positive real number γ1 and let 2ε ,





µ([γ1, γ]) = 2ε. (3.154)
Therefore, there exists γ2 > γ1 such that µ([γ1, γ2]) > ε. We then have






































































































(Eµ(X) + 1) e−z0 , (3.163)
which implies that Eµ(X) <∞.




leads to an upper-bound
on Eµ(X).














that it exists. By (3.140) in Proposition 2 applied to a distribution with a single mass point
at x, | log qx(z)| 6 x+z. We thus have
∫∞
0
(wZ|X◦µ)(z) |log qx(z)| dz 6 x+EwZ|X◦µ(Z) =
x+ 1 +Eµ(X), which is finite by Lemma 27. Consequently,
∫∞
0
(wZ|X ◦µ)(z) log qx(z)dz








































log((wZ|X ◦ µ)(z)) + z
)
dz. (3.167)














= − log(1 + x) + x
1 + x
(Eµ(X) + 1) , (3.170)
where (a) follows from (3.142). Hence, we have










ν, we obtain the desired upper-bound.
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Lemma 29. For any probability measure µ on X with Eµ(X) < ∞, I(µ,wY |X) is well-
defined and finite, and
I(µ,wY |X) = −
∫ ∞
0








Proof. To check that I(µ,wY |X) is well-defined and finite, it is enough to show that
∫ ∣∣∣∣log
px(y)
(wY |X ◦ µ)(y)




(wY |X ◦ µ)(y)
∣∣∣∣ d(wY |X ⊗ µ) (3.175)
6
∫ (
| log px(y)|+ | log((wY |X ◦ µ)(y))|
)




θ2m(x+ Eµ(X)) + 2y
)
d(wY |X ⊗ µ) (3.177)
= 2θ2mEµ(X) + 2EwY |X◦µ(Y ) (3.178)
(b)
= 4θ2mEµ(X) + 2 <∞, (3.179)
where (a) follows from (3.139), and (b) follows from (3.141). Note next that









− log(1 + θ2mX)−
Y
1 + θ2mX
− log((wY |X ◦ µ)(Y ))
)
. (3.181)





6 E(Y ) < ∞, and there-
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fore, we can use the linearity of expectation to write
EwY |X⊗µ
(



































































(wY |X ◦ µ)(Y )
))
, (3.186)
which completes the proof of (3.173).








exist and are finite for




log(wZ|X ◦ µ2(z))dz exists and is finite.
Proof. We shall show that
∫∞
0
(wZ|X ◦µ1)(z)| log((wZ|X ◦µ2)(z))|dz <∞. By Lemma 28,
we know that Eµ1(X) and Eµ2(X) are finite. Therefore, we have
∫ ∞
0





(wZ|X ◦ µ1)(z) (Eµ2(X) + z) dz
(3.187)
= Eµ2(X) + EwZ|X◦µ1(Z) (3.188)
(b)
= Eµ2(X) + 1 + Eµ1(X) <∞ (3.189)
where (a) follows from (3.140), and (b) follows from (3.142).
Lemma 31. Let µ be a probability measure over X such that sup(support (µ)) < ∞. We
then have
I(µ,wY |X) = Eµ
(








Furthermore, if we have sup(support (µ)) < 1, then











(wY |X ◦ µ)(Y )










(wY |X ◦ µ)(Y )
d(wY |X ⊗ µ) (3.193)
= Eµ(D(pX‖p0))− D
(










wY |X ◦ µ‖p0
)
, (3.195)
where (a) follows from the straightforward calculation of the relative entropy between two
exponential distribution. Additionally, we have
































































Lemma 32. If a > 1 and β > 0 is small enough, then
D(βqa + (1− β)q0‖q0) =
β1+
1






































If a < 1 and β > 0 is small enough, then
D(βqa + (1− β)q0‖q0) =
a2
2(1− a2)β
2 + o(β2). (3.202)
Proof. We only consider the case where a > 1 and the other case follows from similar
approach. By definition, we have




(βqa(z) + (1− β)q0(z)) log
(













































By substitution u , e
az





































(1− β)(1 + a)u
)
du (3.207)
Note next that for all real numbers λ1, λ2, a primitive function of uλ1 log (1 + λ2u) up to a
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constant is
uλ1+1 (2F1(1, λ1 + 1;λ1 + 2;−λ2u) + (λ1 + 1) log(λ2u+ 1)− 1)
(λ1 + 1)2
, (3.208)
where 2F1(a, b; c;x) is the hypergeometric function. Additionally, for λ1 < −1, the limit
of this primitive function at u =∞ is
λ−λ1−12 Γ(2 + λ1)Γ(−λ1)
(λ1 + 1)2
. (3.209)
Therefore, if we define λ , β










































− (1 + 1
a


















































































































































































where (a) follows since for x going to zero 2F1(a, b; c;x) = 1 + abx/c + O(x2) and
log(1+x) = x+O(x2) by Taylor’s expansion. By rearranging the terms in above expression



















































































Combining (3.206), (3.207), and (3.216), we have





(1− β)(1 + a)
)1+ 1
a


































3.D Proof of Lemma 26
We first introduce some notation and facts. Let f(z) , (wZ|X ◦ µ)(z) and φ(z) ,










which is increasing and





− 1 > −Eµ(X) > −2
√
ν − ν > −0.5. (3.219)
Furthermore, there exists a unique M0 such that φ(z) 6 0 if and only if z 6M0.
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Since we have log(1 + x) > x− x2/2 +1{x 6 0} 2x3/3 for x > −0.5, we have for all
z ∈ Z ,
f(z) log(φ(z) + 1) > f(z)
(





















f log (f/q0) . (3.222)













































We again separately lower-bound each term in the above expression.

































































where (a) follows since e
xz






x for x ∈ [0, a]. Since q0 > 0











































































fφ3 > −M0 (Eµ(X))3 . (3.239)





PX(x) log qx(2) (3.240)


















> −2 = log q0(2). (3.244)
3. By our assumption that f(M)/q0(M) > e, we have
∫ ∞
M




Combining the bounds in the above three parts, we obtain the desired result.
3.E Optimization Problem in (3.18)
3.E.1 Prokhorov’s Theorem
Theorem 18. Let {µn} be a sequence of tight probability measures on R, i.e., for all ε > 0,
there exists a compact set K ⊂ R such that for all n > 1, µn(R \ K) 6 ε. Then, there
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exists a sub-sequence {µnk}k>1 and another probability measure µ on R such that {µnk}k>1
converges weakly to µ.
3.E.2 Convex Optimization for General Vector Spaces
Theorem 19. ([62, Theorem 1, Page 217]). Let V be a vector space, Ω ⊂ V a convex
set, U be a normed vector space, and P ⊂ U be a positive cone, i.e., for all u1, u2 ∈ U
and all α, β > 0, we have αu1 + βu2 ∈ P . Suppose the interior of P is non-empty, and
φ : Ω → R and G : Ω → U are convex functions such that there exists ω1 ∈ Ω for
which G(ω1) ≺P 0 and A , infω∈Ω:G(ω)P0 φ(ω) > −∞. Then, there exists u∗0 P∗ 0
in U∗ such that A = infω∈Ω φ(ω) + 〈G(ω), u∗0〉. Moreover, if ω0 is a solution to the first
optimization problem, the infimum of the second optimization problem is also achieved by
ω0 and 〈G(ω0), u∗0〉 = 0.
We next recall a result from [54] to find an expression for the KKT conditions of an ab-
stract convex optimization. To this end, we introduce the notation of weak differentiablity
for a function f : Ω → R where Ω is convex. We say that f ′ω0 : Ω → R is the weak
derivative of f at ω0, if
f ′ω0(ω) = lim
θ→0+
f(θω + (1− θ)ω0)
θ
. (3.246)
Theorem 20 ([54]). Let V be a linear space, Ω ⊂ V be convex, and f : Ω→ R be convex
and have weak derivative for all ω ∈ Ω. f(ω∗) = infω∈Ω f(ω) if and only if for all ω ∈ Ω,
we have f ′ω∗(ω) > 0.
3.E.3 Technical Results
Lemma 33. A(ν) defined in (3.18) satisfies the following properties.
1. It is concave and non-decreasing on [0,∞).
2. It is continuous on [0,∞).
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3. The one-sided derivatives,
A′(ν+) , lim
h→0+
A(ν + h)− A(ν)
h
and A′(ν−) , lim
h→0+
A(ν)− A(ν − h)
h
, (3.247)
exist for all ν > 0, and for all 0 < ν1 < ν2, we have A′(ν−1 ) > A
′(ν+1 ) > A
′(ν−2 ) >
A′(ν+2 ).




5. We have limν→0+ A′(ν+) = limν→0+ A′(ν−) =∞.
Proof. 1. By definition of A(ν), it follows that A(ν) is non-decreasing. To check









6 ν2, and λ ∈ [0, 1]. By convexity of the relative entropy, we have
D
(
wZ|X ◦ (λµ1 + (1− λ)µ2) ‖q0
)
6 λν1 + (1− λ)ν2. (3.248)
Therefore, by concavity of the mutual information,
A(λν1 + (1− λ)ν2) > I(λµ∗ν1 + (1− λ)µ∗ν2 , wY |X) (3.249)
> λI(µ1, wY |X) + (1− λ)I(µ2, wY |X). (3.250)
Hence, by definition of supremum, we have
A(λν1 + (1− λ)ν2) (3.251)
> sup
µ1,µ2∈Ω:D(wZ|X◦µ1‖q0)6ν1,D(wZ|X◦µ2‖q0)6ν2









= λA(ν1) + (1− λ)A(ν2). (3.254)
2. Since A(ν) is concave on [0,∞), it is continuous on (0,∞) [63, Page 153, Problem





ν. Using (3.173), we have
I(µ,wY |X) = −
∫ ∞
0






Furthermore, since EwY |X◦µ(Y ) = 1 + θ2mEµ(X) by (3.141) and the support of
wY |X ◦µ is included in [0,∞), the differential entropy of wY |X ◦µ is upper-bounded
by the differential entropy of an exponential distribution with the same mean [64].
Therefore, we have

























(wZ|X ◦ µ)(z) log((wZ|X ◦ µ)(z))dz + EwZ|X◦µ(Z) (3.260)
> −1− log(EwZ|X◦µ(Z)) + EwZ|X◦µ(Z) (3.261)
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(b)























where (a) follows since log q0(z) = −z and EwZ|X◦µ(Z) < ∞ by Lemma 27 and
(3.142), (b) follows from (3.142), (c) follows from log(1 + x) 6 x − x2/2 + x3/3














1− 2√ν . (3.265)
Additionally, since A(ν) is non-decreasing and non-negative, we have





1− 2ν , (3.266)
which implies that A(ν) is continuous at zero.
3. Follows from [63, Page 153, Problem 4] and concavity of A(ν).





6 ν and I(µ,wY |X) > C
√
ν. Let µ be a discrete probability mea-
sure onX with two mass points at 0 and x̃with probabilities 1−α and α, respectively,







2(1− x̃2) + o(α
2). (3.267)
Similarly, we can obtain D
(
wY |X ◦ µ‖p0
)
6 α2θ2mx̃
2/(2(1− θ2mx̃2)) + o(α2). There-
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fore, we can lower-bound the mutual information by
I(µ,wY |X) = αD(px̃‖p0)− D
(





































































θ2mx̃− log(1 + θ2mx̃)
)
. (3.274)
5. Since A′(ν+) 6 A′(ν−), we only need to compute limν→0+ A′(ν+). Since A(ν)
is concave A′(ν+) is decreasing, and therefore, it is enough to show that for any
L > 0 there exists some ν > 0 with A′(ν+) > L. To this end, we fix some ν̃ > 0
and define B(ν) , A(ν) − A(ν̃)
ν̃
ν. B(ν) is continuous on [0, ν̃] and therefore it
achieves its maximum and minimum on [0, ν̃]. Hence, either we have B(ν) = 0
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for all ν ∈ [0, ν̃] or there exists a ν ∈ (0, ν̃) such that B(ν) achieves its maximum
or minimum at ν. Then, we should have B′(ν−) = A′(ν−) − A(ν̃)/ν̃ > 0 or





















Proof of Lemma 18. We only prove the existence of a solution and the uniqueness follows





6 ν and limn→∞ I(µn, wY |X) = A(ν). To use 18, we first
check that this sequence is tight. For any ε > 0, we have
Pµn
(










where (a) follows from applying Markov’s inequality to the almost surely non-negative
random variableX , and (b) follows from Lemma 28. Since [0, (2
√
ν+ν)/ε] is compact, the
sequence {µn}n>1 is tight. Therefore, we are permitted to use Theorem 18 that shows the
existence of a subsequence {µnk}k>1 and probability measure µ on R such that {µnk}k>1
converges weakly to µ. We claim that µ∗ν is indeed µ and prove it in three steps.
Step 1 Theorem 18 only guarantees the existence of a probability measure on R which
can possibly have positive measure on negative numbers. In this step, we show that this is
not the case. By the Portmanteau theorem, the weak convergence of {µnk}k>1 to µ implies
that lim infk→∞ µnk(U) > µ(U) for any open set U ⊂ R. Taking U =]−∞, 0[, we obtain
that
0 = lim inf
k→∞
µnk(]−∞, 0[) > µ(]−∞, 0[) > 0, (3.277)
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which means that µ(]−∞, 0[) = 0.




6 ν. Let us define fk(z) , (wZ|X ◦ µnk)(z) and f(z) , (wZ|X ◦ µ)(z). Since for any
z ∈ Z , qx(z) = e−z/(1+x)/(1 + x) is a continuous and bounded function in x, by weak
convergence definition, we have
fk(z) = Eµnk (qX(z))→ Eµ(qX(z)) = f(z). (3.278)
In the next lemma, we show that |fk(z) log fk(z)| is uniformly upper-bounded by an inte-
grable function.
Lemma 34. There exists some z̃ such that for all k,





















Proof. Note first that for all x ∈ [0, 1], we have |x log x| 6 e−1, and for all x ∈ [0, e−1], we
have |x log x| 6 |x|. Thus, it is enough to show that there exist z̃ such that for all k > 1













By law of total probability, for all λ > 0, we have
fk(z) , Eµnk (qX(z)) (3.281)
= Eµnk (qX(z)|X > λ)Pµnk (X > λ) + Eµnk (qX(z)|X < λ)Pµnk (X < λ) (3.282)
(a)
6 Eµnk (qX(z)|X > λ)
Eµnk (X)
λ
+ Eµnk (qX(z)|X < λ) (3.283)
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(b)





+ Eµnk (qX(z)|X < λ), (3.284)
where (a) follows from Markov’s inequality, and (b) follows from Lemma 28. We also
have for all z > 1, qx(z) 6 (ze)−1, and for all 0 6 x 6 λ 6 z− 1, qx(z) 6 e−
z
1+λ/(1 +λ).
Substituting these upper-bounds in (3.284) for λ = z
1
2 − 1, which is less than z − 1 for













































f(z) log f(z)dz. (3.288)




































Step 3 It remains to show that I(µ,wY |X) > A(ν). We again define hk(z) , (wY |X ◦






hk(z) log hk(z)dz =
∫ ∞
0
h(z) log h(z)dz. (3.293)









1 + log(1 + θ2mX)
)
. (3.294)
Hence, (3.173) implies that I(µ,wY |X) > A(ν).
Proof of Theorem 14. We prove all four statements in order. The proof heavily relies on re-
sults from convex optimization for general vector spaces and properties of the optimization
problem in (3.19), which we have gathered in Appendix 3.E for the reader’s convenience.
















By convexity of the relative entropy and concavity of mutual information in the input
distribution, φ and G are convex functions, with µ1 the deterministic probability
measure with all mass point at zero, we also have G(µ1) = −ν < 0. Therefore, we
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Theorem 19 also implies that µ∗ν is a solution to this new optimization problem, and








is strictly concave [56, Appendix
I.B], the solution is unique.
2. With the help of Lemma 35 in Appendix C to show the existence of weak derivatives
(defined in (3.246)), we use Theorem 20 with









to obtain that µ1 = µ∗ν if and only if for any µ ∈ Ω,





(wY |X ◦ µ1)(Y )
)































= Eµ(w(X,µ1, ν))− f(µ1). (3.304)
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This implies that µ1 = µ∗ν if and only if for all µ ∈ Ω, we have f(µ1) > Eµ(w(X,µ1, ν)).
Since A(ν) = supµ∈Ω f(µ) > f(µ1), if µ1 = µ∗ν , then for all µ ∈ Ω, we have
A(ν) > f(µ1) > Eµ(w(X,µ1, ν)).
3. Assume (3.23) is true, we take the expectation and obtain (3.21). We now show the
opposite direction and prove that if (3.21) holds, we have (3.23) and (3.24). Applying
(3.21) with µ a deterministic probability measure with all mass point at x, we obtain
A(ν) > Eµ(w(X,µ1, ν)) = w(x, µ1, ν). (3.305)
Furthermore, for any x ∈ support (µ1), we prove that w(x, µ1, ν) = A(ν) by contra-
diction. IfA(ν)−w(x, µ1, ν) , δ > 0, by continuity ofA(ν)−w(x, µ1, ν) in x, there
exists a neighborhoodN of x such that for all x′ ∈ N , we haveA(ν)−w(x′, µ1, ν) >
δ/2. Also, since x ∈ support (µ1), we know that Pµ1(X ∈ N ) = ε > 0. Therefore,
we obtain
A(ν) = Eµ1(w(X,µ1, ν)) (3.306)
= Eµ1(w(X,µ1, ν)1{X ∈ N}) + Eµ1(w(X,µ1, ν)1{X /∈ N}) (3.307)









which is a contradiction.
4. To prove that limν→0+ γ(ν) = ∞, we prove that γ(ν) > A′(ν+), and the result will
follow from limν→0+ A′(ν+) =∞ as shown in Lemma 33. Consider any ν1, ν2 > 0,
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− ν2) + γ(ν1)(ν1 − ν2) (3.312)
(b)
> I(µ∗ν2 , wY |X) + γ(ν1)(ν1 − ν2), (3.313)








and (b) follows since γ(ν1) > 0. Thus, for any ν > 0 and ν > h > 0, we have
A(ν)− A(ν − h)
h
> γ(ν) and
A(ν + h)− A(ν)
h
6 γ(ν). (3.315)
Taking the limit h→ 0+, we obtain A′(ν+) 6 γ(ν) 6 A′(ν−).
To prove that limν→0+ γ(ν)ν = 0, note that for all ν > 0,





ν = A(ν), (3.317)
where (a) follows from concavity of A. In the proof of Lemma 33, we show that
limν→0+ A(ν) = 0, which yields the result.















(wY |X ◦ µ1)(Y )
)
−


















(wY |X ◦ µ1)(Y )
)
− I(µ1, wY |X). (3.319)





µ1, µ ∈ Ω, and define
µθ , (1− θ)µ1 + θµ (3.320)
f1(z) , (wZ|X ◦ µ1)(z) (3.321)
f(z) , (wZ|X ◦ µ)(z) (3.322)
fθ(z) , (wZ|X ◦ µθ)(z). (3.323)
Then, we have
G(µθ)−G(µ1) (3.324)


























































































dz < ∞, and (b) follows from






































|6|f1(z) + f(z)| (| log f1(z)|+ log(1 + Eµθ(X)) + z) (3.332)
6 |f1(z) + f(z)| (| log f1(z)|+ log(1 + Eµ1(X) + Eµ(X)) + z) ,
(3.333)
which is a integrable function with respect to Lebesgue measure on Z by Lemma 30 and

































































FUNDAMENTAL LIMITS OF COVERT COMMUNICATION: THE
KNOWLEDGE OF WARDEN ABOUT THE CODE
4.1 Summary
We investigate here how the warden’s knowledge of the code used by the transmitter and
the receiver influences the optimal number of bits that can be covertly and reliably sent.
We formulate the problem in three scenarios: the warden completely knows the code, the
warden knows only the rate and an upper-bound on the probability of error at the decoder,
and the warden has access to previous samples of its channel when the code was used. The
first scenario corresponds to the standard model in covert communication. For the second
scenario, we characterize the number of bits that can be transmitted reliably subject to a
covertness constraint up to the first-order of asymptotics. Finally, for the third scenario,
we provide lower- and upper-bound on the number of bits that can be transmitted reliably
subject to a covertness constraint for two scalings of the number of observed samples. The
content of this chapter is based on [66].
4.2 Introduction
Virtually all results on covert communications highly depend on two premises in the prob-
lem formulation, which we review in details next: how to measure covertness and which
knowledge the parties have about the parameters of the underlying channel statistical model.
In covert communication problems, it is commonly assumed that there exists a particular
channel input symbol that can be considered as no communication (e.g., the transmission
of zero over an AWGN channel); the covertness is then defined in terms of the distance be-
tween the distribution of the warden’s observations when no communication happens and
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when transmission happens. The frequently used distance is the relative entropy [12, 13],
which can be shown to control the performance of the warden’s detector through Pinsker’s
inequality. Another perhaps more operational distance is the total variation [39], which
more directly controls the performance of the warden’s detection. It is also generally as-
sumed that all parties are aware of the channels statistics and the code structure. While
this assumption seems reasonable from the perspective of the two legitimate parties who
aim at communicating reliably, it corresponds to a worst case scenario in which the warden
is granted as much prior information as the legitimate parties. The fact that the warden
completely knows the code is implicitly assumed in the definition of the covertness metric,
which depends on the induced distribution when the code is used.
We address here the problem of covert communication when the warden does not know
the complete structure of the code. Since the induced distribution on the warden’s ob-
servations by the code is only meaningful when the warden knows the code, alternative
covertness metrics have to be developed depending on the assumptions. We first assume
that the warden only knows the rate and an upper-bound on the probability of error, and de-
sires to devise a test that performs well for all codes satisfying such constraints. Under this
scenario, we characterize the number of bits that can be transmitted covertly and reliably.
In particular, we show that the number of bits, up to first order asymptotics, is equal to the
number of bits when the transmitter and the receiver have access to a shared source of ran-
domness and the code is known to the receiver. We then consider a middle ground between
the assumptions of completely known code and completely unknown code, in which the
warden is allowed to query samples from its channel output when the code is used, which
is then used as side information to detect a subsequent transmission. We derive asymp-
totically close lower- and upper-bounds for the required number of samples to detect the
communication with low probability of error.
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4.3 Problem Formulation
We recall the basic setup for covert communication from Section 1.1.1. Let the transmitter
(Alice) be connected to the receiver (Bob) and the warden (Willie) through two binary-
input DMCs (X ,WY |X ,Y) and (X ,WZ|X ,Z), respectively. We assume that X = {0, 1},
in which 0 is the symbol used in the absence of communication. Let Px , WY |X=x,
Qx , WZ|X=x for x ∈ X and P x , Px1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Pxn , Qx , Qx1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Qxn for
x = (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ X n. We assume that Q1  Q0 and P1  P0, and Q1 6= Q0 and define
µ0 , minz:Q1(z)>0Q0(z). Let 0 denote the all-zero sequence in X n, and in particular, let
Q0 = Q⊗n0 be the distribution that Willie expects when there is no communication. A code
C with a message setM and a block-length n consists of an encoder f : M→ X n and a
decoder φ : Yn →M. The code C is called an (M, ε) code if |M| = M and
P f(m)(φ−1(m)) > 1− ε,∀m ∈M. (4.1)




f(m) be the distribution induced over Zn when using the code C =
(f, φ). Willie applies a test t : Zn → {0, 1} to his received sequence to detect the commu-
nication. We define the probability of false alarm and missed detection as
α(t) , Q0(t−1(1)) (4.2)
β(t; f) , Q̂(t−1(0)), (4.3)
A randomized code C = (F,Φ) with a message setM and a block-length n is a random
variable with realizations in the set of all possible codes with message setM and block-
length n. It is called an (M, ε)R code if it is an (M, ε) code almost surely. We define
for a randomized code C = (F,Φ), Q̂ ,
∑





f(m) and β(t;F ) ,
Q̂(t−1(0)), in which it is implicitly assumed that the randomness of the code is kept secret
from the warden. We consider three scenarios for covert communication based on Willie’s
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knowledge of the code.
Scenario One We assume that Willie completely knows the code, which could be deter-
ministic or random. We then characterize the optimal performance by













M∗(ε, δ) , sup{M : δ∗(M, ε) 6 δ}, (4.6)
where in (4.4) the optimization of the test is with respect to a specific code. We similarly
define δ∗R(M, ε) and M
∗
R(ε, δ) by considering random codes instead of deterministic codes.
Scenario Two We now consider a situation, in which Willie is unaware of the code and
should find a test with low probability of error against all possible (M, ε) codes. This leads
to swapping the inf and sup in (4.4) and results in
δ
∗




[α(t) + β(t; f)] , (4.7)
M
∗
(ε, δ) , sup{M : δ∗(M, ε) 6 δ}. (4.8)
Scenario Three We propose here an intermediate ground for Willie’s knowledge about
the code, in which Willie can learn the code from previous observations. Alice and Bob
fix an (M, ε) code C to covertly communicate. Willie has access to ` independent samples
z(1), · · · , z(`) of Q̂ and aims at testing whether his new observations z comes from Q̂ orQ0.
Willie uses a test T : (Zn)` × Zn → {0, 1}, for which T (z(1), · · · , z(`), z) = 0 indicates
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no communication.
α`(T ; f) , (Q̂
⊗` ⊗Q0)(T−1(1)) (4.9)
β`(T ; f) , Q̂
⊗`+1(T−1(0)). (4.10)
We then investigate the quantities
δ
∗




[α`(T ; f) + β`(T ; f)] (4.11)
M
∗
`(ε, δ) , sup{M : δ
∗
`(M, ε) 6 δ}. (4.12)
Note that our definitions imply that
M∗(ε, δ) 6M∗R(ε, δ) 6M
∗
(ε, δ). (4.13)









0(ε, δ) = M
∗
(ε, δ). (4.14)
Remark 6. In the most general setting, one should consider local randomness at the en-
coder. However, we restrict the results of the paper to deterministic encoders for simplicity.
4.4 Main Results
4.4.1 Covert Communication without Learning
In this section, we characterize logM∗(ε, δ), logM∗R(ε, δ), and logM
∗
(ε, δ) up to the first-
order asymptotics. Note that the first order of logM∗(ε, δ) when D(Q1‖Q0) < D(P1‖P0)
and the first order of logM∗R(ε, δ) have already been established in Theorem 8 in Chapter 2.
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Theorem 21. Suppose that D(Q1‖Q0) > D(P1‖P0). We have









6 logM∗R(ε, δ) 6 logM
∗






















6 logM∗(ε, δ) 6 logM∗R(ε, δ) 6 logM
∗















in (4.16) and (4.17) should be larger than






. Otherwise the inequalities are not feasible. Additionally,
the dependence of logM∗(ε, δ), logM∗R(ε, δ), and logM
∗































6 logM∗(ε, δ) by Theorem 8 in Chapter 2.
Remark 8. A shared key is required in the achievability proof when D(Q1‖Q0) > D(P1‖P0)
because the output statistics of Willie’s channel are controlled through channel resolvability
techniques [13], which require randomness of size≈ D(Q1‖Q0)n
1
2 . However, the random-





Converse proof of Theorem 21. We first establish a general converse for covert communi-
cation. We recall the following definition regarding universal hypothesis testing. Consider
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two families of probability distributions P and Q over the same set and define





In other words, βα(P ,Q) is the minimum number β such that there exists a test with prob-
ability of false alarm and missed detection less than α and β, respectively, regardless of the
choice of (P,Q) ∈ P ×Q.
Lemma 36. We define for any S ⊂ X n
λ
∗




























βε(P x, P 0)
, (4.21)
M∗(ε, δ) 6 inf
S⊂Xn:λ∗(S,δ,M∗(ε,δ))>0
1
λ∗(S, δ,M∗(ε, δ)) supx∈Xn\S
1
βε(P x, P 0)
. (4.22)
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
We now provide high-level explanations about the converse bounds in Lemma 36. Note




upper-bounds the number of codewords for any (M, ε) code with
codewords in X n \ S [35, Theorem 31]. We use the covertness constraint to upper-bound
the number of codewords in S.
Our choice of S consists of the set of codewords with a specific minimum weight,
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Sw , {x ∈ X n : wt(x) > w}. We recall here all the required quantities for Sw. We have
by [39, Eq. (191)-(193)] and [39, Lemma 11]
sup
x∈Xn\Sw








































2 −O(1), we obtain
logM
∗









We now prove (4.15) by first lower-bounding λ∗(Sw, δ,M) for an appropriate choice of w.
Lemma 37. Let ζ > 0. There exists M0 depending on δ, ζ , µ0, and D(Q1‖Q0) such that









Proof. See Appendix 4.B.
Let 0 < ζ < D(Q1‖Q0) − D(P1‖P0), M0 be as described in Lemma 37 and C be an
(M∗(ε, δ), ε) code such that 1 − δ > α(t) + β(t; f) for all t. We assume without loss of
generality that logM∗(ε, δ) > logM0, otherwise logM∗(ε, δ) = O(1). Using Lemma 37
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and Lemma 36, we obtain that
logM∗(ε, δ) 6 log
2
1− δ + supx∈Xn\Sw





D(Q1‖Q0)−ζ . Eq. (4.23) implies that
logM∗(ε, δ) 6 log
2













































By our assumption on ζ , we have D(P1‖P0)D(Q1‖Q0)−ζ < 1. Eq. (4.31) therefore leads to a contradic-
tion if logM∗(ε, δ) = ω(1).
4.4.2 Covert Communication with Learning
We now provide asymptotically close lower- and upper-bounds on the number of samples
` required to learn a covert code.
Theorem 22. Let D(P1‖P0) < D(Q1‖Q0) and recall C =
2Q( 1−δ2 )D(P1‖P0)√
χ2(Q1‖Q0)
. If 2 log ` 6
Cn
1
2 −O(n 14 ), we have
Cn
1
2 −O(n 14 )− log ` 6 logM∗`(ε, δ) (4.32)
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`(ε, δ) = O(1). (4.33)
In particular, there exist two constants B1 and B2 depending on the channels, ε, and δ
such that if log ` 6 B1n
1
2 , then logM
∗
`(ε, δ) = Ω(n
1
2 ), and if log ` > B2n
1
2 log n, then
logM
∗
`(ε, δ) = O(1).








when D(P1‖P0) > D(Q1‖Q0).
Achievability proof of Theorem 22. We first recall the definition of the PPM distribution
from Chapter 2, which will be used in our random coding argument.
Definition 7. Given w ∈ J1, nK, let n = mw + r for 0 6 r < w. We define the distribution














We denote the output distribution of P n,wX,PPM for DMCs (X ,WY |X ,Y) and (X ,WZ|X ,Z) by
P n,wY,PPM and P
n,w
Z,PPM, respectively.













We now state an achievabililty result in the next lemma.
Lemma 38. Let γ, λ1, λ2, λ3 be real numbers such that λi > 1 for i = 1, 2, 3 and 1λ1 +
1
λ2
< 1. For a test T with respect to ` observations, w = Θ(n
1
2 ), and M , there exists an
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((1− 1/λ3)M, ε) code C such that























Proof. See Appendix 4.C.
The spirit of the proof of Lemma 38 resembles the proof of Theorem 8 in Chapter 2,
which is sketched as follows. We use a random coding argument, in which each codeword
is drawn independently and from P n,wX,PPM. As shown in Chapter 2, the probability that a
message is incorrectly decoded can be upper-bounded as a sum of two terms. The first
term is fixed with respect to the random coding, and the expected value of the second term
is small. We further show that for a fixed test T with respect to ` observations, the expected




. We use Markov inequality to
conclude the existence of a code with small α`(T ; f) +β`(T ; f) and average probability of
error. We finally expurgate the codewords with large probability of error and control how
much the expurgation changes α`(T ; f) + β`(T ; f).
To use Lemma 38 to prove the achievability of Theorem 22, we need the following
bounds.





































2 ) 6 δ − 1√
n
(4.39)
For γ = D(P1‖P0)w −O(n
1













Proof. We prove (4.38) in Appendix 4.D. Eq. (4.39) follows from [39, Equation (250)].
Eq. (4.40) follows from [39, Lemma 5].
Using Lemma 38 with λ1 = n2, λ2 = (n + 1)/n, and λ3 = `n, there exists a code C




























> 1− δ. (4.44)
Finally, choosing logM = log γ− log `−4 log n−O(1), we guarantee that the probability
of error is less than ε.
Converse proof of Theorem 22. We first provide an upper-bound on the probability of error
of a generic test with respect to ` observations.
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Lemma 40. Let H be a family of functions from Zn to {0, 1}. Given z1, · · · , z` ∈ Zn, we
define











which is equivalent to a test T (z1, · · · , z`, z) , t∗z1,··· ,z`(z). It holds for any code C that
α`(T ; f) + β`(T ; f) 6 min
h∈H
[α(h) + β(h; f)] + inf
η∈]0,1[
[






Proof. See Appendix 4.E.
We now introduce a particular family of tests H. By (4.24), there exists a test h1 such




for all x with











Intuitively, h−11 (0) and h
−1
1 (1) are the set of typical and atypical sequences, respectively, in



















and H , {hA : A ⊂ X n \ Sw1 ,A 6= ∅},for which |H| =




i) − 1 6 22Hb(w1/n)n − 1 when w1 6 n/2. Let T be as defined in
Lemma 40 forH and let C = (f, φ) be an (M, ε) code with 1− δ 6 α(T ; C)+β(T ; f). For
w2 specified later, we shall lower-bound the fraction of codewords with weight less than
w2, i.e.,
λ , |{x ∈ range(f) : wt(x) < w2}| /M.
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Lemma 40 implies that
1− δ 6 min
h∈H
α(h) + β(h; f) + inf
η∈]0,1[
[


































































where (a) follows from the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 37. When logM is









. Therefore, combining (4.51) and (4.55),
















where (a) follows from the definition of h1. For η = 1−δ16 and
` =


















Combining (4.49), (4.57), and (4.59), we obtain that λ > (1− δ)/4. Using (4.23) and [35,










Repeating the argument in (4.28)-(4.30), we have logM = O(1).
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APPENDIX
4.A Proof of Lemma 36
Let us fix S ⊂ X n with λ∗(S, δ) > 0 and an (M, ε) code C = (f, φ) with message setM.





βε(P x, P 0)
(4.61)
To prove (4.21), it is enough to find a test t∗ : Zn → {0, 1} independent of C, such that
1 − δ 6 α(t∗) + β(t∗; f) implies that Mλ∗(S, δ) 6
∣∣∣M̃
∣∣∣. By the definition of λ∗, there
exists α∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that
λ
∗
(S, δ) = 1− δ − α∗ − β∗, (4.62)
where β∗ , βα∗(Q0, {Qx}x∈S). By the definition of βα∗(Q0, {Qx}x∈S), there exists a
subset T ∗ of Zn such that Q0(T ∗) 6 α∗ and Qx(T ∗) > 1 − β∗ for all x ∈ S. We define
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the test t∗(z) , 1{z ∈ T ∗} and have
1− δ 6 β(t∗; f) + α∗(t) (4.63)
= 1− Q̂ (T ∗) +Q0(T ∗) (4.64)














 (1− β∗) + α∗ (4.67)










where (a) follows since Qf(m)(T ∗) > 0 when m ∈ M̃ and Qf(m)(T ∗) > 1−β∗ otherwise.
Thus, Mλ∗(S, δ) 6
∣∣∣M̃
∣∣∣.
We now turn to the proof of (4.22). We follow the same reasoning as in the first part of
the proof except that T ∗ can depend here on the code. In particular, let α∗ be such that
λ∗(S, δ,M) > 1− δ − α∗ − β∗, (4.70)
where β∗ , βα∗(Q0, {Qx}x∈S∩range(f)). We then choose T ∗ such that Q0(T ∗) 6 α∗ and
Qx(T ∗) > 1− β∗ for all x ∈ S ∩ range(f). The remainder of the proof is the same as the
first part of the proof.
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4.B Proof of Lemma 37
Let A ⊂ Sw with |A| 6M . We define
T ,
{











Let x̃ ∈ A, w̃ , wt(x̃) and Z1, · · · , Zw̃ be iid according to Q1. We follow the ideas in the
proof of [67, Lemma 3] to obtain an upper-bound on Qx̃ (T ) regardless of x̃. Note that for
log γ + logM < wD(Q1‖Q0),















































where (a) follows from Hoeffding’s inequality (Theorem 3 in Chapter 1). Since w̃ > w =
log 4
1−δ+logM




































Additionally, by the definition of T ,










By the definition of βα(Q0, {Qx}x∈A), we have
β 1−δ
4








which is less than 1−δ
4











4.C Proof of Lemma 38
We first prove a technical lemma.
Lemma 41. Let f1 and f2 be two encoders inducing output distributions Q̂1 and Q̂2, re-
spectively. We have





Proof. We first show that |α`(T ; f1)− α`(T ; f2)| 6 `/M . Note that















We can similarly show that |β`(T ; f1)−β`(T ; f2)| 6 12(`+1)
∥∥∥Q̂1 − Q̂2
∥∥∥; using the triangle
inequality completes the proof.
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LetM , J1,MK and F : M→ X n be a random encoder such that each codeword is





F (m), a random PMF overZn.
We now explain the decoding rule, which is based on [13]. Given γ > 0, upon observing
y, the decoder forms the estimate Ŵ = m of the transmitted message W if there exists a





If there is no w satisfying (4.87), the decoder declares an error. The conditional probability


























irrespective of F because of our














































EF (α(T ;F ) + β(T ;F )) = EF
(
(Q̂⊗` ⊗Q0)(T−1(0)) + (Q̂⊗`+1)(T−1(1))
)
(4.93)















(Q` ⊗Q0)(T )−Q`+1(T )
]
Using
Markov inequality implies that for λ2 > 1
PF
(











Thus, there exists a code C with message setM such that
































for all λ1, λ2 with 1λ1 +
1
λ2











































Let Q̂1 and Q̂2 denote the induced output distribution of C and C̃, respectively. We have







Lemma 41 together with (4.99), we obtain that










4.D Proof of Lemma 39
Let F : J1,MK → X n be a random function such that F (1), · · · , F (M) be iid according








































Suppose that m 6= mi for all i ∈ J1, `K. The terms
∏`
i=1Q
F (mi)(zi) and QF (m)(z)−Q0(z)









































































































2 ) by [39, Lemma
8].
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4.E Proof of Lemma 40
Let Z1, · · · ,Z` be iid according to Q̂. Let h∗ , argminh∈H [α(h) + β(h; f)] and define
two events





(1− h∗(zi))− η}, (4.115)





(1− h(zi)) + η,∀h ∈ H}. (4.116)
By the law of total probability, we have
α`(T ; f) + β`(T ; f) = E
(
α(t∗Z1,··· ,Z`) + β(t
∗









β(t∗Z1,··· ,Z` ; f)|E1 ∩ E2
)
+ 2P(Ec1 ∪ Ec2).
(4.118)
We upper-bound the first term as
E
(
α(t∗Z1,··· ,Z`) + β(t
∗


























6 α(h∗) + β(h∗; f) + 2η (4.122)
= argmin
h∈H
[α(h) + β(h; f)] + 2η, (4.123)
where (a) follows from the definition of E2, (b) follows from the definition of t∗Z1,··· ,Z` ,
and (c) follows from the definition of E1. Finally the Hoeffding inequality (Theorem 3 in
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Chapter 1) and the union bound yield that







COVERT SECRET KEY GENERATION: PASSIVE AND ACTIVE WARDENS
5.1 Summary
We investigate the problem of covert and secret key generation over a state-dependent dis-
crete memoryless channel with one-way public discussion in which an adversary, the war-
den, may arbitrarily choose the channel state. We develop an adaptive protocol that, under
conditions that we explicitly specify, not only allows the transmitter and the legitimate
receiver to exchange a secret key but also conceals from the active warden whether the
protocol is being run. When specialized to passive adversaries that do not control the chan-
nel state, we partially characterize the covert secret key capacity. In particular, the covert
secret key capacity is sometimes equal to the covert capacity of the channel, so that secrecy
comes “for free.” The content of this chapter is based on [68, 69].
5.2 Introduction
Following the early results of Ahlswede and Csiszár [70] and Maurer [71], secret key gen-
eration from correlated observations using an authenticated public channel has attracted
significant attention, especially in the context of wireless channels [72, 73]. We investigate
here the problem of covert secret key generation, in which legitimate parties must not only
agree on a common secret key but also keep the key generation protocol undetectable by an
adversary, referred to as the warden. Our work partially addresses the question by show-
ing that, under conditions that we shall precisely specify, covert and secret key generation
is possible even with an active warden. Specifically, the results reported here extend our
preliminary results restricted to a passive warden [69] to a model with an active warden
who can arbitrarily vary the channel state, except when no information is sent on the main
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channel. While this restriction arises from the technicalities in our proofs, it is justified in
certain practical scenarios. Specifically, for wireless channels in which the action of the
warden corresponds to tampering with the gain of the legitimate receiver, the gain has no
effect when no signal is transmitted because fading acts as a multiplicative coefficient.
As in most results on secret key generation, the presence of an authenticated public
communication is pivotal in our coding scheme to enable covert secret key generation and
therefore covert communication for channels over which a secret key is required [13]. To
avoid improving the warden’s detection ability, we impose a probability distribution on the
public communication and make certain that the warden cannot detect the communication
with any test jointly performed on the observations of the noisy channel and of the public
channel. This model relates to stealth secret key generation from a source model [74];
however, stealth is a less stringent requirement than covertness, so that our results are of a
different nature and exploit different proof techniques to characterize the covert secret key
capacity. We emphasize that our approach differs from previous studies on two accounts.
First, we neither impose any limit on the warden’s actions nor consider any statistical model
for the channel states, so that the warden may take any action and our coding scheme
remains reliable and covert for all possible state sequences. Second, the covert throughput
is adapted to the warden’s actions, i.e., legitimate parties decide how many bits are extracted
based on the quality of the channels, and we use ideas for estimation that we introduced
in [75] in the context of learning over wiretap channels.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.3, we formally intro-
duce our model for covert secret key generation. In Section 5.4 and Section 5.5, we develop
our results on covert secret key generation for passive and active models, respectively.
5.3 Problem Formulation
We consider the channel model for secret key generation illustrated in Fig. 5.3.1, in which
two legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, attempt to generate a secret key while keeping the
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entire key generation process undetectable by a warden Willie. The channel is a state-
dependent DMC (X × S,WY Z|XS,Y × Z), in which the state S is under Willie’s control
while the input X is under Alice’s control. Bob and Willie’s channel outputs are Y and
Z, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that X = S , {0, 1}, where 0 is the input
corresponding to the absence of communication. For x, s ∈ {0, 1}, we define
P sx , WY |X=x,S=s, Q
s
x , WZ|X=x,S=s, (5.1)
and (PQ)sx , WY Z|X=x,S=s. (5.2)
DETECTOR
X
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PUBLIC AUTHENTICATED CHANNEL
WY Z|XS
<latexit sha1_base64="ioOdeI3szhjIY6W/CjkBGXcRfh4="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ioOdeI3szhjIY6W/CjkBGXcRfh4="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ioOdeI3szhjIY6W/CjkBGXcRfh4="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ioOdeI3szhjIY6W/CjkBGXcRfh4="></latexit>
H1 : bPZ
<latexit sha1_base64="wEkcmoSgu4XbaGP+raUO5vMQpMY="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="wEkcmoSgu4XbaGP+raUO5vMQpMY="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="wEkcmoSgu4XbaGP+raUO5vMQpMY="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="wEkcmoSgu4XbaGP+raUO5vMQpMY="></latexit>
F
<latexit sha1_base64="lZOd9QTCz4z55UUI/00UQAaZ55k="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="lZOd9QTCz4z55UUI/00UQAaZ55k="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="lZOd9QTCz4z55UUI/00UQAaZ55k="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="lZOd9QTCz4z55UUI/00UQAaZ55k="></latexit>
Z
<latexit sha1_base64="vTk/gwXw7WScMoMBDg3PhCY6oBk="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="vTk/gwXw7WScMoMBDg3PhCY6oBk="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="vTk/gwXw7WScMoMBDg3PhCY6oBk="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="vTk/gwXw7WScMoMBDg3PhCY6oBk="></latexit>
Y
<latexit sha1_base64="vEu4XmjX7a9txlqc+MMDcDDbObk="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="vEu4XmjX7a9txlqc+MMDcDDbObk="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="vEu4XmjX7a9txlqc+MMDcDDbObk="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="vEu4XmjX7a9txlqc+MMDcDDbObk="></latexit>
 B , fB
<latexit sha1_base64="RHhBY4YHrVEpdccYNr/7dc7HFcI="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="RHhBY4YHrVEpdccYNr/7dc7HFcI="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="RHhBY4YHrVEpdccYNr/7dc7HFcI="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="RHhBY4YHrVEpdccYNr/7dc7HFcI="></latexit>
KB
<latexit sha1_base64="CU5WHT/aqFQIX11HERItKgiWolY="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="CU5WHT/aqFQIX11HERItKgiWolY="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="CU5WHT/aqFQIX11HERItKgiWolY="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="CU5WHT/aqFQIX11HERItKgiWolY="></latexit>
 A, fA
<latexit sha1_base64="ixzIlZfP3GKlbaKy+m0dlsXoFTc="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ixzIlZfP3GKlbaKy+m0dlsXoFTc="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ixzIlZfP3GKlbaKy+m0dlsXoFTc="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="ixzIlZfP3GKlbaKy+m0dlsXoFTc="></latexit>KA
<latexit sha1_base64="glyU9rlhamBtL6YwzfsYXNaVOwU="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="glyU9rlhamBtL6YwzfsYXNaVOwU="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="glyU9rlhamBtL6YwzfsYXNaVOwU="></latexit><latexit sha1_base64="glyU9rlhamBtL6YwzfsYXNaVOwU="></latexit>
s




Figure 5.3.1: Covert secret key generation model
Secret key generation is enabled by the presence of a public authenticated link of un-
limited capacity, which Bob may use to transmit symbols in alphabet F . Alice and Bob
have access to a source of secret common randomness (RC , PRC ) and each possess a local
source of randomness denoted by (RA, PRA), (RB, PRB), respectively. To make the prob-
lem non-trivial, the entropy of PRC is subtracted from the number of generated key bits in
our throughput analysis.
In the presence of an active attacker controlling the channel state, the final length of
the key is not known ahead of time. Alice and Bob must therefore merely agree a priori
on a maximum number of channel uses and bits of secret key. Formally, a code for key
generation C over n channel uses for a maximum of m key bits consists of the following.
• n encoding function for Alice fA = (fA1 , · · · , fAn ), where fAi : F i−1×RA×RC → X
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specifies the symbol sent by Alice at time i ∈ J1, nK;
• n encoding functions for Bob fB = (fB1 , · · · , fBn ), where fBi : Y i×RB ×RC → F
specifies the symbol sent by Bob at time i ∈ J1, nK over the public channel;
• a key extraction function φA : Fn ×RA ×RC → {0, 1}m for Alice;
• a key extraction function φB : Yn ×RB ×RC → {0, 1}m for Bob;
• an estimator for the number of key bits `A : Fn ×RA ×RC → J0,mK for Alice;
• an estimator for the number of key bits `B : Yn ×RB ×RC → J0,mK for Bob.
We assume that the protocol is known to all parties. The sequence of n random symbols
transmitted by Alice is denoted X ∈ X n, while the sequence of states is denoted s ∈ Sn.
Note that we do not require the existence of a probability distribution for the state sequence.
The sequence of observations at Bob and Willie are denoted Y ∈ Yn and Z ∈ Zn, respec-
tively. Bob’s public communication is collectively denoted by F and the generated keys are
denoted KA, KB, respectively. For a fixed state sequence s, the distribution induced by the
coding scheme is denoted P̂XYZFKAKB`A`B |s. Note that our model allows for an arbitrary
s but does not allow the warden to adapt s to its observations.
The performance of the key generation scheme is measured in terms of the following
metrics:








where KA(i) and KB(i) denote the ith bit in Alice’s key and Bob’s key, respectively;
• the secrecy D
(
P̂KBFZ|s‖P unifKB ⊗ P̂FZ|s
)
;














6 r, Pe(C|s) 6 ε, S(C|s) 6 δ, andC(C|s) 6
τ .
While the definitions of the probability of error and secrecy metrics are standard, there
are somewhat arbitrary choices in our definition of covertness. We require Alice’s transmis-
sion to be indistinguishable from an all-0 transmission, but we allow Bob to send symbols
on the public channel as long as their observation does not help Willie’s detection. For
small τ > 0, the covertness constraint ensures that the public communication is nearly uni-
formly distributed and independent of the Willie’s observation on the noisy channel. One
can think of Bob as a terminal emitting seemingly random “beacons” that do not divulge
the existence of a secret key generation protocol.
The throughput achieved by a protocol is defined as follows.
Definition 8. A throughput R is achievable with respect to the sequence {sn}n>1, if there

















The special case of a passive attacker consists of the situation in which the state se-
quence is fixed and known ahead of time. We set this sequence to be s = 0 and drop the
indices referring to the state to simplify notation. In this case, note that the estimators `A
and `B are not needed and that the total number of key bits m may be fixed ahead of time.
We can then formally define the covert secret key capacity as follows.
Definition 9. A throughputR is achievable with a passive attacker if there exists a sequence
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The supremum of all achievable throughputs is denoted Ccsk.
Remark 10. Our restriction to |S| = |X | = 2 simplifies the technical details in our proofs.
By following [13, Section VII-B], one can extend the results to any finite X . When |S| > 2,
one can adapt our estimation protocol to operate on the type of the state sequences instead
of their weight.
5.4 Covert Secret Key Capacity with a Passive Warden
For completeness, we recall without proof the partial characterization of the covert secret
key capacity in the presence of a passive warden, which is our main result from [69].









(D((PQ)1‖(PQ)0)− D(Q1‖Q0)− D((PQ)1‖P1 ⊗Q1)) . (5.8)
Proof. See [69].
As an application of the above result, we characterize the exact covert secret key capac-
ity when the channels from Alice to Bob and Willie are independent.
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Corollary 1 may be somewhat surprising in that it suggests that secrecy comes “for
free” since the covert secret-key capacity is equal to the covert capacity of the channel.
In practice, however, some small amount of privacy amplification would still be needed
and the effect of the warden’s channel only disappears in the asymptotic limit of large se-
quences. This result is an artifact of the model, which ensures that the information leakage
from Bob to Willie has negligible scaling compared to the information transfer from Bob
to Alice.
5.5 Covert Throughput with an Active Warden
We now develop results for an active warden and show the existence of a sequence of
coding schemes generating a key for any sequence of states. The number of generated key
bits depends on the state sequences only through their weights.
Theorem 24. Let (X × S,WY Z|XS,Y ,Z) be an arbitrarily varying DMC with X = S =
{0, 1}, P 00 = P 10 = P0, P 11 6= P 01 , and (PQ)s0 = P s0 ⊗ Qs0 for s ∈ S . There exists a








D((1− β)P 01 + βP 11 ‖P0)− ((1− β)I0 + βI1)√
(1− β)χ2(Q01‖Q00) + βχ2(Q11‖Q10)
, (5.10)
where for s ∈ S,
Is , D(Qs1‖Qs0) + D(P s1 ‖P s0 )− D((PQ)s1‖(PQ)s0)+D((PQ)s1‖P s1 ⊗Qs1). (5.11)
Remark 11. Comparing the throughputs in (5.8) and (5.10), note that the quantities cor-
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WY |XS=si , and the quantities corresponding to the warden’s channel are replaced
by the average of those quantities over the different channel uses. The intuition is that
Alice and Bob have no direct access to the state sequences and only approximate the
weight through their noisy observations. From their perspective, the best approximation





WY |XS=si . In contrast, Willie knows the exact state sequence
therefore obtains information from each realized channel use.
Remark 12. For an AVC, one can eliminate the common randomness when the channel is
non-symmetrizable as the capacity without common randomness is non-zero [76]. How-
ever, such consideration does not directly apply to our model, which includes a feedback
link from the receiver.
We also establish a straightforward converse result for Theorem 24. Note that it is
challenging to obtain a converse that matches our achievability result for a couple of rea-
sons. First, even without covertness constraint and active adversaries, it is generally hard to
provide a tight converse for the secret key generation problem because of the interactions
allowed by the existence of the public communication. Second, our achievability result
proves the possibility of covert secret key generation for all channel state sequences, which
makes the problem of finding a tight converse more difficult.
Theorem 25. For any sequence of codes {Cn}n>1 that achieves covert throughput R over













where I0 and I1 are defined in Theorem 24.
Proof. To obtain a converse, we can assume that Alice and Bob know the state sequence
sn = (s1, · · · , sn) so that the result follows from the same argument as for the passive
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warden [69]. In particular, let Cn be a (2m, n, r, ε, δ, τ, s). By [70], we obtain that
√
nτnR 6 (1 + o(1))
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yi|ZiSi = si). (5.13)
Let J be uniformly distributed over J1, nK and µs = P(XJ = 1|SJ = s). Using [69, Eq.
(60) and Eq. (61)] and wt(sn) = n(β + o(1)), we obtain
R 6 (1 + o(1))
βµ1 (D(P 11 ‖P0)− I1) + (1− β)µ0 (D(P 01 ‖P0)− I0)√
β(µ1)2χ2(Q11‖Q10) + (1− β)(µ0)2χ2(Q01‖Q00)
. (5.14)
Maximizing over µ1 and µ0 yields the desired result.















Figure 5.5.1: Illustration of Theorem 24 and Theorem 25 for a BSCs
In Fig. 5.5.1, we illustrate the result of Theorem 24 and 25 for the following example.
When s = 0, Bob and Willie’s channel are independent BSC(0.1) and BSC(0.4), respec-
tively. When s = 1, Bob’s channel is a binary asymmetric channel with flipping probability
0.1 and 0.2 for x = 0 and x = 1, respectively, while Willie’s channel is BSC(0.3). The
bounds are reasonably tight but, as expected, do not match.
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5.5.1 Proof of Theorem 24
We break down the proof of Theorem 24 into six steps.
1. We first establish a technical lemma pertaining to a concentration inequality for the
reciprocal of the sum of iid random variables.
2. We define an auxiliary problem and derive one-shot reliability and secrecy results.
3. We specialize the auxiliary problem to an arbitrarily varying DMC and assume that
an oracle provides the weight of the warden’s state sequence. We use the result of
Step 2 to develop a universal secrecy and reliability scheme.
4. We reduce the amount of common randomness required for the coding scheme de-
veloped in Step 3.
5. We remove the oracle from the coding scheme by introducing estimators for the
weight of the warden’s state sequence.
6. Finally, we combine all steps to prove the result.
A Concentration Inequality
Suppose {Xi}ni=1 are iid according to Bernoulli(p). Since E(
∑n
i=1Xi) = np, one could
expect E
(∣∣∣ 11+∑ni=1Xi − 1(n+1)p
∣∣∣
)
to be small. The following lemma formalizes this intuition
and is proved in Appendix 5.B.











































One-shot Results for an Auxiliary Problem
We introduce an auxiliary problem with the help of which we solve the main problem
later on. The main rationale for introducing the auxiliary problem is to use a variation of
the likelihood encoder [77], which allows us to exploit channel coding tools. This helps
us avoid a finite length penalty that would appear if using source coding tools and would
dominate the covert throughput. Alice, Bob and Willie have access to X ∈ X , Y ∈ Y and
Z ∈ Z , respectively, with joint distribution PXY Z . In addition, Alice and Bob share secret
common randomness in the form of a random codebook Ỹ = {Ỹw1w2}w1∈J1,M1K,w2∈J1,M2K ∈
YM1M2 distributed according toQ⊗M1M2Y for some chosenQY . Bob generates two messages
W1 ∈ J1,M1K and W2 ∈ J1,M2K from Y and Ỹ according to the conditional PMF


































This operation induces the joint distribution PXY ZỸW1W2 , PXY ZQ
⊗M1M2
Y PW1W2|Y Ỹ. Note
that QY may be different from PY , which will be useful when analyzing universality and
constitutes the main deviation from the standard likelihood encoder. The next two lemmas
provide bounds showing that W1 and W2 can be interpreted as a secret key and a public
message, respectively.
Lemma 43. Let ν : X × Y → R be a fixed function and define a universal decoder for
estimating W1 from X, Ỹ,W2 as
ŵ1 = φ(x, ỹ, w2) , arg max
w1
ν (x, ỹw1w2) (5.18)
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32 + δ, (5.19)
where q(x, y) ,
∑
y′ QY (y
′)1{ν(x, y′) > ν(x, y)}.
Proof. See Appendix 5.C.
Lemma 44. For all γ > 0 and 2




























Proof. See Appendix 5.D.
Universal Asymptotic Results for the Auxiliary Problem
We now extend the auxiliary problem results of Section 5.5.1 by using the channel n times
allowing the warden to vary the channel at every channel use. More precisely, we con-
sider an arbitrarily varying DMC (X × S,WY Z|XS,Y ,Z) with X = S = {0, 1} and
P 00 = P
1
0 = P0. For simplicity, we suppose for now that the weight wt(s) of Willie’s
state sequence is provided to Alice and Bob by some oracle at the end of the transmis-
sion. Alice samples the input sequence X according to Q⊗nX where QX = Bernoulli(αn)










, and transmits it over the channel so that Bob and Willie
observe Y and Z, respectively. Alice and Bob are assumed to share a random codebook
{Ỹw1,w2,w3}w1∈J1,M1K,w2∈J1,M2K,w3∈J1,M3K distributed iid according to P ⊗n0 . Bob randomly
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creates an encoder F to generate W1 and W2 from y using { ˜Yw1w2w3} as




























6= 0 and 1
M1M2
else. Message W2 is sent over the public
channel and Alice subsequently uses X and W2 to decode W1 as Ŵ1 with the random
decoder Φ : X n × J1,M2K→ J1,M1K defined as








For a code (f, φ) and a sequence of states s, we define





S(f, φ|s) , 1
2




We shall now prove that the above random code performs well over a class of state
sequences specified as follows. For each s, set β , wt(s)
n
, QS , Bernoulli(β), and define
the PMF
QβSXY Z(s, x, y, z) , QS(s)QX(x)WY Z|XS(y, z|x, s). (5.25)
Define S(M1,M2,M3) as the set of state sequences s such that the corresponding QβSXY Z
satisfies




logM1 + logM3 6 b(1− ζ)I(X;Y )nc, (5.27)
logM3 > d(1 + ζ)αn
(




Note that W1 should be interpreted as a secret key and W2 should be interpreted as a
public message. W3 should be interpreted as additional randomization, which plays no
role beyond helping us control the specific distribution used by the likelihood encoder.
The next lemma shows that the random code described above is universal over the set
S(M1,M2,M3). Specifically, we prove that given the choice of (M1,M2,M3), there exists
a protocol that performs well for all state sequences s ∈ S(M1,M2,M3). In Section 5.5.1,
where we choose the values ofM1, M2, andM3 based on Bob’s observations, we show that
with high probability the true state sequence is in S(M1,M2,M3).
Lemma 45. For all β, ζ > 0, there exists ξ > 0 such that for large enough n and for all
s ∈ S(M1,M2,M3), we have
EF,Φ(Pe(F ,Φ|s)) 6 2−ω(logn) and (5.29)
EF,Φ(S(F,Φ|s)) 6 2−ξαnn, (5.30)
where the term ω(log n) depends on ζ and the channel.
Proof. See Appendix 5.E.
Common Randomness Reduction
In the next lemma, we use Ahlswede’s elimination technique [78] to reduce the amount of
common randomness in the coding scheme.
Lemma 46. Let (F,Φ) be any random code and Sn be a subset of Sn. Furthermore, for
all s ∈ Sn, assume that EF,Φ(Pe(F,Φ|s)) 6 ε and EF,Φ(S(F,Φ|s)) 6 ε. Then, there exist










S(fi, φi|s) 6 ε′ (5.31)
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for all s ∈ Sn provided that
ε′ > 2 log(1 + ε) and L >
2
ε′
(1 + n). (5.32)
Proof. Let (F1,Φ1), · · · , (FL,ΦL) be L iid random codes distributed according to P(F,Φ).












































(1 + E(Pe(F,Φ|s)))L + 2−Lε
′
(1 + E(S(F,Φ|s)))L (5.36)
6 2−Lε
′
(1 + ε)L + 2−Lε
′
(1 + ε)L (5.37)
= 2−L(ε
′−log(1+ε))+1, (5.38)
















> 1− 2n2−L(ε′−log(1+ε))+1, (5.39)
which is positive given that (5.32) holds.
Corollary 2. Under the same assumptions as Lemma 45, for all ζ > 0, all large enough



















Proof. We first consider the random code (F,Φ) introduced in Section 5.5.1 for which
we have EF,Φ(Pe(F ,Φ|s)) 6 2−ω(logn) and EF,Φ(S(F,Φ|s)) 6 2−ξαnn = 2−ω(logn) by
Lemma 45 for all s ∈ S(M1,M2,M3). Applying Lemma 46 to (F,Φ) for L > 2n4(1 +n),
we obtain L codes (f1, φ1), · · · , (fL, φL) such that (5.40) holds since the two constraints
n−4 > 2 log(1 + 2−ω(logn)) and L > 2
n−4
(1 + n) in Lemma 46 hold for large n.
Estimation of the State Sequence Weight
We now construct an estimator for wt(s) to replace the oracle. This requires running the
protocol over n′ = n + g channel uses, where g is a positive integer to be specified later
used to provision for channel estimation. Before transmission, Alice and Bob secretly
and independently select every channel use for estimation with probability κn ∈ [0, 1],
which requires nHb (κn) bits of shared secret key. Let L denote the number of positions
chosen for the estimation and let J = (J1, · · · , JL) denote the corresponding indices in
increasing order. If n′ − n , g < L, Alice and Bob halt the protocol and do not generate
a key. Otherwise, Alice transmits symbol “1” in the positions in J and operates as in
Step 3 in the known n positions not in J. Since P 10 6= P 11 , there exists y0 ∈ Y such that
P 10 (y0) 6= P 11 (y0). For µ0 , P 10 (y0), µ1 , P 11 (y0), and Ti ,
1{Yji=y0}−µ0
µ1−µ0 , Bob estimates
β = wt(s)
n
as β̂ , 1
L
∑L
i=1 Ti (for L = 0, we define β̂ = 1). Note that for a fixed ji,






i=1 si/n = β.
We now show that, with high probability, Alice and Bob do not halt the protocol and β̂ is




3 . In addition, for all λ > 0 and µ ∈]0, 1[,
P
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where (a) follows from a Chernoff bound. Conditioned on L = `, J = (J1, · · · , J`) is
distributed uniformly on J ` = {j = (j1, · · · , j`) : j1 < · · · < j`}. Upon defining the event
E ,
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∣∣∣∣L = `, E
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We next express P(E|L = `) as the CDF of the hypergeometric distribution. In particular,
let H denote the number of successes in ` draws without replacement from a population of
size n′ with wt(s) = `β successes in the population. We then have

















where (a) follows from the standard tail bounds for hypergeometric distribution (e.g., see
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[79]).
We next fix some j ∈ J ` \ E . Since E(Ti|Ji = ji) = sji , and −µ0µ1−µ0 6 Ti 6
1−µ0
µ1−µ0 ,
Hoeffding’s inequality (Theorem 3 in Chapter 1) implies that
P
(




































where (a) follows from j /∈ E . Therefore, we obtain
P
(















which is less than 2−ξ` for some ξ > 0 small enough and independent of `. Combin-
ing (5.54) with (5.44), we obtain P
(
|β̂ − β| > λ
)
6 2−ξκnn
′ for some ξ > 0 small enough.
We next show that forQŜ = Bernoulli(β̂),Q
β̂
ŜX̂Ŷ Ẑ
defined as in (5.25) and (M1,M2,M3)
such that














we have s ∈ S(M1,M2,M3) with high probability. To do so, we should verify that (5.26)-
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(5.28) hold with high probability. By our definition of (M1,M2,M3), (5.26) is always true.
Additionally, for QS = Bernoulli(β), and Q
β
SXY Z defined as in (5.25), the function
ψ(β) , D(βWY |X=1S=1 + (1− β)WY |X=1S=0
‖βWY |X=0S=1 + (1− β)WY |X=0S=0) (5.58)
is continuous in β. Therefore, there exists λ > 0 such that if |β−β′| < λ, |ψ(β)−ψ(β′)| 6
ζ − o(1). Then,
P(b(1− ζ) (I(X̂; Ŷ )− ζαn)nc > b(1− ζ)I(X;Y )nc)
= P
(













































P (logM1 6 (1− ζ) (I(X;Y )− ζαn)n− (1 + ζ)
×αn
(







Hence, s ∈ S(M1,M2,M3) with probability more than 1− 2−ξκnn′+1.
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Proof of Theorem 24
We put together the different pieces developed so far and describe our active covert key
generation protocol. Let ζ > 0, n′ = n + g be the block-length, κn = o(αn/ log n) ∩
ω(log n/n), g > (1 + µ)κnn′ for some µ ∈]0, 1[, J = (J1, · · · , JL) be the positions to be
used for the estimation, and K be a shared secret key uniformly distributed over J1, UK for
any U > 2n4(n+ 1). For L > g, the protocol halts. Otherwise, Alice samples X̃ according
to Q⊗nX for transmission over the channel WY Z|XS at the n positions not included in J, and
transmits 1 in the positions in J. Let Y and Z denote Bob’s and Willie’s received sequences,
respectively, and Ỹ denote the sub-sequence of Y obtained by removing the components
in J. Bob first estimates the type β̂ of Willie’s states sequence defined in Section 5.5.1 and
sets (M1,M2,M3) such that (5.55)-(5.57) hold. Subsequently, for (f1, φ1), · · · , (fU , φU)
defined in Corollary 2, Bob generates two messages (W1,W2) = fK(Ỹ) and broadcasts
W2 together with β̂ one-time-padded with a shared secret key. Finally, Alice decodes W1
as Ŵ1 , φK(X̃,W2). We provide the performance analysis of the protocol in four parts.
Reliability Analysis With probability at most 2−ξκnn′ 6 2−ω(logn), the protocol is halted.
If s ∈ S(M1,M2,M3), then by Corollary 2, the probability of error is less than 1n4 . Since
P(s ∈ S(M1,M2,M3)) > 1 − 2−ξκnn′+1 6 2−ω(logn), the probability of error for the pro-
tocol is less than n−4 + 2−ω(logn).
Secrecy and Covertness Analysis Let P̂W1W2Z be the PMF induced by the protocol and
χ2(β) , βχ2(Q11‖Q10) + (1− β)χ2(Q01‖Q00). By definition, we have
S(C|s) + C(C|s) (5.62)
= D
(


































































where (a) follows since κn = o(αn), (b) follows from [76, Problem 17.1], and (c) follows
from Hb (x) 6 x log ex . To upper-bound
1
2
∥∥∥P̂W1W3Z|s − P unifW1W3 ⊗ P̂Z|s
∥∥∥
1
, let E be the event
{s /∈ S(M1,M2,M3)}. By convexity of variational distance, we have
1
2

















6 n−4 + 2−ξκnn
′+1 (5.70)
6 n−4 + 2−ω(logn). (5.71)











































D((1− β)P 01 + βP 11 ‖P0)− ((1− β)I0 + βI1)√
χ2(β)
− o(1)−O(ζ). (5.75)
Finally, the required amount of secret common randomness for sharing K, sharing J,
and one-time-padding β̂ is logU = O(log n), n′Hb (κn) = O(n′κn log 1κn ) = o(n
′αn), and
O(log n), respectively. Since all three terms are o(n′αn), and the amount of the generated
key is Ω(n′αn), the amount of secret common randomness is negligible.
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APPENDIX
5.A Notation for Method of Types
For x = (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ X n and a ∈ X , let N(x|a) , |{i : xi = a}|. If PX is a PMF over
X , let TPX , {x ∈ X n : for all a ∈ X : N(x|a) = P (a)n}. We denote by Pn(X ) the set
of all pPMF PX for which TPX 6= ∅ and by Pn(X|Y) the set of all conditional PMFs PX|Y
for which there exists a joint PMF PXY such that PX|Y = PXYPY and TPXY 6= 0. For x ∈ X
n
and a conditional PMF PY |X , we also define TPY |X (x) , {y ∈ Yn : for all a ∈ X , b ∈
Y : N(x,y|a, b) = PY |X(b|a)N(x|a)}. For two sequences x ∈ X n and y ∈ Yn such that
(x,y) ∈ TPXY , we define I(x ∧ y) , I(PXY ).
5.B Proof of Lemma 42
We first use the additivity of probability measures for disjoint events to split the probability
























































































































































where (a) follows since ε > 2
np
, and (b) follows since ε ∈ [0, 1]. To upper-bound the above



































































Combining these two inequalities completes the proof of (5.15).
To prove (5.16), we first define the event E ,





















































5.C Proof of Lemma 43











Y (ỹ)PW1W2|Y Ỹ(w1, w2|y, ỹ)
× 1
{









Y (ỹ)PW1W2|Y Ỹ(1, 1|y, ỹ)
× 1
{

























































PY (y)(1−QY (y))M1M2 ,
(5.93)
where (a) follows since Q⊗M1M2Y is iid, (b) follows since the probability that for all w
′
1
and w′2, we have Y 6= Ỹw′1w′2 is
∑
y PY (y)(1 − QY (y))M1M2 , and (c) follows since we can
replace y by ỹ11 because of the term 1{y = ỹ11}. We upper-bound the first term in (5.93)























































































































where (a) follows by applying Lemma 42 when ỹ11 is fixed and other components of Ỹ are














































PXY (x, y) min(1,M1q(x, y)). (5.98)
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Finally, to simplify our upper-bound on the average probability of error, we bound the
second term in (5.93) as
∑
y












which can be combined with (5.94) to obtain the desired result.
5.D Proof of Lemma 44





























































PY Z(y, z)PW1|Y (w1|y), (5.106)
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(∣∣PW1|Y (1|y)− PW1|Y (1|y)
∣∣), (5.110)
where (a) follows since Q⊗M1M2Y is iid. We also have
EỸ






































































































































































































where the derivation of (a) is similar to that of (5.102). We can now use Lemma 42, for a
particular y and 2
M1M2QY (y)

























































PY (y)(1−QY (y))M1M2 . (5.120)














PY Z(y, z)PW1|Y (w1|y)1{PY Z(y, z) < γPZ(z)QY (y)} , (5.122)
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for which we upper-bound E
(


























































































































































= P unifW1 ⊗ PZ completes the
proof.
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5.E Proof of Lemma 45




























P ⊗n0 (ỹ)1{I(x ∧ y) 6 I(x ∧ ỹ)} . (5.137)
To upper-bound q(x,y), let VX and VY |X be the type of x and the conditional type of y
given x, respectively. Then, we have
∑
ỹ




P ⊗n0 (TṼY |X (x))1
{









I(VX , ṼY |X) > I(VX , VY |X)
}
(5.140)
6 (n+ 1)|X ||Y|2
−nmin
ṼY |X :I(VX,ṼY |X )>I(VX,VY |X )
D(ṼY |X‖P0|VX) (5.141)
= (n+ 1)|X ||Y|2
−nmin
ṼY |X :I(VX,ṼY |X )>I(VX,VY |X )
I(VX ,ṼY |X)+D(ṼY |X◦VX‖P0) (5.142)
6 (n+ 1)|X ||Y|2
−nmin
ṼY |X :I(VX,ṼY |X )>I(VX,VY |X )
I(VX ,ṼY |X) (5.143)
= (n+ 1)|X ||Y|2−nI(VX ,VY |X) (5.144)
= (n+ 1)|X ||Y|2−nI(VX|S◦QS ,VY |XS◦QS), (5.145)
184
where (a) follows from [76, Lemma 2.6]. Substituting the above upper-bound in the first
term of the right hand side of (5.136) and usingQ⊗nXY |S(TVXY |S(s)|s) 6 2−nD(VXY |S‖QXY |S |QS)









2−nD(VXY |S‖QXY |S |QS) min
(
1,M1M3(n+ 1)






2−nD(VXY |S‖QXY |S |QS)2−n[I(VX|S◦QS ,VY |XS◦QS)−logM1M3/n−O(logn)/n]
+
(5.148)
6 (n+ 1)2|X ||Y|2−nminVXY |S(D(VXY |S‖QXY |S |QS)+[I(VX|S◦QS ,VY |XS◦QS)−logM1M3/n−O(logn)/n]
+)
(5.149)
6 2−nminVXY |S(D(VXY |S‖QXY |S |QS)+[I(VX|S◦QS ,VY |XS◦QS)−logM1M3/n]
+−O(logn)/n) (5.150)
(a)
6 2−nminVXY (D(VXY ‖QXY )+[I(VX ,VY |X)−logM1M3/n]
+−O(logn)/n) (5.151)
(b)
6 2−nminVXY (D(VXY ‖QXY )+[I(VX ,VY |X)−(1−ζ)I(QX ,QY |X)]
+−O(logn)/n), (5.152)




> D(VXY ‖QXY ) by convexity of the
KL-divergence, and (b) follows from (5.27). We next state a result that shows that, for all
VXY , D(VXY ‖QXY ) and [I(VX , VY |X)− (1− ζ)I(QX , QY |X)]+ cannot be simultaneously
small.
Lemma 47. For a PMF VXY with D(VXY ‖QXY ) 6 ε, we have








































where α , QX(1), µ0 , minyQY |X(y|0), and B is a constant that depends only on |Y|
and µ0.
Proof. See Appendix 5.F.
To lower-bound the exponent in (5.152),
nmin
VXY
(D(VXY ‖QXY ) + [I(VX , VY |X)− (1− ζ)I(QX , QY |X)]+ −O (log n) /n),
(5.153)





∩ o(αn) and D(VXY ‖QXY ) > εn,
we have

















where (a) follows since εn = ω(log n/n). For the case when D(VXY ‖QXY ) 6 εn, applying
Lemma 47, we obtain
D(VXY ‖QXY ) + [I(VX , VY |X)− (1− ζ)I(QX , QY |X)]+ −O(log n/n) (5.155)



































































































o(αn), and (b) follows from [13, Lemma 1]. Therefore, we conclude that
nmin
VXY
(D(VXY ‖QXY ) + [I(VX , VY |X)






Y |XS(y|xs) min(1,M1M3q(x,y)) 6 2−ω(logn). (5.164)






6 δ < 1 for large n and we
187
obtain
































which is less than e−ζ′n for large enough n and ζ ′ > 0 independent of n.






Y Z|XS(yz|xs), by Lemma 44, we have















































































= I(Yi;Zi) + D(PYi‖P0) =
αnI
si + O(α2n), where I
s is defined in the statement of Theorem 24. Thus, by choosing
γ = (1 + ζ/2)αn (βI
1 + (1− β)I0), we obtain that EF,Φ(S (F,Φ|s)) 6 2−ξn for some
188
ξ > 0 small enough.
5.F Proof of Lemma 47
For a fixed VXY and QXY , we first define
α , QX(1), α̃ , VX(1), (5.168)
P0 , QY |X=0, P̃0 , VY |X=0, (5.169)
P1 , QY |X=1, P̃1 , VY |X=1, (5.170)
Ps , sQY |X=1 + (1− s)QY |X=0, (5.171)
P̃s , sVY |X=1 + (1− s)VY |X=0. (5.172)
By [13, Lemma 1], we have














Moreover, by the chain rule for relative entropy, we can write D(VXY ‖QXY ) as
D(VXY ‖QXY ) = D(VX‖QX) + D
(
VY |X‖QY |X |VX
)
(5.175)









where D(p‖q) , p log(p/q) + (1 − p) log((1 − p)/(1 − q)). Since all terms in terms in
(5.176) are positive, our assumption that D(VXY ‖QXY ) 6 ε implies that















1− α̃ . (5.179)
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Using the inequalities D(p‖q) > (p− q)2/(2q) for p 6 q and D(p‖q) > (p− q)2/(2p) for
q 6 p, we obtain
α−
√
2εα 6 α̃ 6 α +
√
2ε. (5.180)



































 log(|Y| − 1)
2







































































where B depends only on µ0 and |Y|. Also because χ2(P̃1‖P̃0) 6 |Y| 1µ̃0 and µ̃0 > µ0 −
√
ε
1−α̃ , we have
























































































COVERT SECRET KEY GENERATION: CLASSICAL-QUANTUM CHANNELS
6.1 Summary
Covert and secret quantum key distribution aims at generating information-theoretically se-
cret bits between distant legitimate parties in a manner that remains provably undetectable
by an adversary. We propose a framework in which to precisely define and analyze such
an operation, and we show that covert and secret key expansion is possible. For fixed
and known cq wiretap channels, we develop and analyze protocols based on forward and
reverse reconciliation. The crux of our approach is the use of information reconciliation
and privacy amplification techniques that are able to process the sparse signals required
for covert operation and whose Shannon entropy scales as the square root of their length.
In particular, our results show that the coordination required between legitimate parties to
achieve covert communication can be achieved with a negligible number of secret key bits.
The content of this chapter is based on [81].
6.2 Introduction
The possibility of quantum covert and secret key generation was recently explored [24, 82,
83] but has led to the rather pessimistic conclusion that “covert QKD consumes more secret
bits than it can generate” [24]. Our main contribution is to offer a more nuanced and opti-
mistic perspective and show that covert and secret key expansion is actually possible over
quantum channels. The intuition behind our approach is the following. In layman’s terms,
the covertness constraint requires the number of qubit transmissions to scale as O(
√
n) for
n channel uses [84]. A crucial characteristic of earlier works [84, 24] is that the scaling is




channel uses chosen secretly and uniformly at random out of n. Unfortunately, the secret
key size required to select these secret channel uses scales as Ω(
√
n log n) and necessarily
exceeds the number of covert bits that one can hope to obtain, which scales as Ω(
√
n). In
contrast, we introduce more sophisticated coding schemes for information reconciliation
and privacy amplification that do not require such coordination and are able to directly pro-
cess the sparse and diffuse statistical information content of covert signals. The protocols
that we present do not yet offer the secrecy levels of state-of-the art QKD against coherent
attacks but already achieve covert and secret key expansion over cq wiretap channels and
might pave the way to more broadly applicable protocols.
Our results are developed in two steps as follows. We first lay out a precise model
for quantum covert and secret key generation that captures a wide range of attacks by
the adversary and protocols for legitimate parties, along with quantifiable metrics to as-
sess the performance of a covert and secret key generation protocol over quantum chan-
nels. The main distinction with previous models [24, 82, 83] is the inclusion of the public
communication required for information reconciliation in the analysis; specifically, since
an adversary may devise a hypothesis test for detection based on all its observations, the
probability distribution of the public communication has to be considered jointly with the
quantum measurements in evaluating covertness. We then proceed to analyze an instance
of quantum covert and secret key generation over fixed and known cq wiretap channels,
for which we can define and analyze the covert and secret key capacity. We lower-bound
the covert and secret key capacity by developing coding schemes using both forward and
reverse reconciliation. The forward reconciliation scheme can be constructed by a suitable
modification of established protocols for quantum covert communication [23] to guarantee
secrecy. In contrast, the reverse reconciliation scheme requires a new approach because of
technical challenges precluding the direct use of well-known results on information rec-
onciliation and privacy amplification for the sparse distribution needed for covert commu-
nication. We do not instantiate explicit codes but recent progress in designing codes for
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Figure 6.3.1: Model of covert and secret key expansion
covert communications [21] suggests that the protocols described here can be implemented
with low-complexity.
6.3 Framework for Covert and Secret Key Generation over CQ Wiretap Channels
As illustrated in Fig. 6.3.1, we consider a setting in which two legitimate parties, Alice
and Bob, desire to share a secret key while avoiding detection from an adversary, Eve,
by exploiting a one-way quantum channel and a two-way classical authenticated public
channel of unlimited capacity. Specifically, over n time steps, Alice prepares a cq state
ρAÃ, possibly depending on public communications, on a bipartite system described by a
Hilbert space HA ⊗HÃ and sends the sub-system Ã to Bob. We assume that for X ⊂ R,
{|x〉A}x∈X is an orthonormal basis forHA, all eigenvectors of ρA are always in {|x〉A}x∈X ,
and for any x ∈ X , the conditional state ρx
Ã
is fixed. For simplicity, we restrict our attention
to a two-dimensional HA, i.e., X = {0, 1}, in which 0 represents an “innocent” symbol,
corresponding to the absence of communication, while 1 represents an ‘non-innocent” sym-
bol. We further assume that the “start” and “stop” times of the protocol are known to all
parties and obtained through other modalities, e.g., GPS signals. Eve expects the product
state (ρ0
Ã
)⊗n when there is no communication and may modify the states according to a
quantum channel. We denote the entire state received by Bob and acting on the product
Hilbert space (HB)⊗n by ρB.
For the purpose of covert communications, we need to distinguish protocols based on
the type of Eve’s attacks. In the most general case, Eve implements a coherent attack
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→ L (H⊗nB ) , (6.1)
with isomorphic extension UÃ→BE, in which Bob receives ρB = EÃ→B(ρÃ). In such situa-
tion, Bob should refrain from transmitting information over the public channel until the end
of the transmission to avoid improving Eve’s detection capability on the quantum channel.
Note that this has no impact on QKD since no useful information is shared until the end of
the protocol. A less powerful Eve can only implement collective attacks described by quan-
tum channels of the form EÃ→B = E⊗nÃ→B, i.e., Eve applies the same channel independently
to each state transmitted by Alice. In this case, we can assume that Bob receives each
state before Alice transmits the next state, which allows meaningful public communication
during the transmission between Alice and Bob. Throughout the paper, we assume that
Alice and Bob have exact knowledge of the attack. We can therefore define an effective cq
wiretap channel x 7→ ρxBE , with marginal cq channels x → ρxB and x → ρxE from Alice to
Bob and Eve, respectively. Finally, Alice and Bob have access to independent local sources
of randomness, denoted by RA ∈ RA and RB ∈ RB, respectively, as well as a source of
secret key R ∈ R.
For simplicity, we describe the protocols with only reverse public communication, but
extension to the general case, in which forward public communication is also allowed, does
not present any difficulty. A protocol for key generation operates in n time steps as follows.
Alice and Bob draw realizations rA, rB, and r of their local and common randomness.
Subsequently, in every state t ∈ J1, nK:
• Alice prepares a cq state ρAÃ as explained earlier using her local randomness rA, the
common randomness r, as well as past public messages from Bob denoted (w1, · · · ,
wt−1) and sends ρÃ to Bob through the channel controlled by Eve;
• Bob performs a quantum measurement on his available quantum state to obtain a
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classical measurement yt ∈ Y ⊂ R;
• Bob sends a message Wt ∈ Wt over the public channel using his local randomness
rB, the common randomness r, as well as past measurements yt−1. The choice of
alphabetWt is part of the protocol design.
At the end of time step n, when no further public communication happens, Eve performs
a measurement on her state ρE, as an attempt to detect the communication and obtain
information about the secret key, while Alice and Bob use all their available information
and randomness to compute two long binary strings sX and sY , respectively, as well as the
number of bits `X and `Y , respectively, to use as a secret key. The length of sX and sY is
public and fixed at the beginning of the protocol. Alice finally sets her key kX to be the
first `X bits of sX while Bob sets his key kY to be the first `Y bits of sY .
A protocol is called an (ε, δ, µ)-protocol if the following properties hold. Let W , SX ,
SY , KX , KY , be the random variables representing the total public communication, Alice’s
random string, Bob’s random string, Alice’s key, and Bob’s key, respectively. We require:
• ε-reliability: Pe , P(KX 6= KY ) 6 ε, which implicitly includes the condition `X =
`Y ;




6 δ, where ρEWSX is the joint density ma-
trix of the eavesdropper’s observations, public messages and Alice’s random string.




6 µ, where ρ0E is the density matrix of the
eavesdropper’s observations when no communication takes place.
A protocol is efficient if it allows key expansion so that the number of key bits created
exceeds the number of common randomness bits consumed. Our goal is to analyze under
what conditions efficient (ε, µ, δ)-protocols might exist.
A couple of remarks are in order regarding our protocol definition. Note that the choice
of the key length is a part of the protocol. However, δ-secrecy requires the string SX to be
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secret and not just KX . This is merely enforced for technical reasons, so that the relative
entropy is a deterministic quantity irrespective of the length of the key. Since ε-reliability
only applies to the bits ofKX , Alice can always generate the remaining bits of SX indepen-
dently and uniformly at random using her local randomness, so that our definition does not
incur any loss of generality. By convention, we assume that the public communication is
not by itself a proof of communication. Instead, µ-covertness only requires that the public
bits look uniformly distributed and do not reveal communication on the quantum channel.
We point out that δ-secrecy and µ-covertness are “one-shot” guarantees, in the sense that
they only ensure a low probability of detection for a single execution of the protocol. In
fact, by repeating the protocol k consecutive and independent times, a (ε, δ, µ)-protocol
gives rise to a (kε, kδ, kµ)-protocol. Additional post-processing can reduce the constant kε
and kδ but cannot affect the constant kµ. This suggests that the protocol should be designed
for small values of µ and large values of n. Finally, the particular choice of the quantum
state ρunifW in the definition of covertness plays no role in our proofs. As long as there exists a
specific state corresponding to no communication for the public communication, our proof
holds and leads to a covert and secret key generation scheme.
6.4 Covert and Secret Key Generation over Known CQ Channels
We address the situation in which the cq wiretap channels are fixed and known ahead of
time, and in which the adversary is passive. Our analysis corresponds to “known collective
attacks.” In this special case, the length of the key can be computed ahead of time, and there
is no need to distinguish between the random strings SX and SY and the keys KX and KY .
Furthermore, it becomes possible to define a notion of covert and secret key capacity as
follows. A throughput Θ is achievable if there exists a sequence of (εn, δn, µn)-protocols









µn = 0, (6.2)






The supremum of all achievable throughputs is called the covert and secret key capacity
and denoted Cqck. Note that the definition of the throughput already captures the scaling
of the throughput with the square root of the number of channel uses,
√
n. The scaling is
justified a posteriori by our analysis that shows thatCqck is lower bounded by a constant that
only depends on the channel parameters. The unit of Cqck is therefore in nats per channel
use. Our main results are lower-bounds on the covert capacity obtained by showing the
existence of sequences of covert secret key generation protocols using reverse or forward
reconciliation.
To analyze the performance of protocols with forward reconciliation, we build upon
existing results for covert communication over cq channels [23, 42] with appropriate ex-
tensions to guarantee secrecy. The innovative principle of our approach is best highlighted
for protocols with reverse reconciliation as follows. In a first phase, Alice transmits a
sequence of iid symbols X distributed according to a Bernoulli(αn) distribution over the




). Intuitively, the choice of {αn}n>1 must ensure
that X is sparse, so that the warden cannot suspect the existence of information symbols,
but not so sparse that Alice and Bob cannot extract a long enough key from their observa-
tion. We shall show that our choice of {αn}n>1 simultaneously satisfies both requirements.
In a second phase, Bob measures his received quantum states in some basis and, based on
the output of the measurements, generates two messages W and K, representing public in-
formation reconciliation and secret key, respectively. Bob subsequently sends W through
the public channel, and Alice recovers K using W and X. Although the second phase of
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the protocol seems deceptively similar to a standard application of information reconcil-
iation and privacy amplification, there exists a technical difficulty because of the specific
distributions of Alice’s and Bob’s observations, which precludes the use of standard tools.
Specifically, consider the classical channel WY |X and suppose that Y is the output of the
channel to the input X. The standard finite-length analysis of reconciliation requires the





























= Ω(1) so that the
second-order penalty satisfies γn = ω(
√
n). A similar reasoning holds for privacy am-
plification, which prevents us from establishing the desired first-order scaling of o(
√
n).
We circumvent this difficulty by resorting to a technique called likelihood encoder [77], in
which the encoders used to generateW andK are derived from different principles. In par-
ticular, the analysis of the likelihood encoder only requires the use of quantities depending
on mutual information (instead of conditional entropy), which has the same scaling as the
number of bits generated by a covert protocol. As we shall see later, instead of (6.5), the

































= O(αn), which leads to γn = ω(
√
nαn). The second-order penalty
is now conveniently dominated by the first-order term
∑n
i=1 I(Xi;Yi) which is of the order
of Ω(nαn).
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The analysis of protocols with forward and reverse reconciliation leads to Theorem 26
below, whose proof is given in Appendix 6.A.




(|y〉〈y|B ⊗ 1E) ρxBE (|y〉〈y|B ⊗ 1E) . (6.7)















and if ρ̃0BE = ρ̃
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which simplifies when ρ̃1BE = ρ̃
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In addition, the lower bound in (6.9) is achieved without public communication using covert
communication codes for cq channels [23] combined with wiretap coding techniques [13]
while the lower bound in (6.10) is achieved with reverse reconciliation on the public chan-
nel.
While this result does not hold for the most general quantum setting, note that the
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Figure 6.4.1: Simplified model of a lossy bosonic channel.
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Figure 6.4.2: Covert and secret key generation throughput as a function of Eve’s dark count
rate.
explicitly includes the public communication and demonstrate the existence of efficient
protocols that allow key expansion. Perhaps more importantly, as apparent in the proof of
the result, such protocols do not rely on a secret key to determine the instances in which
Alice transmits non-zero states; in contrast, our proof shows the existence of reconciliation
and key-extraction algorithms capable of extracting the diffuse secret correlations created
by Alice’s sparse transmission of non-innocent states. We finally point out that for ρ̃1BE =
ρ̃1B ⊗ ρ̃1E secrecy comes almost for free as the information leakage to Eve is asymptotically
dominated by the information shared between Alice and Bob in reverse reconciliation.
As an illustration, we consider the situation depicted in Fig. 6.4.1 in which the input
port of a balanced beam-splitter is in control of Alice while Bob and Eve are each con-
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Figure 6.4.3: Covert and secret key generation throughput for a lossy bosonic channel.
nected to one of the output ports through optical fibers of length dAB and dAE , respectively,
and loss γ dB/km. We further assume that the second input port is in the vacuum state,
and that Alice uses the vacuum state |0〉 and a coherent state |α〉 as the innocent and the
information symbol, respectively. Bob and Eve measure their output ports with photode-
tectors to count the number of photons at each channel use. The photodetectors suffer from
dark count that is beneficial for covert communication since detection of photons at Eve
does not necessarily imply the existence communication. Let ηB and ηE be Bob and Eve’s
photodetector efficiency, respectively, and λB and λE be Bob and Eve’s photodetector dark
count rate, respectively. The achievable covert and secret key throughputs can be obtained




































in (6.9) and (6.11) for forward and reverse reconciliation, respectively. Note that the output
states of this channel belong to infinite-dimensional spaces and, strictly speaking, one can-
not directly apply Theorem 26. Nevertheless, since for the number states {|n〉}n>0, 〈n|ρ|n〉
decays exponentially for all output states ρ, one can construct a sequence of channels with
finite-dimensional output states for which the quantities used in (6.9) and (6.11), as well
as the performance of any covert and secret key generation protocol, tend to those of the
original channel.
We illustrate in Fig. 6.4.2 the achievable covert and secret key throughput as a function
of Eve’s photodetector dark count rate λE for γ = 0.2 dB/km, ηB = ηE = 0.97, λB =
0.001, and dAB = dAE = 3 km. In Fig. 6.4.3, we also illustrate the achievable covert and
secret key throughput as a function of the distance of Bob to Alice dAB for |α|2 = 0.001,
γ = 0.2 dB/km, ηB = ηE = 0.97, λB = λE = 0.001, and dAE = 3 km. As expected,
the secret and covert key throughputs are orders of magnitude lower than their counterparts
without covertness constraint. This is an unfortunate but unavoidable byproduct of the
covertness constraint, which severely limits how many useful bits can be embedded in
transmitted signals.
6.5 Conclusion
We have introduced a comprehensive framework in which to analyze the possibility of
covert quantum key generation. In the special case of cq wiretap channels, for which the
adversary’s attack is known, we have established two lower-bounds on the optimal covert
throughput of key generation based on forward and reverse reconciliation. While our results
suggest that covert key expansion is possible over quantum channels, several lingering
questions remain to be explored before envisioning an actual practical demonstration of
covert quantum key distribution. This includes, in particular, extending our results to more
general attacks with fewer assumptions regarding Eve’s abilities, extending the analysis to
infinite-dimensional systems that are closer to current technological implementations, and
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designing efficient coding schemes with provable finite length performance. With respect
to the latter, an explicit construction of covert communication codes over classical channels
has been recently developed [21], which provides a promising lead to design codes for the
framework proposed in the present paper.
204
APPENDIX
6.A Proof of Theorem 26
We prove Theorem 26 by generalizing the proof of [69, Theorem 1] to the quantum setting.
The most challenging part of this generalization is to establish a channel resolvability result
for cq channels for distributions suitable for covert communications. We first introduce
some preliminary concepts regarding covert communications mostly borrowed from [13].
We also note that the use of standard proof techniques for secret key generation such as
source coding with side information and privacy amplification is challenging for covert
communication as discussed in Section 6.4. We therefore resort to the likelihood encoder
technique [77] in which we first define an auxiliary problem that can be analyzed using
channel coding approaches, for which designing a code for the main problem is reduced to
the design of code for the auxiliary problem.
6.A.1 Preliminaries
We define here required quantities used for our achievability proof. Suppose Alice sends iid
symbols through her cq channel x 7→ ρxBE with each symbol distributed according toQX ∼
Bernoulli(αn) for αn ∈ (0, 1). Upon receiving each state, Bob makes a measurement in a
fixed orthonormal basis {|y〉B} forHB to obtain a classical symbol y. In the following, we
define equivalent cq channels from Bob to Alice and Eve that result in the same joint state
for the three parties.
Definition 10. Let αn ∈ [0, 1]. We define









QX(x)|x〉〈x|A ⊗ ρ̃xBE, (6.19)
ρ̃x,yE ,






QX|Y (x|y)|x〉〈x|A ⊗ ρ̃x,yE . (6.21)
Note that the state ρ̃ABE is the joint state of all parties after Bob’s measurement, which is
classical for both Alice and Bob, and ρ̃xBE , ρ̃
y
AE , and ρ̃
x,y
E are the corresponding conditional
quantum states.
The following lemma establishes useful properties of ρ0BE under the assumption ρ̃
0
BE =
ρ̃0B ⊗ ρ̃0E .
























Proof. By the spectral decomposition theorem, there exist orthonormal bases {|y〉B} and












λyy′zz′|y〉〈y′|B ⊗ |z〉〈z′|E. (6.25)
Our assumption that ρ̃0BE = ρ̃
0
B ⊗ ρ̃0E implies that λyy′zz′ = λyλz1{y = y′, z = z′}. Fur-
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thermore, for any y, we have by definition
ρ̃0,yE ,











λy′λz′ |y′〉〈y′|B ⊗ |z′〉〈z′|E
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= 1, which together with (6.30) yields ρ̃0E = ρ̃
0,y
E .
To prove (6.22), notice that
I(QY , ρ̃
y
E) = I(B;E)ρ̃ (6.31)
= I(A;B)ρ̃ + I(A;E)ρ̃ − I(A;BE)ρ̃ + I(B;E|A)ρ̃. (6.32)
Moreover, for ρ̃αnB , (1− αn)ρ̃0B + αnρ̃1B, we can write
I(A;B)ρ̃ = H(ρ̃
αn
B )− (1− αn)H(ρ̃0B)− αnH(ρ̃1B) (6.33)
= −tr(ρ̃αnB log (ρ̃αnB )− (1− αn)ρ̃0B log(ρ̃0B)− αnρ̃1B log(ρ̃1B)) (6.34)
= −tr(ρ̃αnB
(








− (1− αn)ρ̃0B log(ρ̃0B)− αnρ̃1B log(ρ̃1B)) (6.35)
= −tr(ρ̃αnB
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Since X is classical, [85, Equation (11.92)] yields that








where (a) follows from our assumption that ρ̃0BE = ρ̃
0
B ⊗ ρ̃0E . This completes the proof of
(6.22).
6.A.2 An Auxiliary Problem
To show the existence of good codes for our main problem, we use the likelihood encoder
technique [77], and in particular, define an auxiliary problem for which we can exploit
channel coding instead of source coding. We then show how these two problems are related
in Section 6.A.3. Consider a cq channel y 7→ ρ̃yAE from Bob to Alice and Eve as in
Definition 10. Bob encodes three uniformly distributed messages W1 ∈ J1,M1K, W2 ∈
J1,M2K, and W3 ∈ J1,M3K into a codeword Y using an encoder f : J1,M1K × J1,M2K ×
J1,M3K → Yn, transmits the codeword Y over the cq channel, and sends W2 publicly.
Alice subsequently performs a measurement on her received state ρaY in a fixed basis {|x〉}
to obtain X, and uses X and W2 to decode W1 as Ŵ1. If P aY denotes the induced PMF of
Y, and ρa
ABEW1W2W3Ŵ1







‖P aY −Q⊗nY ‖1, and ‖ρEW1W2 − ρE ⊗ ρW1W2‖1 are small.
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Lemma 49. If for some ζ > 0
logM3 = b(1 + ζ)I(QY , ρ̃yE)nc, (6.44)
logM1 + logM2 + logM3 = d(1 + ζ)H(QY )ne, (6.45)
logM1 + logM3 = b(1− ζ)I(QY , QX|Y )nc, (6.46)








‖P aY −Q⊗nY ‖1 6 2−ξn, (6.48)
‖ρEW1W2 − ρE ⊗ ρW1W2‖1 6 2−ω(logn). (6.49)
Proof. Let F : J1,M1K × J1,M2K × J1,M3K be a random encoder whose codewords are
drawn independently according to Q⊗nY . By construction, Alice can assume that each sym-
bol Xi is received as the output of a DMC (Y , QX|Y ,X ) with input Yi, and, therefore,

















































where (a) follows from applying Lemma 3 to the subcodebook {F (w1, w2, w3) : w1 ∈
J1,M1K, w3 ∈ J1,M3K} for a particular w2. By choosing






I(QX , QY |X)n, (6.54)
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+ 2− ζ2 I(X;Y )n
6 2−ξαnn,
(6.55)
for some ξ > 0. Next, by using Lemma 5 in Chapter 1 for the channel (Y , QY ′|Y ,Y) with

























































for ξ > 0 small enough.
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|w1w2〉〈w1w2| ⊗ ρw1w2E . (6.61)





































logM3 = bI(QY , ρ̃yE)n+ ζαnnc, (6.65)













































































where (a) follows from [37, Lemma 3.7]. We now introduce the following technical lemma
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to simplify the above expression.
Lemma 50. Suppose s < 0; there exists a constant B > 0 such that for n large enough
and |s| small enough, we have
φ(s) > −I(QY , ρ̃yE)s−B(αns2 − s3). (6.70)
Proof. See Appendix 6.B.
















































By choosing s = o(
√
αn) ∩ ω( lognnαn )
2, the above expression goes to zero faster than any





















logM3 = b(1 + ζ)I(QY , ρ̃yE)nc, (6.76)
logM1 + logM2 + logM3 = d(1 + ζ)H(QY )ne, (6.77)
logM1 + logM3 = b(1− ζ)I(QY , QX|Y )nc. (6.78)






















‖P aY −Q⊗nY ‖1 6 4× 2−ξn}, (6.80)
E3 , {‖ρW1W2E − (ρ̃E)⊗n ⊗ ρW1W2‖1 6 4× 2−ω(logn)}, (6.81)
and using Markov inequality, we have






























6 4× 2−ξαnn, (6.86)
1
2
‖P aY −Q⊗nY ‖1 6 4× 2−ξn, (6.87)
‖ρW1W2E − (ρ̃E)⊗n ⊗ ρW1W2‖1 6 4× 2−ω(logn). (6.88)
6.A.3 Proof of Theorem 26
Using the likelihood encoder technique, we first prove the lower bound in (6.10). Consider
a specific code for the auxiliary problem in Section 6.A.2 and let ρ̃ABEW1W2Ŵ1 be the
corresponding induced joint quantum state. Because all random variables W1, W2, X, and
Y are classical, we can define their induced joint PMF denoted by P̃W1W2XY. We then use
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the conditional PMFs P̃W1W2|Y and P̃Ŵ1|XW2 as the encoder and decoder, respectively, in
the main problem, which results in the induced joint quantum state ρ̂ABEW1W2Ŵ1 . By our




P̃Y(y)P̃W1W2|Y(w1, w2|y)Q⊗nX|Y (x|y)P̃Ŵ1|XW2(ŵ1|x, w2)





Q⊗nY (y)P̃W1W2|Y(w1, w2|y)Q⊗nX|Y (x|y)P̃Ŵ1|XW2(ŵ1|x, w2)
× |yxw1w2ŵ1〉〈yxw1w2ŵ1| ⊗ ρ̃x,yE . (6.90)
Since they differ only in the distribution of Y, we have






where (a) follows from (6.74). Thus, we upper-bound the probability of error in the main
problem as
PP̂ (W1 6= W2) 6 PP̃ (W1 6= W2) + ‖ρ̃ABEW1W2Ŵ1 − ρ̂ABEW1W2Ŵ1‖1 (6.92)
6 2−ζαnn + 2−ζn, (6.93)
and upper-bound the sum of secrecy and covertness as












































= ‖ρ̂W1W2E − ρW1W2unif ⊗ ρ̂E‖1
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where (a) follows from [23, Lemma 7], (b) follows from Lemma 51 in Appendix 6.C, and
(c) follows from
‖ρ̂W1W2E − ρunifW1W2 ⊗ ρ̂E‖1 6 ‖ρ̃W1W2E − ρunifW1W2 ⊗ ρ̂E‖1 + ‖ρ̂W1W2E − ρ̃W1W2E‖1
(6.100)
6 2−ζαnn + 2−ζn. (6.101)







































We finally turn to the proof of the lower bound in (6.9). Note that if D(ρ̃1B‖ρ̃0B) 6
D(ρ̃1E‖ρ̃0E), the result is trivial. Therefore, we can assume that D(ρ̃1B‖ρ̃0B) > D(ρ̃1E‖ρ̃0E).
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Let M1 and M2 be such that
logM1 + logM2 = b(1− ζ)I(QX , ρ̃yB)c, (6.105)
logM2 = d(1 + ζ)I(QX , ρ̃yE)e. (6.106)
The protocol is then as follows. Alice chooses a random binary string of length logM1 +
logM2 and transmits this string through a covert code introduced in [23]. Alice and Bob
subsequently extract the first logM1 bits of the string as the key. The reliability and covert-
















Similar to the proof of (6.75), one can show that the above expression is upper-bounded
by 2−ω(logn) provided that logM2 = d(1 + ζ)I(QX , ρ̃yE)e. Lower-bounding the throughput
as in (6.104) using (6.105) and (6.106) concludes the proof. Note that unlike the proof
of (6.10), the protocol used here does not use the public communication channel.
6.B Proof of Lemma 50
For a fix n, applying Taylor’s theorem on φ defined in (6.64), we have
















QY (y)tr (Ay(s)) . (6.111)
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− (ln (ρ̃yE))3Ay(s) + 3 (ln (ρ̃yE))2Ay(s) ln (ρ̃E)




Using Ay(0) = ρ̃
y










QY (y)tr (− ln (ρ̃yE) ρ̃yE + ρ̃yE ln (ρ̃E)) (6.118)































2 ρ̃yE − 2 ln (ρ̃yE) ρ̃yE ln (ρ̃E) + ρ̃yE (ln (ρ̃E))2
)
− I(QY , ρ̃yE)2. (6.124)








2 ρ̃yE − 2 ln (ρ̃yE) ρ̃yE ln (ρ̃E) + ρ̃yE (ln (ρ̃E))2
)
(6.125)





































where (a) follows from Lemma 48. By the mean value theorem, we know that |h(α) −
h(0)| = |h(α)| = h′(β)α for some 0 < β < α. Since h′ is continuous for a small
neighborhood around zero, it is bounded and therefore, we have |h(αn)| = O(αn). Fur-
thermore, Lemma 48 implies that I(QY , ρ̃
y
E)
2 = O(α2n). Thus, there exists B > 0 such
that |φ′′(0)| 6 Bαn for n large enough. Notice next that g, g′, g′′, and g′′′ are jointly con-
tinuous functions of both variables s and αn in a neighborhood around (0, 0). Additionally,
since g(0) = 1 when α = 0, we conclude that φ′′′ is also continuous in both s and αn in a
neighborhood around (0, 0). Therefore, for B large enough, |s| small enough and n large
enough, we have |φ′′′(s)| 6 B. Combing φ(0) = 0, φ′(0) = −I(QY , ρ̃yE), |φ′′(0)| 6 Bαn,
and |φ′′′(η)| 6 B with (6.109), we obtain the desired result.
6.C Technical Lemma
Lemma 51. Suppose ρ and σ are two density matrices on a Hilbert spaceH with dimH =
d such that suppρ ⊂ suppσ and ‖ρ− σ‖1 6 ε 6 e−1. Then,




Proof. Since supp(ρ) ⊂ supp(σ), we have
D(ρ‖σ) = tr (ρ(log ρ− log σ)) (6.129)













where (a) follows from Fannes inequality.
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CHAPTER 7
COVERT SECRET KEY GENERATION: TOWARD A PARCTICAL
EXPERIMENT OVER A QUANTUM CHANNEL
7.1 Summary
We propose a protocol based on pulse-position modulation and multi-level coding that al-
lows one to bootstrap traditional quantum key distribution protocols while ensuring covert-
ness, in the sense that no statistical test by the adversary can detect the presence of commu-
nication over the quantum channel better than a random guess. When run over a bosonic
channel, our protocol can leverage existing discrete-modulated continuous variable pro-
tocols. Since existing techniques to bound Eve’s information do not directly apply, we
develop a new bound that results in positive, although very low, throughput for a range of
channel parameters. The analysis of the protocol performance shows that covert secret key
expansion is possible using a public authenticated classical channel and a quantum channel
largely but not fully under control of an adversary, which we precisely define. We also
establish a converse result showing that, under the golden standard of quantum key dis-
tribution, by which the adversary completely controls the quantum channel, no covert key
generation is possible. The content of this chapter is based on [86].
7.2 Introduction
The first attempts at covert QKD [24, 84] have ensured covertness with fully coordinated
protocols, in which information-bearing qubits are only communicated over a secret ran-
dom subset of channel uses upon which Alice and Bob secretly agree prior to communi-
cation; in the remaining channel uses Alice transmits an “idle” state corresponding to no
communication. If n denotes the total number of channel uses and t denotes the number
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of channel uses over which communication happens, fully coordinated protocols [24, 84]
require t = Θ(
√
n) to generate Ω(
√
n) bits of secret key. Although the processing com-
plexity is identical to that of standard QKD protocols, fully coordinated protocols require







n log n) secret bits prior to communication, so that
the number of required key bit asymptotically dominates the number of generated key bits,
thereby forbidding secret key expansion.
To circumvent the impossibility of covert and secret key expansion with fully coordi-
nated protocols, we have proposed in Chapter 6 to achieve covertness with an uncoordi-
nated protocol based on the use of “sparse signaling” for quantum state distribution, which
operates as follows. If αn , O(n−
1
2 ) and if PX denotes the Bernoulli(αn) distribution,
Alice generates an i.i.d. sequence Xn = (X1, · · · , Xn) according to P ⊗nX , which is then
modulated by mapping zero to the idle state and one to another state. A technical subtlety,
however, prevents Alice and Bob from performing classical information reconciliation and
privacy amplification to obtain a secret key from their shared quantum states. While the
asymptotic key rate is O(n−
1
2 ) by the square root law, the finite length penalty of privacy
amplification is of the order of ω(n−
1
2 ) [87], which dominates the asymptotic rate. For a
known adversary’s attack, our uncoordinated protocol circumvents this difficulty and en-
sures secret key expansion using a likelihood encoder but the classical post-processing of
the protocol is much more complex than for typical QKD protocols.
To reap the benefits of both fully coordinated and uncoordinated protocols and achieve
secret key expansion without increasing processing complexity, we develop here a partially
coordinated protocol inspired by our prior construction of low-complexity codes for covert
communication over classical channels with PPM and MLC [21]. This approach is more
aligned with traditional low-complexity information reconciliation and privacy amplifica-
tion algorithms and we analyze the covertness and the security under an unknown attack by
the adversary. We restrict, however, the adversary’s attack by requiring that a portion of the
channel be out of the adversary’s control (e.g., the part of channel in Alice’s laboratory).
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We prove that such a requirement is fundamentally necessary to establish any covertness
result. Since we were not able to use any standard technique to bound Eve’s information,
we present a new bound, which we use to show the existence of positive throughputs for
some range of bosonic channel parameters. While our results are slightly disappointing in
that the range of useful parameters is limited, our analysis opens the way to experimental
demonstrations of covert QKD.
7.3 Notation
In this chapter, we used the following two notations. We defineC(ρA, σA) ,
√
1− F (ρA, σA),
which satisfies the triangle inequality [88, Proposition 3.3]. For a non-empty finite set X ,
let HX be a Hilbert space defined by an orthonormal basis {|x〉 : x ∈ X}. For a function
f : X → Y , we define the channel





7.4 Covert QKD Setup
Alice and Bob aim at covertly expanding a secret key using the following generic setup and
protocol. Let RA and RB be Alice’s and Bob’s local randomness, respectively, and let R be
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Figure 7.3.1: Covert quantum key expansion model in the presence of Eve
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laboratory to send quantum states to Bob. At any time instant, the state of the transmitter
is described by a density operator on a Hilbert space HQ. A pure state |0〉〈0| identifies the
“idle” state of the transmitter when there is no communication.1 Alice prepares a quantum
state σ̃AQn = trRRARB (σ̃RRARBAQn) and sends σ̃Qn to Bob by n uses of her transmitter.
The adversary Eve is assumed to receive the state through a known memoryless quantum
channel, which we call probe, EQ→Q that is outside its control. Eve therefore obtains the
output of E⊗nQ→Q for the input σ̃Qn , which then interacts with an ancilla En in Eve’s lab
before being transmitted to Bob. The whole operation can be described by an isometry
UQn→QnEn , for which we denote the corresponding quantum channel by UQn→QnEn . We
call this phase quantum state distribution, which results in the joint quantum state
σRRARBAQnEn , (idRRARBA ⊗ UQn→QnEn ◦ E⊗nQ→Q)(σ̃RRARBAQn) (7.2)
between Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. After establishing a shared quantum state, Alice
and Bob may interactively communicate over an authenticated classical public channel and
perform measurements on their available state to generate keys SA and SB, respectively.
We call this phase quantum key distillation and formally describe it by a quantum channel
DRARBRAQn→CSASB , where C denotes all public communication. The final state is then
σCSASBEn , (idEn ⊗DRARBRAQn→CSASB)(σRRARBAQnEn). (7.3)
1One can associate a mixed state to no communication, but in bosonic systems, the natural choice for the
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Figure 7.3.2: Covert quantum key expansion model in the absence of Eve
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Finally, we assume that, in the absence of an adversary, Alice and Bob expect to be con-
nected through the “honest” channel NQ→Q after the probe (see Fig 7.3.2). Alice and Bob
can also abort the protocol at any time and do not generate secret keys.
For a particular protocol inducing the final joint state σCSASBEn , we assess the perfor-
mance of the protocol with the following four quantities:
1. the probability of error P(SA 6= SB|not abort);
2. the information leakage





∥∥σCEn − ρunifC ⊗ ρ0En
∥∥
1
, where ρ0En , UQn→En(E⊗nQ→Q(|0〉〈0|
⊗n)); and
4. the robustness P(abort) in the presence of the honest channel NQ→Q.
We highlight here three crucial distinctions between our model and traditional QKD.
1. As covertness is of no concern in QKD, the idle state of the transmitter is not specified
in a QKD model.
2. Unlike QKD, in which the quantum channel is in complete control of the adversary,
we restrict Eve’s observations to result from a known probe EQ→Q. We discuss this
limitation of our model in Section 7.5.
3. To the best of our knowledge, there is no standard way of defining covertness in the
presence of public communication in the literature. We use a covertness criterion
similar to that in Chapter 6, in which the mere existence of public communication
does not reveal the existence of the protocol; however, when
∥∥σCEn − ρunifC ⊗ ρ0En
∥∥
1
is small, we effectively require negligible dependence between public communi-
cation and σEn and that public communication be distributed according to a pre-
specified distribution, which we choose to be the uniform distribution ρunifC for sim-
plicity. These two requirements are critical to ensure that public communication does
not help Eve detect the communication over the quantum channel.
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7.5 Role of the Probe
We now establish a no-go result in the absence of the probe. We measure here the infor-
mation leakage and the covertness through the relaxed matrics




‖σ̃Qn − ρ0En‖1, respectively, instead of





















∥∥σCEn − ρunifC ⊗ ρ0En
∥∥
1
by the data processing inequality. Thus, a converse for the relaxed secrecy and covertness
constraints implies a converse for the constraint as defined in Section 7.4.
Theorem 27. Let EQ→Q = idQ and define K , log dimHSA . Consider a protocol
that operates as in Section 7.4 with P(SA 6= SB) 6 ε,







6 µ. We then have
(1− 5√µ− ε− 2δ)K 6 Hb (
√
µ) + Hb (ε+
√










Proof. See Appendix 7.A.
Consequently, if ε, δ, µ → 0 then K vanishes, as well. Theorem 27 therefore shows
that giving the complete control of the channel to the adversary is too stringent to establish
covertness. A probe is therefore necessary and could be created with some part of the
channel that is protected from the adversary, for example the portion of an optical fiber that
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Figure 7.6.1: Covert quantum state distribution through PPM and MLC
7.6 Description of PPM-MLC-based Protocol
We first provide a high level description of the role of PPM and MLC in our PPM-MLC-
based protocol. The principle of PPM is to split the whole transmission block into smaller
sub-blocks and to transmit exactly one non-idle state in a position chosen uniformly at
random in each sub-block. The number of sub-blocks and the size of each sub-block should
both be O(
√
n) to achieve covertness [46]. The idea behind MLC is to further split the
randomness used to specify the position of the non-idle state into two parts: one part with
a fixed size independent of n, generated locally by Alice and used for key generation, and
another part of size growing with n, generated secretly and jointly by Alice and Bob and
used for mimicking the uniform distribution via quantum channel resolvability [37, Chapter
9.4]. This splitting allows Alice and Bob to partially coordinate without paying the penalty
incurred by full coordination. The use of MLC converts the problem of covert QKD into
a traditional QKD problem over an effective block-length scaling as O(
√
n), for which
low-complexity processing is possible.
We now elaborate on the details of the partially coordinated PPM-MLC-based protocol.
As depicted in Fig. 7.6.1, the n channel uses are partitioned into ` consecutive sub-blocks
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of length m so that n , `m. Fix a non-idle state |φ〉 for the transmitter such that
〈φ|0〉 6= 0, (7.5)
supp (EQ→Q(|1〉〈1|)) ⊆ supp (EQ→Q(|0〉〈0|)) . (7.6)
We define the zth PPM state of length m, |PPM, z〉Qm as
|0〉⊗z−1 ⊗ |φ〉 ⊗ |0〉⊗m−z, (7.7)
a product state of |0〉 and |φ〉 with a single non-idle state in the zth position. Writing
m , mxmv, Alice generates ` PPM states of length m by choosing the position of the
non-idle state in the ith state as
d(Xi, Vi) , (Xi − 1)mv + Vi, (7.8)
where X` = (X1, · · · , X`) ∈ J1,mxK` and V ` = (V1, · · · , V`) ∈ J1,mvK` are randomly
generated sequences. Let ρx
`,v`
Qn be the corresponding density operator when X
` = x` and
V ` = v`, i.e.,
ρx
`,v`
Qn , ⊗`i=1|PPM, d(xi, vi)〉〈PPM, d(xi, vi)| (7.9)
The crux of the PPM-MLC-based protocol is to generate the sequences X` and V ` using
different mechanisms: X` is generated locally by Alice i.i.d. according to the uniform
distribution over J1,mxK while V ` is generated jointly by Alice and Bob by sampling code-
words uniformly at random from a codebook of size h described as follows. Let F be a




Bob samples F ∈ F and Z ∈ Z uniformly at random and transmits them over the public
channel. The codebook consists of the codewords in F−1(Z) and will be denoted through
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Figure 7.6.2: Gray squares indicate the possible values of d(x, v) for a given value of v
when mx = 2 and mv = 4.
the function
g : J1, hK→ J1,mvK` : R 7→ V ` = g(R). (7.10)
The choice of X` uniformly at random defines an effective cq channel from v` to the state












By sampling R uniformly at random in J1, hK and using g(R) at the input of the effective















If Alice and Bob secretly share R prior to the transmission, Bob can discard m −mx of
his sub-systems in each sub-block of length m, for which he knows that the state |0〉 is sent
(see Fig. 7.6.2 for an example). We shall later account for the partial coordination through
R by subtracting log h from the number of generated key bits. For each sub-block, Alice
therefore obtains the classical stateXi while Bob obtainsmx received states. We denote the
whole state shared between Alice and Bob in ` sub-blocks by σX`(Qmx )` , which is τ⊗`XQmx
in the absence of the adversary for some τXQmx independent of n.
The last steps of the PPM-MLC-based protocol are similar to a traditional QKD proto-
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col applied to σX`(Qmx )` with the additional constraint




requires the public communication to be uniformly distributed and independent of Eve’s ob-
servation during the quantum communication phase. The three main steps of this phase are
parameter estimation, information reconciliation, and privacy amplification. Let ` , `1+`2
and decomposeX`(Qmx)` into two disjoint partsX`1(Qmx)`1 andX`2(Qmx)`2 , used for pa-
rameter estimation and secret key distillation, respectively. For simplicity, we do not detail
the classical algorithm for information reconciliation and take for granted the existence of
a protocol IX`2 (Qmx )`2→X`2X̂`2CIR where X̂
`2 denotes Bob’s estimate of X`2 and CIR is the
public communication that takes place during the information reconciliation protocol. Let
σX`2 ,X̂`2CIREnC′ , (I⊗idEnC′)(σX`2 (Qmx )`2EnC′) where σEn is the adversary’s observation
from the quantum communication and C ′ is the public communication in the quantum state






P(abort| honest channel) 6 εIR, (7.14)




More details to justify the existence of good reconciliation protocols can be found in [89]
and references therein. Furthermore, it is shown in [90] that the public communication
could be uniformly distributed and independent of the adversary’s observations as required
in (7.15) by using a negligible amount of key. The final step is to perform privacy amplifica-
tion to establish a secure key. To this end, Alice and Bob require a bound on HδPAmin(X`2|En)
for some information leakage threshold δPA, which we establish in Theorem 29.
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7.7 Analysis of PPM-MLC-Based Protocol
7.7.1 Covertness















∥∥σEnC − ρ0En ⊗ ρunifC
∥∥
1







and εIR and δPA are the parameters of the information reconciliation and privacy amplifi-
cation protocols, respectively, as described in Section 7.6.
Proof. Let C = (C ′, C ′′) where C ′ contains (F,Z) and the value of hash function for
privacy amplification, andC ′′ denotes the remaining public communication. By the triangle
inequality, we have





















By our assumptions in (7.13)-(7.15) at the end of Section 7.6 and the leftover hash lemma [30],
we have
∥∥σEnC − σEnC′ ⊗ ρunifC′′
∥∥
1
6 εIR + δPA. We now consider the second term, i.e.,
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∥∥σEnC′ − ρ0En ⊗ ρunifC′
∥∥
1





























which is the average state at the output of the probe when v` is chosen uniformly at random
from J1,mxK`, we have


























where (a) follows from Pinsker’s inequality [85, Th. 11.9.1], and (b) follows from [91, Eq.
(B144)].2 Therefore, establishing covertness amounts to proving that the state σQnC′ gener-
ated by the protocol is nearly identical to ρPPMQn ⊗ ρunifC′ . This problem is known as quantum
channel resolvability, and the minimum number of bits log h required is approximately
equal to the Holevo information [37, Lemma 9.2]. Recall that F is a regular two-universal
family of hash functions from J1,mvK` to Z , J1,mv`/hK.
2In the classical setting, the authors of [46] showed the upper-bound with a factor of 1/2 on the right hand
side. While we conjecture that an extension of such upper-bound to the quantum setting is possible, we could


















|v〉〈v|V ⊗ ρ̃vQm , (7.28)
ρV Qm , E⊗mQ→Q(ρ̃V Qm). (7.29)
By Lemma 53 in Appendix 7.B,





































and |V|` is divisible by h.3 Applying [30, Corollary 3.3.7], we simplify the condition on





















= `I(V ;Qm)ρ +
√






3For any h′, we can choose h such that |V|h′ > h > h′ and |V|` is divisible by h; hence, this condition
adds at most log |V| = O(log n) of penalty to log h.
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where (a) follows since ρV is a mixed state. We also further upper-bound I(V ;Qm)ρ by





















































where (a) follows from the symmetry in the definition of ρvQm , and (b) follows from [91,
Eq. (B144)].
7.7.2 Security
The objective of this section is to lower bound the smooth min-entropy of Alice’s data X`
given Eve’s observations. We first recall that, by our discussion in Section 7.6, we can






|x〉〈x|X ⊗ σ̃xQmx , (7.42)
σ̃xQmx , |0〉〈0|⊗x−1 ⊗ |φ〉〈φ| ⊗ |0〉〈0|⊗mx−x, (7.43)
and sends σ̃⊗`Qmx over the quantum channel to Bob. We assume that Eve applies the same
unitary UQmx→QmxEm on each PPM symbol. We do not prove the security against a coher-
ent attack, but the techniques developed in [92, 93, 94] might be applicable to our problem.
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ρ̃0Qmx , (EQ→Q (|0〉〈0|))⊗mx , (7.48)





Theorem 29. We have
1
`

















for all unitaries U and for all ηx such that
F (τxQmx , ρ
0
Qmx ) 6 ℵ(λx, F (|0〉〈0|, |φ〉〈φ|))− 2
√
1− F (|0〉〈0|, |φ〉〈φ|)δ − δ2, (7.51)
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where















ηxδ1 + 4(δ1)2, (7.53)
δ1 , C(|φ〉〈φ|, ρ1Q), (7.54)
δ0 , C(|0〉〈0|, ρ0Q), (7.55)
δ , δ0 + δ1. (7.56)
Remark 13. The right hand side of (7.50) only depends on quantities that are either spec-
ified by the protocol and the probe, or could be calculated from Alice’s and Bob’s observa-
tions.
Remark 14. The difficulty in obtaining a bound on the adversary’s information is the fol-
lowing. Note first that, as detailed in Chapter 6, reverse reconciliation only leads to a
positive covert throughput if Eve’s and Bob’s observations are independent when |0〉 is
sent. This is unfortunately not the case when the channel is a beam-splitter. To the best
of our knowledge, there exist two standard methods to bound Eve’s information for con-
tinuous variable QKD protocols. The first method leverages the optimality of Gaussian
attack, which results in a sub-optimal bound on Eve’s information for discrete-variable
protocols. Since Alice’s measurement is not Gaussian (in the entanglement-based ver-
sion), it is not straightforward to calculate the bound for forward reconciliation protocols.
The second method exploits entropic uncertainty relations, which would require finding an
entanglement-based version with two different measurements at Alice. We could not find
such version of our specific quantum state distribution.





















This inequality holds when ηx > 0 and N is close to a noiseless channel.
We now state a general upper bound for the relative entropy between the outputs of the
complementary channel for two fixed states.
Theorem 30. Let A and B be two possibly infinite dimensional quantum systems such that
system A is a composition of two sub-systems A′ and A′′. Let ρ0A and ρ
1
A be in D(HA) such
that for two pure states |φ0〉A′ and |φ1〉A′ in HA′ and a mixed state νA′′ in D(HA′′), we
have C(φxA′ ⊗ νA′′ , ρxA) 6 δx. Let N : D(HA) → D(HB) be a quantum channel with a
complementary channel E : D(HA)→ D(HE). Suppose that η > 0 satisfies
F (N (ρ1A),N (ρ0A)) 6 ℵ(λ, F (φ1A′ , φ0A′))− 2
√
1− F (φ1A′ , φ0A′)δ − δ2 (7.58)














+ log (1− η) . (7.59)
Proof. See Appendix 7.D.
























H(X|Em)τ = H(X)τ − I(X;Em)τ = logmx − I(X;Em)τ . (7.62)
Note now that


































+ log (1− ηx) . (7.67)
Combining the above inequalities, we obtain the result.
7.7.3 Example
We present here an experimental setup over which our proposed scheme could be executed.
As illustrated in Fig. 7.7.2, Alice’s transmitter is a laser whose output is a single-mode
bosonic system. The idle state is |0〉 and we choose a coherent state |α〉 as the non-idle
state. The probe and the honest channel are both beam-splitters with transmissivity τE
and τN , respectively, and excess noise nE and nN , respectively. In Fig. 7.7.3, we plot the
number of bits per PPM symbol versus τN for τE = 0.9994, α = 0.6, nE = 11, and
nN = 0.01. For these parameters, we also have χ2(E(|0〉〈0|)‖E(|α〉〈α|)) = 59881934,
which controls the covertness through Eq. (7.17). This example shows the possibility of
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Figure 7.7.2: Experimental setup for our protocol.
Conclusion
We have developed a protocol based on PPM and MLC for the expansion of a secret key, for
which we established information-theoretic secrecy of the generated keys and covertness
of the protocol with respect to an adversary restricted to observing the output of a probe
outside its control but otherwise only limited by the laws of quantum mechanics. We
have also demonstrated the performance of our protocol for a bosonic channel. Although
the range of channel parameters is narrow and the efficiency is very low, this example
shows the possibility of covert QKD in settings not envisioned earlier. We believe that two
factors cause the low-efficiency of our protocol: the stringent constraint of covertness and
our sub-optimal bounds on Eve’s information. The former factor is, in our opinion, more
crucial because the optimal throughput under covertness constraint is negligible even with
the knowledge Eve’s attack (see Chapter 6). Using many optical mode at once [95] and
developing tighter bound for Eve’s information could mitigate this low-efficiency.
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Figure 7.7.3: Achievable number of key bits per PPM symbol.
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APPENDIX
7.A Proof of Theorem 27
We first prove a quantum counterpart of [70, Lemma 2.2].
Lemma 52. Let ρAB be a bipartite state and EA→AF be a quantum channel. We then have
I(A;B)ρ > I(A;B|F )ρ′ , (7.68)
where ρ′ABF , (EA→AF ⊗ idB)(ρAB).
Proof. We have
I(A;B|F )ρ′ = H(B|F )ρ′ −H(B|FA)ρ′ (7.69)
(a)
6 H(B)ρ′ −H(B|FA)ρ′ (7.70)
= I(AF ;B)ρ′ (7.71)
= D(ρ′ABF‖ρ′AF ⊗ ρ′) (7.72)
(b)
6 D(ρAB‖ρA ⊗ ρB) = I(A;B)ρ, (7.73)
where (a) follows from the sub-additivity of the von Neumann entropy, and (b) follows
from the data processing inequality.




6 µ. We then have by [85, Th. 9.3.1]
F (σ̃Qn , |0〉〈0|⊗n) > 1− µ. (7.74)
Let σ̃RAQn be a purification of σ̃AQn . By Uhlmann’s theorem, there exists a unit vector
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|φ〉RA such that
F (σ̃RAQn , φRA ⊗ |0〉〈0|⊗n) > 1− µ. (7.75)
Let τ̃AQn , trR (|φ〉〈φ|RA) ⊗ |0〉〈0|
⊗n and τCSASBEn be the output of the protocol if
Alice initially prepares τ̃AQn instead of σ̃AQn . By monotonicity of the fidelity, we have
F (τ̃AQn , σ̃AQn) > 1−µ, and therefore, ‖τ̃AQn − σ̃AQn‖1 6
√
µ. By the data processing in-
equality, we also have ‖τCSASBEn − σCSASBEn‖1 6
√
µ. This implies that P(SA 6= SB)τ 6
ε+
√
µ. We can write the number of generated bits as





















µK + Hb (
√
µ) + δK (7.80)
= H(SA|C)τ + I(SA;C)τ +
√
µK + Hb (
√
µ) + δK, (7.81)
where (a) follows from [96, Eq. (360)], (b) follows from the data processing inequality,
and (c) follows from Fannes’ inequality. By [85, Exercise 11.10.2], we also have
I(SA;C)τ 6 I(SA;C)σ + 3
√













































where (a) follows from [96, Eq. (360)].
Using Fano’s inequality, we obtain























where (a) follows from using Lemma 52 for each use of the public channel, (b) follows
from data processing inequality, and (c) follows since τ̃AQn = τ̃A⊗ τ̃Qn . Combining (7.81),
(7.82), (7.87), and (7.91), we obtain the desired bound.
7.B A Quantum Resolvability Result
We prove a quantum channel resolvability result based on the privacy amplification result
Lemma 7 in Chapter 1, the classical counter-part of which was proved in [21]. Note that we
cannot use the standard quantum resolvability result Lemma 6 in Chapter 1 since the bound
therein depends on the dimension of the output space, which itself grows exponentially for
v` 7→ ρv`Qn .
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|X | |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxA be a cq state on HX ⊗HA. Let δ > 0, h be
a positive integer such that |X | is divisible by h and
log h > log |X | −H
δ
4



































Proof. Let us define Z , J1, |X |
h

















By definition of EfX→Z and ρXA, we have



















































































where (a) follows from (7.92). Taking a bijection g : J1, hK → f−1(z) completes the
proof.
7.C Reducing Public Communication When mv is a Power of a Prime
In the next lemma, we show that under our symmetry conditions on F and ρXA, the choice
of z does not matter.
Lemma 54. Suppose that for all f ∈ F , z, z′ ∈ Z , there exist a bijection φ : X → X and
unitary U acting onHA (depending on z, z′, and f ) such that

















































































































ρxA = ρA. (7.111)
Therefore, we obtain (7.104).
When mv is a power of a prime, we provide an example of two-universal hash func-
tions satisfying the conditions of Lemma 54. We assume in this paragraph only that
V = J0,mv − 1K to be consistent with the standard notation for finite fields. Note first
that V` is a field with component-wise addition modulo mv and a multiplication operation
denoted by . We use the short-hand 0m for the all-zero sequence of length m and ·|·
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for the concatenation of two sequences. For k ∈ J1, `K and u` ∈ V`, let fu`(v`) be the
first k elements of u`  v`. By [97, 98], F =
{
fu` : u




is a regular two-
universal class of hash functions. Moreover, for any u` ∈ V` \ {0}, zk, z′k ∈ Vk, we define


































Furthermore, let UCS be the unitary operation on H⊗mQ corresponding to cyclic shift of
length 1, i.e., |φ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |φm〉 7→ |φm〉 ⊗ |φ1〉 ⊗ · · · |φm−1〉. By definition of d(x, v) and
ρv
`






















where v` + v′` is modulo mv. We therefore conclude that (7.103) holds.
7.D Proof of Theorem 30
To prove Theorem 30, we need the following tools.
Theorem 31. ([85, Theorem 12.1.1]) Let A and B be two quantum systems. Let ρ0A and ρ1A
be in D(HA) and N : D(HA) → D(HB) be a quantum channel. There exists a quantum









> − logF (ρ1A, (R ◦N )(ρ1A)) (7.118)
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and
(R ◦N )(ρ0A) = ρ0A. (7.119)
Lemma 55. Let A and B be two quantum systems such that A is a composition of two
sub-systems A′ and A′′. Let ρ0A and ρ
1
A be in D(HA) such that for two pure states |φ0〉A′
and |φ1〉A′ in HA′ and a mixed state νA′′ in D(HA′′), we have C(φxA′ ⊗ νA′′ , ρxA) 6 δx. Let
N : D(HA)→ D(HA) be a quantum channels such that F (ρxA,N (ρxA)) > 1− εx. We then
have
F (E(ρ1A), E(ρ0A)) > ℵ(λ, F (φ1A′ , φ0A′))− 2
√
1− F (φ1A′ , φ0A′)δ − δ2, (7.120)
where δ ,
∑






εxδx + 4δ2x, E is a complementary channel to N .
Proof. See Appendix 7.D.1.
We are now ready to provide the proof of Theorem 30.









> − logF (ρ1A, (R ◦ E)(ρ1A)) (7.121)
(R ◦ E)(ρ0A) = ρ0A. (7.122)
Let UA→BE be an isometric extension ofN compatible with E . LetWE→AF be an isometric








is a complementary channel ofR ◦ E and
trAF
(
(1B ⊗WE→AF )UA→BEρ((1B ⊗WE→AF )UA→BE)†
)
= trE (UA→BEρUA→BE) = N (ρ)
(7.124)
Therefore, N is a degraded version of the complementary channel of R ◦ E . Hence, by
Lemma 55, we have
F (N (ρ1A),N (ρ0A)) > ℵ(λ′, F (φ1A′ , φ0A′))− 2
√






1− F (ρxA,R(E(ρxA))) + 4
√






1− F (ρ1A,R(E(ρ1A)) + 4
√




By our assumption in (7.58), we have ℵ(λ, F (φ1A, φ0A)) > ℵ(λ′, F (φ1A, φ0A)). Since ℵ(x, y)
is decreasing in x for positive x, we have
λ′ > λ, (7.128)
which yields that 1 − η > 1 − F (ρ1A,R(E(ρ1A)). Substituting this inequality in (7.121)
completes the proof of our claim.
7.D.1 Proof of Lemma 55
We first prove a “triangle” inequality for fidelity measure, which follows from the triangle
inequality for C(·, ·).
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Lemma 56. Let ρ, σ, ρ′, σ′ ∈ D(A) and let ε , C(ρ, ρ′) + C(σ, σ′). We then have
F (ρ, σ) > F (ρ′, σ′)− 2
√
1− F (ρ′, σ′)ε− ε2. (7.129)
Proof. By the triangle inequality for C(·, ·), we have
C(ρ, σ) 6 C(ρ′, σ′) + C(ρ, ρ′) + C(σ, σ′) = C(ρ′, σ′) + ε (7.130)
This could be written as
√
1− F (ρ, σ) 6
√
1− F (ρ′, σ′) + ε. (7.131)
Therefore,
1− F (ρ, σ) 6 1− F (ρ′, σ′) + 2ε
√
1− F (ρ′, σ′) + ε2, (7.132)
which yields the desired bound.
We now prove a result similar to Lemma 55 when ρ0A and ρ
1
A are pure.
Lemma 57. Let A and B be finite dimensional quantum systems such that A is a composi-
tion of two sub-systems A′ and A′′. Let |φ0〉A′ and |φ1〉A′ be pure states in HA′ and νA′′ be
a mixed state in D(HA′′). Let us define ρxA , φxA′ ⊗ νA′′ . Let V : HA → HA ⊗HB be an













B) > ℵ(ε, F (φ1A′ , φ0A′)) (7.134)
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Proof. Let |ν〉RA′′ be a purification of νA′′ and define |ψx〉RAB , 1R⊗V (|φx〉A′ ⊗|ν〉A′′R)
(which is consistent with the definition of ψxAB). By Uhlmann’s theorem, there exist isome-







A′ ⊗ UxνA′′R(Ux)†) (7.135)
Furthermore, note that
F (φ1A′ , φ
0
A′) (7.136)
= F (φ1A′ ⊗ νA′′R, φ0A′ ⊗ νA′′R) (7.137)
(a)




6 F (φ1A′ ⊗ U1νA′′R(U1)†, φ0A′ ⊗ U0νA′′R(U0)†) + 2
√
1− F (ψ1ABR, ψ0ABR)ε+ ε2
(7.139)
= F (φ1A′ ⊗ U1νA′′R(U1)†, φ0A′ ⊗ U0νA′′R(U0)†) + 2
√
1− F (φ1A, φ0A)ε+ ε2 (7.140)







1− F (φ1A, φ0A)ε+ ε2, (7.141)




0)†) > 1− 2
√































= ℵ(ε, F (φ1A, φ0A)). (7.146)
We now prove Lemma 55. Note that for




> F (E(φ1A), E(φ0A))− 2
√
1− F (E(φ1A), E(φ0A))δ − δ2 (7.148)
> F (E(φ1A), E(φ0A))− 2
√
1− F (φ1A, φ0A)δ − δ2 (7.149)
(b)
> ℵ(λ, F (φ1A, φ0A)),−2
√
1− F (φ1A, φ0A)δ − δ2, (7.150)
where (a) follows from Lemma 56, and (b) follows from Lemma 57 Additionally, we have
F (φx,N (φx)) > F (ρx,N (ρx))− 4
√
1− F (ρx,N (ρx))δx − 4δ2x (7.151)
> 1− εx − 4
√
εxδx − 4δ2x, (7.152)











We study several versions of a quantum steganography problem, in which two legitimate
parties attempt to conceal a cypher in a quantum cover transmitted over a quantum channel
without arising suspicion from a warden who intercepts the cover. In all our models, we
assume that the warden has an inaccurate knowledge of the quantum channel and we for-
mulate several variations of the steganography problem depending on the tasks used as the
cover and the cypher task. In particular, when the cover task is classical communication,
we show that the cypher task can be classical communication or entanglement sharing;
when the cover task is entanglement sharing and the main channel is noiseless, we show
that the cypher task can be randomness sharing; when the cover task is quantum commu-
nication and the main channel is noiseless, we show that the cypher task can be classical
communication. In the latter case, our results improve earlier ones by relaxing the need for
a shared key between the transmitter and the receiver and hold under milder assumptions
on the cover quantum communication code. The content of this chapter is based on [99,
100].
8.2 Introduction
In steganography, two parties seek to embed information within an innocent-looking mes-
sage without being detected by an unwanted party. The well-known example is that of
two prisoners, Alice and Bob, who aim at developing an escape plan (cyphertext) through
a permissible communication (covertext). The resulting message (stegotext), which is a
combination of cyphertext, covertext, and possibly of a shared secret key, shall be made
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available to a warden Willie and should be almost indistinguishable from the covertext.
While this fictional example illustrates the main motivation behind the problem, the advent
of the digital age has opened several real opportunities to conceal information, including
the embedding of messages in digital images and texts as well as telecommunication net-
works. Applications of modern steganography are now numerous and range from copyright
protection to malicious activities. The importance of such applications has led to the for-
malization of steganography using sound cryptographic principles and the development of
both steganography methods and their countermeasures [10].
The classical information-theoretic limits of information-hiding and steganography have
been studied using different measures of “hiding.” The measures include average distortion
between the covertext and the stegotext [101, 102] as well as relative entropy between the
distributions of the covertext and stegotext [9, 103], which essentially controls the perfor-
mance of the warden’s optimal detector. More recently, these ideas have also been applied
in the context of covert and stealth communications [7, 44]. The main insight derived from
these works is the precise characterization of the number of covert bits that can be embed-
ded in the covertext while remaining undetectable by Willie and of the number of secret key
bits required by Alice and Bob to achieve this goal. The number of covert bits is sensitive
to modeling assumptions, in particular to whether Willie knows the covertext or whether
there is noise in the system. The authors of [20] have shown that reliable and covert trans-
mission of O(n) bits of information is possible in n uses of an AWGN channel when the
warden has uncertainty about the noise power of the channel. The authors of [104, 105]
have moreover considered covert communication when friendly nodes transmit artificial
noise and have proved that covert transmission of positive rates is possible. Another situ-
ation in which covert communication with a positive rate was shown to be possible is the
transmission from a relay node to a destination when the source is uncertain regarding the
forwarding strategy of the relay node [53].
Concurrently, the quantum description of physical devices used in information process-
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ing tasks has made us re-think communication and computation problems from two per-
spectives. First, one can use the limits imposed by quantum mechanics to devise enhanced
solutions to hard problems in the classical world. For example, quantum key distribution
offers unconditional security for classical communication while most classical solutions
rely on assumptions regarding the computational power of the adversary. Second, one
often encounters new challenging problems in a quantum setting, such as entanglement
generation, which plays a role in intriguing applications such as quantum teleportation and
superdense coding. Returning to the problem of steganography, one can extend the clas-
sical formulation to encompass both these aspects. That is, in addition to leveraging the
quantum nature of the communication channel to perform classical steganography, one can
ask for new paradigms to hide various quantum information processing tasks. Alice and
Bob could, for instance, conceal a classical message within a quantum error-correcting
code used to mitigate the quantum noise of a quantum computer. Because of the unique
nature of quantum states and channels, quantum steganography is in principle richer than
classical steganography [106], and much efforts have been devoted to characterize how
much information can be embedded into various quantum channels with or without noise
[107, 108, 23, 109, 110, 111], and to assess how much key is required to achieve the task.
We revisit here the model of quantum steganography put forward in [111, 109], which
assumes that the warden has inaccurate knowledge of what the channel is. Specifically, we
assume that the warden’s knowledge of the channel is a degraded version of the real chan-
nel, which can be achieved by intentionally cascading another channel at the transmitter.
We develop and analyze several quantum steganography protocols and obtain the following
four results summarized in Table 8.2.1.
1. When the cover protocol consists of communicating classically over a quantum chan-
nel, we show that, in addition to the cover classical message, a cypher classical mes-
sage can be transmitted (Theorem 32).
2. When the cover protocol consists of communicating classically over a quantum chan-
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X noisy main channel X noiseless main channel
nel, we show that, in addition to the cover classical message, entangled qubits can be
generated. (Theorem 33).
3. When the cover protocol consists of sharing entanglement and the channel is noise-
less, we show that legitimate parties can share entanglement as well as classical ran-
domness (Theorem 34).
4. When the cover protocol consists of quantum communication and the channel is
noiseless, we show that, in addition to the cover quantum message, a cypher classical
message can be transmitted (Theorem 35).
In all aforementioned results, the observed channel output state when the stego protocol is
executed over the true channel resembles the observed state when the cover protocol is ex-
ecuted over the channel expected by the warden. Unlike earlier results [108, 111, 109], we
show that no shared key is required to run the stego protocol when the channel is noiseless.
This is achieved through the use of a random encoder obtained from privacy amplification
and source coding with side information techniques similar to [112, 29]. Furthermore, we
relax the assumption on the cover code in [111] that “on a valid codeword in the QECC,
the typical errors all have distinct error syndromes, and act as unitaries that move the state
to a distinct, orthogonal subspace,” by relying on one-shot coding results. Our main results
are not single-letterized because of the arbitrary structure of the cover code; however, we
specialize our results to certain classes of codes and obtain a single-letterized expression
for those examples.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce our notation in Sec-
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tion 8.3. We formulate different information process protocols over a quantum channel
and define our problem in Section 8.4. We state our main theorems in Section 8.5. We
next calculate the rate of the cypher protocol for specific instances of cover protocols in
Section 8.6. We finally prove the main theorems in Section 8.7.
8.3 Notation
Let ∅A be the channel that maps all states inD(HA) to the trivial state in a one-dimensional
state.
Suppose that ρXB =
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB is a cq state. We recall two versions of
Rényi quantum mutual information [37] for a 6= 0,



























We also define the Rényi quantum entropy as Ha(ρ) , − 1
a
log tr (ρa+1) [37]. These quan-
tities are approximated by the Holevo information when ρ and N have a product structure
and are useful to express the coding theorems for cq channels [37, 113, 36].
For a positive integer M , let H(M) denote the M -dimensional space spanned by the
orthonormal basis {|1〉, · · · , |M〉}. We also define id(M)(ρ) , ρ and id(M)(ρ) , ∑Mi=1




. Furthermore, we define the perfectly entangled and the




















Suppose that Alice and Bob are connected by a quantum channel NA→B : L(HA) →
L(HB) and use the channel n times to run a protocol, which could be a combination of four
primary tasks (classical communication, quantum communication, randomness sharing,
and entanglement sharing), as defined next.
• Classical Communication: Alice wishes to reliably transmit a classical message
W uniformly distributed over J1,MK. A code consists of a function f : J1,MK →
D(H⊗nA ) for Alice to encode message w into an input state ρwAn , f(w) and a POVM
Λ = {Λw}w∈J1,MK for Bob to decode W . We call the code an (M, ε)CC classical




wN ⊗nA→B(f(w))) > 1−ε. The induced




• Quantum Communication: Alice wants to transmit a quantum state ρW acting on
an M -dimensional Hilbert space HW , H(M). Alice encodes ρW using an encoder
EW→An and transmits it over n uses of NA→B. Bob decodes ρW by applying a de-




F (ρW , (DBn→W ◦ N ⊗nA→B ◦ EW→An)(ρW )) > 1− ε. (8.5)
A more stringent notion of reliability is that the code recovers most of the error
operators applied by the channel. Formally, we call a code (EW→An ,DBn→B) an
(M, ε)QCR code, if there exists a decomposition N ⊗nA→B = ÑAn→Bn +
˜̃NAn→Bn such
that DBn→W ◦ ÑAn→Bn ◦ EW→An = c idW for c > 1− ε. The induced output state is
N ⊗nA→B(EW→An(ρW )) when the message is ρW .
• Randomness Sharing: Alice and Bob desire to share a classical random variable
Φ
(M)
. Let HÃ = HB̃ , H(M). Alice prepares a state ρÃAn over the Hilbert space
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HÃ⊗H⊗nA and transmits ρAn to Bob over n uses of the channelNA→B. Bob applies a
decoder DBn→B̃ to his received stateN ⊗nA→B(ρAn) to obtain the state ρB̃ acting on the
Hilbert space HB̃. The joint state ρÃB̃ , (idÃ ⊗ (DBn→B̃ ◦ N ⊗nA→B))(ρÃAn) is their
final shared randomness. A code (ρÃAn ,DBn→B̃) is called an (M, ε)RS randomness
sharing code if F (Φ
(M)
, ρÃB̃) > 1− ε. The induced output state is N ⊗nA→B(ρAn).
• Entanglement Sharing: Alice and Bob want to share the entangled state Φ(M). An
(M, ε)ES code is defined in the same way as a randomness sharing protocol except
that the final desired state is Φ(M). The induced output state is defined similarly to
that of randomness sharing.





, and Φ(M) with n uses of NA→B. Alice and Bob can in
principle desire to perform any combination of these four protocols over n uses of the chan-
nelNA→B. We formalize only the combinations for which we develop results, i.e., classical
communication/quantum communication, entanglement sharing/randomness sharing, and
entanglement sharing/classical communication.
• Quantum and Classical Communication: Alice wants to transmit a quantum state
ρW over anM -dimensional spaceHW , H(M) and an independent classical message
W uniformly distributed over J1,MK. When W = w, she encodes ρW using the
encoder EwW→An . Bob decodes the messages using a decoder DBn→WW . The code is







|w〉〈w|(DBn→W ◦ N ⊗nA→B ◦ EwW→An)(ρW )
)
> 1− ε, (8.6)




w=1N ⊗nA→B(EwW→An(ρW )) when the quantum message is ρW .
• Entanglement and Randomness Sharing: Alice and Bob want to share the state
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Figure 8.4.1: Willie’s expectation (top) and true communication (bottom)
Φ(M) ⊗ Φ(M). An (M,M, ε)ES-RS code is defined in the same way as a randomness
sharing protocol except that the final desired state is Φ(M) ⊗ Φ(M). The induced
output state is defined similarly to that of randomness sharing.
• Classical Communication and Entanglement Sharing: Alice wants to transmit a
classical message W uniformly distributed over J1,MK and share the entangled state
Φ(M) with Bob. Let HÃ = HB̃ , H(M) and HW , H(M). A code consists of an
encoder f : J1,MK → HÃ ⊗ HAn and a decoder DBn→WB̃. Given the classical
message W = w, Alice prepares f(w) and sends the subsystem An over n uses
of NA→B. Bob applies DBn→WB̃ to his received state. We call (f,DBn→WB̃) an



















All these protocols can be enhanced with a shared secret classical key S uniformly dis-
tributed over J1, KK, which can help Alice and Bob induce a specific output state. As de-
picted in Fig. 8.4.1, Willie expects Alice and Bob to execute a protocol Pc, which is called
the cover protocol and is known to Willie. However, Willie has an inaccurate estimation of
the channel and believes that the channel between Alice and Bob isNA→B ◦MA→A, which
is a degraded version of the true channel NA→B. We assume that running the protocol Pc
induces the quantum state ρcBn at the output of N ⊗nA→B ◦M⊗nA→A. The objective is for Alice
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and Bob to run a stego protocol Ps, which performs the task of Pc together with another
task and induces a state ρsBn at the output of N ⊗nA→B such that ‖ρcBn − ρsBn‖1 is small. The
added tasks can be any of the tasks listed earlier. We focus on four of these as summarized
in Table 8.2.1 and detailed next.
8.5 Main Results
We state our main results in this section, and all proofs are relegated to Section 8.7. We
first show that if the cover protocol is a classical communication code, the stego protocol
could be a classical communication code with a higher rate, equivalent to sending a cypher
classical message in addition to the cover classical message.
Theorem 32 (classical communication / classical communication). Let the cover protocol
be an (M, ε)CC code (f,Λ) for N ⊗nA→B ◦M⊗nA→A inducing the output state ρcBn . We define
ρwBn , N ⊗nA→B ◦M⊗nA→A(f(w)) for w ∈ J1,MK.
• Suppose that HA = HB and NA→B = idA, i.e., the true channel from Alice to Bob
is noiseless. For any ζ > 0, there exists an (MM, ζ + 2
√
ζ + ε)CC stego protocol












• Suppose that the channelNA→B is noisy. Let σ1XAn , · · · , σMXAn be cq states such that
upon defining σwXBn , (idX ⊗ N ⊗nA→B)(σwXAn), we have trX(σwXB) = ρwBn for all
w ∈ J1,MK. Let ζ, ξ ∈]0, 1[ be fixed and M and K be positive integers such that


































− logMw + 1
}
. (8.11)
There exists an (MM, ζ + 2
√
ξ + ε)CC code with logK bits of required common
randomness inducing the output state ρsBn such that ‖ρsBn − ρcBn‖1 6 ξ.
Remark 16. We assume for simplicity that the cover message is uniformly distributed, but
the proof holds for all distributions on the cover message.
Remark 17. The arbitrary choice of σ1XAn , · · · , σMXAn in the second part of Theorem 32
is an essential part of most of the channel coding results, for example the choice of the
channel input state in the definition of the Holevo information of a quantum channel [85,
Definition 13.3.1]. We need however an additional requirement trX(σwXB) = ρ
w
Bn to control
the channel output statistics.
We next show that if the cover protocol is a classical communication code, we can
use a stego protocol to share entanglement and communicate classically. We introduce
the following two definitions to express our results. In the first definition we introduce a
shorthand for the result of Theorem 32. It shall help us compactly state the next theorem
as we use the stego protocol of Theorem 32 as a sub protocol in our stego protocol of
Theorem 33.
Definition 11. Let us fix ξ = ζ in the second part of Theorem 32. For an encoder f
and positive number ζ , let logM
CC
(f, ζ) and logKCC(f, ζ) be the number of bits of the
cypher message and the number of required key bits, respectively, in the stego protocol of
Theorem 32. Note that these quantities are well-defined, because the right hand side of
(8.9), (8.10), and (8.11) only depends on f , ζ , and ξ when the channel is fixed.
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We next introduce a notation for the maximum amount of entanglement that can be
distilled from an arbitrary shared quantum state using local operations and classical com-
munication, known as the entanglement distillation problem.
Definition 12. Let Alice and Bob share ρAB and HÃ = HB̃ , H(M). An entanglement
distillation protocol consists of an encoder EA→CÃ and a decoder DBC→B̃ such that the
output of EA→CÃ is always a cq state. Alice applies EA→CÃ to ρA to obtain a cq state
ρCÃ and transmits C to Bob over a noiseless channel. Bob applies DCB→B̃ to his sub-
system B and the received classical message C. The code (EA→CÃ,DCB→B̃) is called an
(M,L, ρAB, ε)
ED code if dimHC = L and




We further define Ed(ρAB, L, ε) , max
{
M : ∃ (M,L, ρAB, ε)EDcode
}
.







Theorem 33 (classical communication / entanglement sharing). Let the cover protocol
be an (M, ε)CC code (f,Λ) for N ⊗nA→B ◦ M⊗nA→A inducing the output state ρcBn . Further
assume that f(w) = f1(w) ⊗ f2(w) for two functions f1 : J1,MK → D (H⊗n1A ) and f2 :
J1,MK→ D (H⊗n2A ) where n = n1 + n2. Let |φw〉RAn1 be a purification ofM⊗n1A→A(f1(w))
and σwRBn1 , idR ⊗ N ⊗n1A→B(|φw〉〈φw|RAn1 ). For any ζ > 0, there exists an (M,M, 2ζ +
2
√




ε+ ζ)CC−ES stego protocol inducing the output state ρsBn such that
‖ρsBn − ρcBn‖1 6 ζ provided that M 6 minw∈J1,MKEs(|φ〉wRBn1 ,M
CC
(f2, ζ), ζ).
The stego protocol requires logM
CC
(f2, ζ) + logK
CC(f2, ζ) bits of shared key.
Remark 18. Our assumption that f(w) decomposes as f1(w)⊗ f2(w) for all w holds for
common codes for classical communication over quantum channels such as [116].
We next show that if the cover protocol is an entanglement sharing code, there exists a
stego protocol that shares both entanglement and classical randomness.
263
Theorem 34 (entanglement sharing / classical randomness sharing). Let the cover protocol
be an (M, ε)ES code (ρÃAn ,DBn→B̃) for N ⊗nA→B ◦M⊗nA→A inducing the output state ρcBn . If
HA = HB andNA→B = idA, for any ζ > 0 and M , there exists an (M,M, (
√
ε+ζ)2)ES-RS
















Finally we show that a cover protocol for quantum communication can be converted
into a quantum and classical communication stego protocol.
Theorem 35 (quantum communication / classical communication). Let the cover proto-
col be an (M, ε)QCR code (EW→An ,DBn→W ) inducing the output state ρcBn . Suppose that
EW→An = VW→AnρWV †W→An where VW→An is an isometry. If HA = HB and NA→B =
idA, for all ζ > 4
√
ε, there exists an (M,M,max(ζ, ε))QC-CCR stego protocol inducing the


















whereMcA→A is the complementary channel ofMA→A.
8.6 Examples
8.6.1 Classical Codes with Product Structure
Definition 13. Let k and ` be positive integers, and ρ1
Ak
, · · · , ρ`
Ak
∈ D(H⊗kA ). We say
that an encoder f : J1,MK → D(H⊗nA ) has a product structure with respect to Pk,` ,
{ρ1
Ak
, · · · , ρ`
Ak
}, if n is divisible by k and for all w ∈ J1,MK, we have f(w) = ⊗n/ki=1σi
where σ1, · · · , σn/k ∈ Pk,`.
Remark 19. Definition 13 is useful when n/k  1. Several explicit constructions of
1Note that ρsBn and ρ
c
Bn depend on ρW , and this inequality should hold for all choices of ρW .
264
classical codes for quantum channels are in this regime [116]. Moreover, from the stan-
dard random coding arguments, codes with large n/k achieve the classical capacity of any
quantum channel.
Considering the cover classical communication code described in Theorem 32, we sim-
plify the expressions for the rate of the cypher message provided that the cover code has a
product structure and n/k is large enough. Let δ > 0 and let the classical communication
code have a product structure with respect to Pk,`. There exist an integer m depending on
Pk,`, ζ, δ > 0 such that if n/k > m the following two propositions hold.






. For a noisy channel, the number of bits of the cypher
message is at least n
k
(







, using a shared secret
key of δn bits.
Proposition 4. For a noiseless channel, the number of entangled qubits that the stego






required number of shared secret key bits is O(log n).
8.6.2 Gaussian States
Although we have assumed so far that all Hilbert spaces are finite dimensional, the proof
of the first part of Theorem 32 carries over to infinite dimensional spaces since the left-
over hash lemma still holds for such a setting. Gaussian channels form an important class
of infinite dimensional channels, which models optical channels. Let A and B be single
mode bosonic systems, NA→B be noiseless,MA→A be a Gaussian channel, and f(w) be a
Gaussian state for all w. Denoting the symplectic spectra of ρBn by (νw1 , · · · , νwn ), we have




, where ηα(x) , 2α/((x+1)α− (x−1)α).
265














Figure 8.6.1: Rate of the cypher message vs the symplectic eigenvalues ofMA→A(ρ0A) and
MA→A(ρ1A), ν0 and ν1

















We now suppose that the cover code uses a binary modulation, i.e., for two states ρ0A
and ρ1A, we have f(w) = ⊗ni=1ρ
xw,i
A for all w ∈ J1,MK. Let ν0 and ν1 be the symplectic
eigenvalue of MA→A(ρ0A) and MA→A(ρ1A), respectively, with ν0 6 ν1. Upon defining
r , minw∈J1,MK
∑n
i=1 xw,i, we have
logM = sup
a∈]0,1[
−(n− r) log (η1+a(ν









We plot the rate of the cypher message for n = 106, r = n/2, ζ = 10−3 in Fig. 8.6.1.
8.6.3 Quantum Codes of [111]




= 1{j = j′} dj .
This defines a Kraus representation {Fj}j∈J n forM⊗nA→A, where Fj , Fj1 ⊗· · ·⊗Fjn . Let
Tε be the typical subset of Fj , Fj1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Fjn as defined in [118]. If Π is the projector
onto the sub-space of inputs defined by the code, we assume that for all Fj ∈ Tε, we have
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FjΠ = pjUjΠ, where pj = pj1 × · · · × pjn for a probability distribution {pj} on J , and
Uj = Uj1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Ujn for unitaries {Uj} onHA.


















pj log pj − δ
)
. (8.17)
8.6.4 Random Quantum Codes
Proposition 6. Let S be a random M -dimensional subspace ofH⊗nA distributed according
to the Haar measure, and Π denote the projector onto S. LetMA→A be a quantum channel

























Proof. Let |g1〉, · · · , |gM〉 be M random independent Gaussian vectors in H⊗nA as defined
in [119]. Since the distribution of span(|g1〉, · · · , |gM〉) is the same as the distribution
of S by [119], we take S = span(|g1〉, · · · , |gM〉). Defining G , ∑Mj=1 |gj〉〈gj|, the
vectors {|φj〉An , G−
1
2 |gj〉}j∈J1,MK form an orthonormal basis for S. One can check that
































































rank (trA(V V †))
n +
√














where (a) follows from the concavity of Rényi entropy, and (b) follows from the bound in
the proof of [120, Lemma III.1].
8.7 Proofs
8.7.1 One-Shot Results
In this section, we develop one-shot coding results stated in terms of Rényi mutual in-
formation. We shall specialize them to prove our main results in Section 8.7.2. We first
derive an achievability result stating that there exists a classical communication code for a
cq channel inducing a pre-specified state at the output. Our proof is based on combining
quantum channel coding and channel resolvability results.
Lemma 58. Let ρXB =
∑
x∈X PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB be a cq state. Let M and K be positive
integers. For each s ∈ J1, KK, there exist an encoding function gs : J1,MK → X and a

























































Proof. We consider K independently generated random encoders Gs : J1,MK→ X where
Gs(1), · · · , Gs(M) are iid according to PX . By Lemma 4 in Chapter 1, for all ε > 0, there













> 1− ε, (8.27)
if logM 6 Dε/2H (ρXB‖ρX ⊗ ρB)− log 1ε − 4 where
DεH(ρ‖σ) , − log inf
Q:06Q61,tr(Qρ)>1−ε
tr (Qσ) . (8.28)
By [121, Theorem 2], for all γ > 0, there exists an operator 0 6 Q 6 1XB such that for all
a ∈]0, 1[,
tr (Q(ρX ⊗ ρB)) 6 ν(ρX ⊗ ρB)e−ℵ
a(X;B)ρa−γ(1−a) (8.29)
tr ((1XB −Q)ρXB) 6 ν(ρX ⊗ ρB)e−ℵ
a(X;B)ρa+γa. (8.30)
Choosing γ = ℵa (X;B)ρ − a−1(log ν(ρX ⊗ ρB) + log 2/ε) yields that
D
ε/2




> ℵa (X;B)ρ −
1
a









> ℵa (X;B)ρ −
1
a


































Choosing log λ = ia (X;B)ρ +
2
a
log δ/4 and logMK > −2 log δ
2

















Finally, Markov’s inequality and the bounds on the expected values imply the existence of
the desired code.
We now prove the existence of a code for transmission of a classical message over a
noiseless classical channel while a pre-specified distribution is induced at the output of the
channel. We show that no key is required in this case. The idea of the proof is similar to
[112, Lemma 2].
Lemma 59. Let PX be a PMF over X , and QW be uniform distribution over J1,MK for
M ∈ N+. Let (W,X, Ŵ ) be distributed according to
QWXŴ (w, x, ŵ) , QW (w)QX|W (x|w)1{f(x) = ŵ} (8.36)
for a conditional PMF QX|W and a function f : X → J1,MK. For all ε > 0, there exists
QX|W and f such that






provided that logM 6 supa∈]0,1[H
a(PX)− 4a log 2ε .
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Proof. Let PWXŴ be another distribution for (W,X, Ŵ ) defined as
PWXŴ (w, x, ŵ) = PX(x)1{g(x) = w, g(x) = ŵ}
for a function g : X → J1,MK. Using a privacy amplification result [30, Corollary 5.6.1]
and a bound on smooth min-entropy in terms of Rényi entropy [122, Theorem 7], there
exists g such that ‖PW −QW‖1 6 ε when logM 6 supa∈]0,1[ Ha(PX) − 4a log 2ε . It is







PW (w) 6= 0
PX(x) PW (w) = 0
(8.39)
Note that PŴ |XW (ŵ|x,w) = 1{f(x) = ŵ} and we have PXW (x,w) = PW (w)QX|W (x|w)












|QW (w)− PW (w)| = ‖QW − PW‖1 6 ε. (8.42)
By the data processing inequality, (8.37) holds. Since for any two distributions P and Q,


















∥∥ 6 ε. (8.44)
We extend Lemma 59 to the quantum setting in the following corollary.
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Corollary 3. Let M ∈ N+, ε > 0, H be a finite dimensional Hilbert space, and ρ be a
density operator on H. Suppose that logM 6 supa∈]0,1[Ha(ρ) − 4a log 2ε . There exist a














tr (Λwg(w)) > 1− ε. (8.46)
Proof. Considering an eigen-decomposition of ρ as
∑d
i=1 PX(xi)|xi〉〈xi| and definingX ,
{x1, · · · , xd}, we apply Lemma 59 to PX to obtain a conditional PMFQX|W and a function







































































































8.7.2 Proof of Main Results
Proof of Theorem 32. We separately prove the two parts of the theorem. Let the code
(f,Λ) be the cover protocol, and the main channel be noiseless. By Corollary 3, for every






























> 1− ζ. (8.59)
We define the stego protocol as follows. Let f : J1,MMK → D (H⊗nA ) be defined as




















w (b)= 1B, where (a)
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follows since Γw is a valid POVM, and (b) follows since Λ is a valid POVM. Note next
that























































































wgw(w)) > 1− ζ by (8.59). To lower-bound the second term



































































where (a) follows from the gentle operator lemma [123], and (b) follows from Jensen’s
inequality and the concavity of x 7→
√














































































> 1− ε− ζ. (8.73)
Let ζ , ξ, ρwBn , Mw, M , and K be defined as in the statement of Theorem 32, and the main
channel be noisy. We assume without loss of generality that Mw is divisible by M for all
w, otherwise we define M
′
w , bMw/McM , and | logMw − logM
′
w| 6 1. By Lemma 58,
for each w, there exist K encoding functions gs,w : J1,MwK → D(H⊗nA ) and K POVMs


















We define the stego protocol as follows. For s ∈ J1, KK, w ∈ J1,MK, and w ∈ J1,MK,














Λw. As done previously, one can show that for each s ∈ J1, KK,


































































where (a) follows since the index (w − 1)µw + i is changing from 1 to Mw. Repeating







Λ(w−1)M+ws fs((w − 1)M + w)
)
> 1− ζ − 2
√







































































where (a) follows from the convexity of the trace norm.
Proof of Theorem 33. Intuitively, Alice splits the transmission into two part. Alice gener-
ates a purification of the state supposed to be transmitted in the first part, keeps the reference
system for herself, and transmits the state over the channel, which results in a shared entan-
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gled state between Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob use an entanglement distillation protocol
to distill perfect entanglement in the second part of the transmission. This might require
classical communication, which can be achieved by using the result of Theorem 32. To for-
mally state our protocol, we first need a generalization of the gentle measurement lemma.
Proposition 7. Suppose that ρx ∈ D(H) is a density operator, N x : D(H) → D(H′) is a
quantum channel for all x ∈ X , and Λ = {Λx}x∈X is a POVM. Suppose that PX is a PMF



















Proof. See Appendix 8.8.
Let (f,Λ) be the (M, ε)CC satisfying f(w) = f1(w) ⊗ f2(w) for all w ∈ J1,MK,





(f2, ζ) and K , KCC(f2, ζ). Using the same argument as in the proof of
Theorem 32, there exist an encoder function gw : J1,M
CCK × J1, KK → D (H⊗n2A ) and a






















> 1− ζ. (8.86)













CBn1→B̃). Let S1 and S2 be two
shared secret keys between Alice and Bob uniformly distributed over J1,MCCK and J1, KK,
respectively. We define a POVM Λs2 = {Λ
w,w
s2





The stego protocol would operate as follows when W = w.





R and sends gw(C ⊕ S1, S2) over n2 uses of NA→B. Bob performs the POVM
ΛS2 to decode W and C with the help of S1. Bob finally applies DwCBn1→B̃ to his first n1
received subsystem to obtain the entangled state.
Let ρwBn denote the state received by Bob when W = w and the cover protocol is
executed over n uses of NA→B ◦MA→B. Let ρwBn denote the state received by Bob when
W = w and the stego protocol is executed over n uses of NA→B. Note that both ρwBn and
ρwBn decompose as
ρwBn = (NA→B ◦MA→A)⊗n1(f1(w))⊗ (NA→B ◦MA→A)⊗n2(f2(w)) (8.87)
ρwBn = N ⊗n1A→B(φwAn1 )⊗N ⊗n2A→B
(∑
w,s2
P(C + S1 = w, S2 = s2)gw(w, s2)
)
(8.88)








N ⊗n2A→B (gw(w, s2))
)
. (8.89)
We have (NA→B ◦MA→A)⊗n1(f1(w)) = N ⊗n1A→B(φwAn1 ) because |φw〉RAn1 is a purification
ofM⊗n1A→A(f1(w)). We therefore have














which is less than ζ by (8.85). By the convexity of trace norm, it holds that ‖ρcBn − ρsBn‖1 6
















N ⊗nA→B(φwAn1 ⊗ gw(w, s2))
)




In other words, Bob correctly decodes W and C with probability at least 1− ζ − 2√ε+ ζ .
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We fix W = w, S1 = s1, and S2 = s2 and denote
(Ew





P(C = c|W = w)|c〉〈c|C ⊗ φw,cÃAn1 . (8.92)
Fixing a value C = c and setting w , c⊕ s1, Alice transmits the subsystem An of φw,cÃAn1 ⊗
gw(w, s2) over N ⊗nA→B, which results in the state φw,cÃBn .
























































6 ζ + 2
√
















Using the triangle inequality completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 34. Let |φ〉RÃAn be a purification of ρÃAn . Let VA→BE and WBn→B̃H be
isometric extensions of NA→B ◦ MA→A = MA→A and DBn→B̃, respectively. The stego
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protocol will be as follows. Alice prepares a pure state |ω〉RÃBnEn , 1RÃ⊗V ⊗nA→BE|φ〉RÃAn
and sends ωBn overN ⊗nA→B. Bob appliesWBn→B̃H on ωBn , which results in the overall state
|ψ〉RÃEnB̃H , (1RÃEn ⊗WBn→B̃H) ◦ (1RÃ ⊗ V ⊗nA→BE)|φ〉RÃAn , (8.96)
Note that F (Φ(M), ψÃB̃) > 1− ε from our assumption on the code. We now follow a stan-
dard application of Uhlmann’s theorem to show that Bob can indeed decode ψRE . Note that
|ψ〉RÃEnB̃H is a purification of ψÃB̃. The state Φ(M) also has a purification overHRÃEnB̃H .
Uhlmann’s theorem therefore implies the existence of a purification |τ〉RÃEnB̃H of Φ(M)
over HRÃEnB̃H such that |〈τ |ψ〉RÃEnB̃H |2 = F (Φ(M), ψÃB̃). The vector |Φ(M)〉 ⊗ |0〉 is
another purification of Φ(M) for every unit vector |0〉 ∈ HREnH . By [85], there exists a
unitary TREnH→REnH onHREnH such that
|τ〉RÃEnB̃H = (1ÃB̃ ⊗ TREnH→REnH)|Φ(M)〉ÃB̃ ⊗ |0〉 (8.97)
= |Φ(M)〉 ⊗ (TREnH→REnFnH |0〉) (8.98)
, |Φ(M)〉 ⊗ |τ ′〉REnH . (8.99)
We thus have 〈τ |ψ〉RÃEnB̃H = (〈Φ(M)| ⊗ 〈τ |REnH)|ψ〉RÃEnB̃H . We consider a Schmidt




PX(x)|αx〉REn⊗|βx〉H , where PX
is a PMF over X , and |αx〉REn and |βx〉H are orthonormal in REn and H , respectively. Let
X be a random variable distributed according to PX , f : X → J1,MK, and Q and Pf(X) be
the uniform distribution and the distribution of f(X), respectively. By [30, Corollary 5.6.1]





6 ζ . Alice measures {ΛwA ,
∑
x:f(x)=w |αx〉〈αx|REn}w∈J1,MK
on ψREn and Bob measures {ΛwB ,
∑
x:f(x)=w |βx〉〈βx|H}w∈J1,MK on ψH . Let WA and WB
denote the output of the Alice’s and Bob’s measurement, respectively and AREn→WA and
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BH→WB denote the corresponding quantum channels to these measurements. We have
√










∥∥(idÃB̃ ⊗AREn→WA ⊗ BH→WB)(ψÃB̃REnH) (8.102)





















1− F (ψÃB̃REnH ,Φ(M) ⊗ |τ ′〉〈τ ′|REnH)
−












We can also write
























Proof of Theorem 35. We start the proof by a technical lemma that helps us simplify the
expression of the rate of the cypher message. Let (EW→A,DA→W ) be an (M, ε)QCR code for
one use of the channelMA→A. Suppose that EW→A(ρW ) = VW→AρWV †W→A where VW→A
is an isometry, and Π = VW→AV
†
W→A is the projector on to the range of VW→A. Consider
a decomposition, MA→A = M̃A→A + M̃A→A such that DB→W ◦ M̃A→A ◦ EW→A =
c idW for c > 1 − ε. There exists a Kraus representation {Fj}j∈J for M̃A→A such that
ΠF †j Fj′Π = 1{j = j′} djΠ for real positive numbers {dj : j ∈ J }. Define a PMF PJ over
J as PJ(j) , dj∑
j′ dj′
.
Lemma 60. For all δ > 2
√











McA→A is the complementary channel ofMA→A.
Proof. See Appendix 8.9
Consider the (M, ε)QCR cover protocol (EW→An ,DBn→W ) for the channelM⊗nA→A. Let
EW→An(ρ) = VW→AnρV †W→An where VW→An is an isometry, and Π denote the projec-
tor onto the range of VW→An . By definition, there exists a decomposition M⊗nA→A =
M̃An→An + M̃An→An such that DBn→W ◦ M̃An→An ◦ EW→An = c idW with c > 1− ε. By
the same argument as in the proof of [32, Theorem 10.1], there exists a Kraus representa-
tion {Fj}j∈J for M̃An→An such that ΠF †j Fj′Π = 1{j = j′} djΠ. By polar decomposition,
we therefore have FjΠ , Uj
√
ΠF †j FjΠ =
√
djUjΠ for some unitary Uj onH⊗nA .
Let J be distributed according to PJ(j) ,
dj∑
j′ dj′
, andQ denote the uniform distribution




























































where (a) follows from Lemma 60, and (b) follows from [122, Theorem 7].
Let µw ,
∑







(for µw = 0 take EwW→An = EW→An). We define the decoder for Bob as
DBn→WW (ρBn)
, (DBn→W ⊗ idW )
(∑
j
(PU †j ⊗ |g(j)〉)ρBn(UjP ⊗ 〈g(j)|) + EρBnE†
)
, (8.116)
where the term Eρ†BnE
† is added to ensure that DBn→WW is trace-preserving. By the
argument in the proof of [32, Theorem 10.1], DBn→WW is a valid quantum channel. The
partial channels are
DBn→W (ρBn) , DBn→W
(∑
j












|g(j)〉〈g(j)|+ E ′′ρBnE ′′†. (8.118)
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PU †j EwW→An(ρW )UjP
)
|g(j)〉〈g(j)|



















































































For a w ∈ J1,MK we have






























 (UjP ) (8.131)
= M̃An→AnEW→An(ρW ). (8.132)
Hence, it holds thatDBn→W ◦M̃An→An ◦EwW→An = DBn→W ◦M̃An→An ◦EW→An = cidW
for c > 1− ε. Finally for all ρW , we have
‖ρcBn − ρsBn‖1 =
∥∥∥∥∥M
⊗n























For the first term, we have



































































∣∣∣∣∣ 6 ε+ ζ, (8.140)


























= 1− c 6 ε. (8.144)
8.8 Proof of Proposition 7


































































































PX(x)tr (Λxρx) 6 ε. (8.150)



















































PX(x)tr (Λxρx) 6 2
√
ε, (8.155)
where (a) follows from the date processing inequality (which holds for non-normalized
states), and (b) follows from the concavity of the mapping x 7→
√
1− x.
8.9 Proof of Lemma 60
We extend {Fj}j∈J to a Kraus representation {Fj}j∈K for the channelMA→A withJ ⊂ K.
By [85], UA→AE ,
∑
j∈K Fj ⊗ |j〉E is an isometric extension ofMA→A where {|j〉E}j∈K









































For the projector Γ ,
∑
j∈J |j〉〈j|E , we have










































































= c > 1− ε, (8.165)
where (a) follows since {Fj}j∈J is a Kraus representation of M̃A→A, (b) follows since
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M. Peev, “The security of practical quantum key distribution,” Reviews of Modern
Physics, vol. 81, no. 3, 1301–1350, 2009.
[35] Y. Polyanskiy, H. V. Poor, and S. Verdú, “Channel coding rate in the finite block-
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